Univ., Diss.--Trier, 1996.

Abstract: In this dissertation, I propose a solution to Ronald Dworkin’s challenge from hard cases. Hard cases are cases in which the judges agree on the facts of the case and on what the posited law requires, but they disagree on what the law on the matter is. It is commonly thought that hard cases are decided on moral grounds, and that this problem raises the problem of explaining how the law can include unposited moral considerations. Dworkin argues that this problem generalizes, and that a theory of law must explain how all attempts to determine what the law is must make appeal to moral considerations. I argue that existing attempts to solve this problem fail. On the one hand, Dworkin argues that every attempt to determine what the law is must include an appeal to all moral considerations. This overstates the role of morality in law. Legal positivists, on the other hand, hold that moral considerations can be legally binding only when they are anticipated by the posited law. This understates the role of morality in law. By making the validity of moral considerations depend on the posited rules, inclusive positivists remain vulnerable to the possibility that a new hard case will arise that is not anticipated by the posited rules, but that the law can resolve nonetheless. And by excluding all moral considerations from law, exclusive positivists fail to explain law as we know it. Instead, I propose an alternative positivist solution to Dworkin’s challenge. First, legal positivists need not accept Dworkin’s understanding of source-based considerations as excluding all appeals to morality in their applications By econfiguring this problematic distinction, positivists can explain who the law can require frequent appeal to morality in the application of its rules. Secondly, I argue, the problem of hard cases is best understood as in instance of the prior problem of distinguishing legal rules from all other rules to which people are subject. And, I hold that Hart’s solution to this prior problem solves this problem as well. I thus conclude that the problem of hard cases poses no special threat to legal positivism.

Abstract: In this dissertation, I propose a solution to Ronald Dworkin’s challenge from hard cases. Hard cases are cases in which the judges agree on the facts of the case and on what the posited law requires, but they disagree on what the law on the matter is. It is commonly thought that hard cases are decided on moral grounds, and that this problem raises the problem of explaining how the law can include unposited moral considerations. Dworkin argues that this problem generalizes, and that a theory of law must explain how all attempts to determine what the law is must make appeal to moral considerations. I argue that existing attempts to solve this problem fail. On the one hand, Dworkin argues that every attempt to determine what the law is must include an appeal to all moral considerations. This overstates the role of morality in law. Legal positivists, on the other hand, hold that moral considerations can be legally binding only when they are anticipated by the posited law. This understates the role of morality in law. By making the validity of moral considerations depend on the posited rules, inclusive positivists remain vulnerable to the possibility that a new hard case will arise that is not anticipated by the posited rules, but that the law can resolve nonetheless. And by excluding all moral considerations from law, exclusive positivists fail to explain law as we know it. Instead, I propose an alternative positivist solution to Dworkin’s challenge. First, legal positivists need not accept Dworkin’s understanding of source-based considerations as excluding all appeals to morality in their applications By econfiguring this problematic distinction, positivists can explain who the law can require frequent appeal to morality in the application of its rules. Secondly, I argue, the problem of hard cases is best understood as in instance of the prior problem of distinguishing legal rules from all other rules to which people are subject. And, I hold that Hart’s solution to this prior problem solves this problem as well. I thus conclude that the problem of hard cases poses no special threat to legal positivism.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2001. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 400-422).

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Faculdade de Direito, 2008. / Submitted by Suelen Silva dos Santos (suelenunb@yahoo.com.br) on 2009-09-15T18:26:08Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissert_Guilherme Rodrigues_ A afirmacao da justica.pdf: 554604 bytes, checksum: 2d3e79f838f46a0bc4d00213d33a2f56 (MD5) / Rejected by Gomes Neide(nagomes2005@gmail.com), reason: Su, vc esqueceu de preencher um dos campos de informações adicionais. Me avise quando corrigir! Beijinhos! Kell ♥ on 2010-06-29T19:40:21Z (GMT) / Submitted by Suelen Silva dos Santos (suelenunb@yahoo.com.br) on 2010-06-30T17:38:00Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissert_Guilherme Rodrigues_ A afirmacao da justica.pdf: 554604 bytes, checksum: 2d3e79f838f46a0bc4d00213d33a2f56 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Daniel Ribeiro(daniel@bce.unb.br) on 2010-06-30T18:32:32Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissert_Guilherme Rodrigues_ A afirmacao da justica.pdf: 554604 bytes, checksum: 2d3e79f838f46a0bc4d00213d33a2f56 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2010-06-30T18:32:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissert_Guilherme Rodrigues_ A afirmacao da justica.pdf: 554604 bytes, checksum: 2d3e79f838f46a0bc4d00213d33a2f56 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-02 / O problema a ser enfrentando pelo trabalho é o da possibilidade de aplicação da justiça diante do reconhecimento do caráter estruturalmente indeterminado do direito moderno, tendo-se em vista o esgotamento da força explicativa das teorias positivistas. Face à crença irracional de que textos racionalmente elaborados poderiam reduzir a complexidade da tarefa interpretativa e ao ceticismo decisionista, Ronald Dworkin buscou resgatar a crença na força normativa dos direitos virando do avesso a pureza epistemológica pretendida pelo positivismo e restaurando a plausibilidade do conceito de justiça em termos pós-metafísicos e pós-convencionais, defendendo que a postura a ser adotada pelo aplicador do direito deve ser a de buscar a única resposta correta no ordenamento jurídico em sua integridade. O resgate reflexivo do conteúdo normativo da modernidade e da própria idéia de razão se mostra fundamental para a compreensão do papel dos princípios na argumentação jurídica contemporânea, na fundamentação da democracia e no desenvolvimento de eticidades reflexivas. A teoria de Ronald Dworkin será o fio condutor da análise a ser empreendida, por sua abordagem que busca fazer valer simultaneamente as pretensões à justiça e à segurança jurídica. A compreensão da tensão existente entre normas fundamentais, e o debate travado com teorias que vêem os princípios como incompatíveis será de fundamental importância para as conclusões do trabalho, que buscará então demonstrar que mesmo em decisões onde se procura afirmar explicitamente um balanceamento de valores a busca por correção, no sentido apontado, se faz presente e desempenha um papel decisivo na compreensão das exigências normativas dos princípios jurídicos. _________________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT / The problem confronted in this work is that of the possibility of application of justice in face of the recognition of the structurally indeterminate character of the modern law, having in sight the exhaustion of the explaining force of the positivist theories. Challenging both the irrational belief that rationally elaborated legal texts could reduce the complexity of the interpretative task and the decisionist skepticism, Ronald Dworkin aims at rescuing the belief in the normative force of rights, turning upside down the epistemic pureness intended by the positivism and restoring the plausibility of the concept of justice in post-metaphysical and post-conventional terms, defending that the attitude to be adopted by those who apply the law must be that of searching the one right answer required by the legal system in its integrity. The reflective rescue of the normative content of the modernity and the proper idea of reason is considered essential for the understanding of the role of principles in contemporary legal reasoning, in the legitimate basis of democracy and in the development of reflexive ethics. The theory of Ronald Dworkin will be the conducting wire of the analysis undertaken, for its approach that seeks simultaneously to validate both the claim to justice and to legal certainty. The understanding of the existing tension between basic norms, and the debate with theories that comprehend principles as being essentially incompatible will be of great importance for the conclusions of the work, that it will then try to demonstrate that even in decisions where a balancing of values is explicitly defended, the search for rightness, in the sense described, is present and plays a decisive role in the understanding of the normative requirements of legal principles.

劉傑雄. / 手稿本及手稿本複印本. / Thesis (M.A.)--香港中文大學, 1988. / Shou gao ben ji shou gao ben fu yin ben. / Includes bibliographical references: leaves [13]-[16] / Liu Jiexiong. / Thesis (M.A.)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 1988. / 引言 --- p.1 / Chapter 第一部份 --- 哈特對法律道德關係的看法 --- p.14 / Chapter （甲） --- 社會律則的一般分析 --- p.14 / Chapter （一） --- 社會律則的意義 --- p.14 / Chapter （二） --- 社會律則兩方面的陳述 --- p.16 / Chapter （三） --- 義務 --- p.18 / Chapter （乙） --- 道德 --- p.21 / Chapter （一） --- 道德的意義 --- p.21 / Chapter （二） --- 道德的基本成份 --- p.22 / Chapter （三） --- 道德的特質　 --- p.30 / Chapter （丙） --- 法律 --- p.36 / Chapter （一） --- 基始律則──義務律 --- p.36 / Chapter （二） --- 從屬律則──轉變律、審裁律和認可律 --- p.37 / Chapter （三） --- 法律的成份 --- p.47 / Chapter （丁） --- 法律與道德的關係 --- p.48 / Chapter 第二部份 --- 狄奧堅對哈特的批評 --- p.61 / Chapter （甲） --- 一個基本的概念──原則 --- p.62 / Chapter （一） --- 原則的意思 --- p.62 / Chapter （二） --- 原則和律則 --- p.67 / Chapter （三） --- 原則的來源 --- p.70 / Chapter （乙） --- 對哈特法律理論的批評 --- p.72 / Chapter （一） --- 哈特的兩個選擇 --- p.73 / Chapter （二） --- 第一個選擇──至少有些原則具有法律的約束力 --- p.76 / Chapter （三） --- 第三個選擇──任何原則不具有法律的約束力 --- p.76 / Chapter （四） --- 哈特法律理論的兩難 --- p.88 / Chapter （五） --- 認可律的漏洞 --- p.90 / Chapter （丙） --- 法律與道德的關係 --- p.100 / Chapter 第三部份 --- 哈特與狄奧堅爭辯之評估 --- p.103 / Chapter （一） --- 哈特與狄奧堅爭辯之論題 --- p.103 / Chapter （二） --- 爭辯的爭論點 --- p.103 / Chapter （三） --- 第一個爭論點 --- p.106 / Chapter （四） --- 第二個爭論點　 --- p.116 / Chapter （五） --- 狄奧堅理論的毛病 --- p.124 / 結語 --- p.131

Estudamos dois argumentos de Ronald Dworkin contra a tese de que o direito é exclusivamente determinado por fatos sociais. De acordo com o primeiro, positivistas devem concluir que, se dois advogados estiverem usando diferentes critérios factuais para decidir se uma proposição de direito é verdadeira ou falsa, então cada um quer dizer algo distinto do que diz o outro quando afirma o que é o direito – i.e., não há desacordo genuíno entre os dois, pois estão falando de coisas diferentes. O segundo ataca uma visão reducionista da relação entre a tese das fontes e a tese da indeterminação do direito: se uma proposição jurídica x é verdadeira num sistema jurídico se, e somente se, corresponde a uma ‘fonte’, e se isso também vale para a negação de x, então é simples demonstrar que a ausência de uma fonte para x equivale a uma fonte para não-x - logo, o sistema é ou completo, ou inconsistente. As duas conclusões seriam inaceitáveis; portanto, o positivismo deveria ser abandonado em favor de uma concepção interpretativista do direito. Uma possível escapatória a esses argumentos é admitir uma separação o direito propriamente dito – um sistema de normas, para o qual as teses das fontes e da indeterminação são necessariamente verdadeiras – e o raciocínio jurídico, o qual é compatível com desacordos teóricos e a busca da resposta moralmente correta. Contudo, para Dworkin, o debate sobre o conceito de direito então se torna irrelevante (pois sua função era prática: investigar como os juízes devem decidir) e circular, já que os discordantes já assumem, ab ovo, uma certa relação entre direito e moral. Ao final, a disputa precisa ser decidida em função de qual a melhor filosofia prática. / We’ll study two arguments against the thesis that law is exclusively determined by social facts. According to the first, positivists must conclude that, if two lawyers use different factual criteria to decide if a legal proposition is true or false, then each means something distinct from the other when he says what is the law – i.e., there’s no genuine disagreement between them both, because they’re talking past each other. The second one attacks a reductionist view of the relationship between the source thesis and the indetermination thesis: if a legal proposition x is true in a legal system if, and only if, it corresponds to a source, and if it applies to x’s denial also, then it’s simple to show that the absence of a source for x is equivalent to a source for non-x – so, the system is either complete or inconsistent. The conclusion of both arguments is inacceptable; therefor, positivism must be abandoned in favor of an interpretive conception of law. One possible way out to these arguments is to admit a separation between law as properly understood – a system of norms, to which source and indetermination theses are necessarily true – and legal reasoning, which is compatible with theoretical disagreements and the search for a moral right answer. However, for Dworkin, the debate over the concept of law then becomes irrelevant (since its function was practical: to inquire over how judges should decide) and circular, since the debaters assume, ab ovo, some relationship between law and morality. In the end, the dispute has to be decided according with the best practical philosophy.

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Faculdade de Direito, Pós-Graduação Stricto Sensu em Direito, 2016. / Submitted by Albânia Cézar de Melo (albania@bce.unb.br) on 2016-06-13T13:45:02Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2016_AnaLuizaNunezRamalho.pdf: 1263882 bytes, checksum: 27e49ecae4f9781ba1137a2520a2269f (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Raquel Viana(raquelviana@bce.unb.br) on 2016-06-15T21:54:16Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2016_AnaLuizaNunezRamalho.pdf: 1263882 bytes, checksum: 27e49ecae4f9781ba1137a2520a2269f (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-15T21:54:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2016_AnaLuizaNunezRamalho.pdf: 1263882 bytes, checksum: 27e49ecae4f9781ba1137a2520a2269f (MD5) / O Estado Democrático de Direito é exigência da própria sociedade democrática moderna, que construiu, para si, uma comunidade de princípios, orientada pelo reinado da igualdade. Não obstante o resquício insistente do positivismo jurídico, o atual paradigma moderno, insuflado pelo excesso do Estado Social, aprendeu a lição herdada pelo mito da perfeição científica, pela crença no método heurístico, incapaz de regular a indeterminação imanente ao Direito. Com a virada principiológica, ganham destaque dois filósofos do Direito contemporâneo: Robert Alexy e Ronald Dworkin. A partir da leitura que cada um deles realiza acerca das regras e dos princípios e do lugar que ocupam os direitos fundamentais no cenário jurídico, de suas possibilidades de restrição e da adoção de uma teoria interna ou externa, encontram-se distinções cruciais que convidam a caminhos distintos. Por um lado, percebe-se, em Alexy, o apego à aplicação de um direito metodológico, amparado na perquirição de fórmulas matemáticas para a garantia de certezas. A perspectiva axiológica dos direitos alexiana e o uso da técnica da ponderação e da máxima da proporcionalidade acabam por tratar o Direito como ordem concreta de valores passíveis de gradação, realizáveis, na maior medida do possível. Por outro lado, a perspectiva deontológica dos direitos, à luz da Justiça de ouriços, considera o valor como algo muito importante, passível de uma lógica binária, e não gradual. A unidade do valor forma um tecido que se interliga através dos fios argumentativos construídos pela teoria de Dworkin. Esses fios percorrem cada caso concreto, que exige um esforço interpretativo capaz de levar os direitos a sério, atendendo ao verdadeiro sentido de que o homem possui trunfos contra o Estado. Para isso, Dworkin sugere o reinado dos princípios da igual consideração e respeito, de onde fluem as liberdades, e do respeito às responsabilidades que cada cidadão possui para a escolha de questões essenciais – o respeito à independência ética. Nesse cenário, igualdade e liberdade se pressupõem, na medida em que, se uma liberdade é exigência da igualdade, então essa liberdade constitui um direito forte, um verdadeiro trunfo. Destarte, as liberdades são medidas pelo respeito à independência ética. Aborda-se a incômoda questão do discurso do ódio, defendendo-se que essa modalidade de expressão da liberdade encontra respaldo enquanto direito-trunfo pressuposto do igual tratamento e do respeito à independência ética. Assim, a teoria da liberdade dworkineana agasalha o direito dos detestáveis, e rechaça argumentos utilitaristas, que ilusoriamente contêm um matiz igualitário. Faz-se imperiosa a distinção entre argumentos de política e argumentos de princípio. O cenário jurídico brasileiro, no entanto, e, especialmente no emblemático caso Ellwanger, proíbe o discurso do ódio, por considerá-lo racista e discriminatório. Portanto, o contexto histórico-institucional optou por traçar a tênue linha divisória entre o discurso do ódio e as leis antidiscriminatórias um pouco antes do respeito à independência ética, um pouco antes da configuração real, fática, concreta e iminente de uma prática discriminatória. À luz da teoria dworkineana, isso configuraria um erro, pois o Estado censurou uma voz que tem direito à igualdade, e que merece respeito, ainda que detestável, ao menos que ela configurasse, além do plano das ideias impressas nas folhas de papel, um perigo grave, real, concreto e iminente. Vale refletir se nosso contexto está preparado para ressignificar a liberdade de expressão nos tempos de hoje. _______________________________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT / The democratic rule of law is required by modern democratic society. This society has built a community of principles, guided by the reign of equality. Despite the persistence of legal positivism in some circles, the current legal scene has a new paradigm. It is a product of the lessons learned from the mistakes of the welfare state and the myth of scientific perfection (which is totally unfit to deal with law’s inherent indeterminacy). After this paradigm shift based on the idea of principles, two contemporary philosophers of law have gained preeminence: Robert Alexy and Ronald Dworkin. Each one of them has reached crucially different conclusions, based on distinctions concerning rules and principles, the role of fundamental rights in the legal landscape, and the adoption of the external or the internal theory of rights. On one side, Alexy strives to find certainty, based in mathematical formulas and attachment to a rigorous methodology. Alexy’s view and his use of balancing and proportionality assume that law is a system of values to be realized to the greatest extent possible, given the legal and factual possibilities. On the other side, the deontological view of rights, in light of a justice for hedgehogs, holds that values, because of their extreme importance, should be treated in a binary manner, and not in degrees. The unity of value constitutes a fabric that is intertwined with argumentative threads, just like in Dworkin’s theory. These threads encompass each concrete case, which requires an interpretative effort capable of taking rights seriously. That is the true meaning of an individual having trumps against the Government. That is why Dworkin proposes a reign of principles of equal respect and concern. Every citizen is empowered by liberties – also arising from his responsibilities – that demand respect for his ethical independence. In this context, equality and freedom presuppose one another, because, if a freedom is required by equality, then that freedom constitutes a strong right, a real trump. Therefore, freedoms are measured by the respect to ethical independence. The problem of hate speech can be settled in the following way: hate speech should be defended, because the freedom of speech is a right (and a trump) based on equal treatment and on the respect to one’s ethical independence. Thus, Dworkin’s theory of freedom protects the right of contemptible speech and sets aside utilitarian arguments, which only deceptively abide by equality. It is pivotal to differentiate arguments of policy and of principle. Nevertheless, the Brazilian legal systems, especially after the Ellwanger case, has banned hate speech, considering it racist and discriminating. Hence, the current legal system has chosen to draw a line between hate speech and anti-discrimination laws a little before ethical independence requires (a little before an actual and concrete act of discrimination takes place). In light of Dworkin’s theory, that would be a mistake, since the Government has censured an opinion that, notwithstanding its despicable nature, deserves respect, because of the right to equality. The only exception would be if, beyond the mere expression of ideas, a clear and present danger was imminent. It is necessary to consider if our current system is prepared to give a new meaning to freedom of speech today, one that is compatible with the idea of equal respect and concern.

A presente dissertação investiga o problema da eutanásia. A tecnologia biomédica avançou nestas últimas duas décadas de forma notável, no bom e no mau sentido. É graças a esta tecnologia que muitos e muitos doentes têm sido salvos de suas enfermidades transitórias, porém, de outro lado, estas mesmas medidas, escravizam milhares de vidas a serem vividas sem qualquer perspectiva de cura ou melhora, somente prolongando a vida e o sofrimento de pacientes terminais. Nesse contexto, buscou-se trazer para conhecimento de toda comunidade científica, bem como dos estudantes de direito e afins, as teorias de direito do notório autor Ronald Dworkin, para possibilitar, num primeiro momento, demonstrar como este vê e entende o Direito e para, após, apresentar sua visão acerca do instituto da eutanásia. Por fim, expor a proposta de Dworkin em face de pedidos de eutanásia, bem como trazê-la para a realidade brasileira, verificando a possibilidade de sua implementação face à legislação vigente. Ressalta-se que se espera com este trabalho proporcionar mais uma fonte de conhecimento, para instigar a reflexão acerca da eutanásia em nossa sociedade, uma vez que é realmente necessária já que a morte é um processo vital pelo qual todos nós passaremos. / Submitted by Ana Guimarães Pereira (agpereir@ucs.br) on 2015-10-08T12:28:02Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Joseane Cauduro.pdf: 1220139 bytes, checksum: 4210a2e963d84ecccddc938941629399 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-10-08T12:28:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Joseane Cauduro.pdf: 1220139 bytes, checksum: 4210a2e963d84ecccddc938941629399 (MD5) / The present dissertation deals with the euthanasia’s problem. The biomedical technology advanced to much in these last two decades, in the good one and bad one way. Is is thanks to this new technology that many sick people have been safe of its disease. However, in the another way, this same technology has been slaving thousand of lives, to live without any cure’s perspective or health’s improves, only prolonging those lifes and those suffering. In this context, it tries to bring to the scientific community and for all students, the Law’s Theories of Ronald Dworkin, a very famous author, to make possible to show how he sees and undestands Law. And then, presents his vision concerning the euthanasia institute. After that, it displays the Dworkin’s proposal in face of euthanasia order, as wel as brings his proposal for the brazilian reality, verifying the possibility of it is implementation face the current Law. It is expects with this work to provide plus a new source of knowledge to instigate the reflection concerning the euthanasia in our society. The reflection is very important because deaths is part of ours lifes.

A bioética, a genética e, em especial, a eugenia, tem suscitado grande interesse e preocupação das diversas áreas do conhecimento. Se por um lado as descobertas na área da genética possibilitam a descoberta de cura de determinadas doenças, por outro, leva à consequente preocupação sobre a ética das condutas humanas nessa área e a temida limpeza racial. Diante disso, o presente trabalho faz o contraponto entre a concepção bioconservadora de Jürgen Habermas e a concepção liberal de Ronald Dworkin, considerando os antagonismos de ambas as teorias sob o ponto de vista ético e moral. Após contextualizar o problema no horizonte filosófico, em primeiro lugar, são apresentados os argumentos habermasianos contra a eugenia liberal através da análise da obra O Futuro da Natureza humana: a caminho de uma eugenia liberal? Explicitam-se os argumentos de Habermas em favor de uma ética da espécie a partir dos conceitos de igualdade, reciprocidade, autonomia, autodeterminação, dignidade, além da autocompreensão dos indivíduos como seres livres e iguais. Busca-se, portanto, reconstruir a estratégia argumentativa habermasiana. Posteriormente, criticam-se os argumentos bioconservadores de Jürgen Habermas, principalmente em relação à eugenia positiva (melhoramento humano) e ao fundamento de suas ideias em relação à compreensão normativa das relações humanas. Aborda-se o debate em torno da questão de pós-humanidade com apoio na teoria liberal de Ronald Dworkin, uma vez que tal estágio é considerado consequência da biotecnologia e perfaz um ponto crucial de discórdia entre ambas as teorias. O filósofo estadunidense firma a sua posição a favor de um direito à liberdade reprodutiva e, em consequência, favorável à submissão dos meios de melhoramento humano à liberdade de escolha individual. Assim sendo, este trabalho pretende fornecer elementos para que se constatem os limites da manipulação genética, de modo que cabe à moralidade e à ética preencher o vácuo do destino criado pela biotecnologia, tendo como fim a manutenção da espécie e da natureza humana. / Submitted by Ana Guimarães Pereira (agpereir@ucs.br) on 2016-04-20T18:56:42Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Quetlin Nicole Meurer.pdf: 671791 bytes, checksum: 986a16c040a414501d9304bcee5c65ea (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-20T18:56:42Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertacao Quetlin Nicole Meurer.pdf: 671791 bytes, checksum: 986a16c040a414501d9304bcee5c65ea (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-04-20 / Bioethics, genetic and in particular, eugenics, have aroused great interest and concern in sev-eral knowledge areas. The discoveries in genetics make it possible to discover the cure of cer-tain diseases, on the other hand, leads to consequent concern about the ethics of human behav-ior in that area and the dreaded racial cleansing. Thus, the present work is the contrast be-tween the bioconservative design Jürgen Habermas and the liberal conception of Ronald Dworkin, considering the antagonism of both theories from an ethical and moral point of view. After contextualizing the problem in the philosophical horizon, first, they present the Habermasians arguments against liberal eugenics through the analysis of the work The Future of Human Nature: towards a liberal eugenics? It will explain the Habermas's arguments in favor of the ethics of the species from the concepts of equality, reciprocity, autonomy, self-determination, dignity, beyond the self-understanding of individuals as free and equal beings. Searching, therefore, to reconstruct Habermas's argumentative strategy. Later, criticizing the bioconservatives arguments of Jürgen Habermas, especially in relation to positive eugenics (human enhancement) and the foundation of their ideas in relation to the normative under-standing of human relationships. The debate around the issue of post-humanity with support in the liberal theory of Ronald Dworkin, as this stage is considered a result of biotechnology and makes a crucial point of disagreement between the two theories. The American philoso-pher picks a side in favor of the right of reproductive freedom and, consequently, in favor of the submission of the means of human improvement to freedom of choice. Therefore, this paper aims to provide elements for which they verify the boundaries of genetic manipulation, so that it is up to morality and ethics to fill the vacuum of fate created by biotechnology, tak-ing aim at maintaining the species and the human nature.