No description available.

Task Management (TM) refers to the function in which the human operator manages his/her available sensory and mental resources in a dynamic, complex, safety-critical environment in order to accomplish the multiple tasks competing for a limited quantity of attention. There is reason to believe that the level of automation on the commercial aircraft flight deck may effect TM, however to date there has been little research that directly addresses this effect. Thus, the primary objective of this study was to begin evaluating the relationship between TM of commercial airline pilots and the level of automation on the flight deck by determining how automation affects the frequency of Task Prioritization errors as reported in Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) incident reports. The secondary objective of this study was to create a methodology that modeled an effective way to use ASRS incident report data in an inferential analysis. Two samples of ASRS incident reports were compared. The first sample was composed of 210 incident reports submitted by pilots flying advanced technology aircraft and the second sample was composed of 210 incident reports submitted by pilots flying traditional technology aircraft. To help avoid confounding effects, the two samples were further divided into three sub-samples each made up of 70 reports submitted during a specified time period: 1988-1989, 1990-1991, and 1992-1993. Each incident report was analyzed using an incident analysis form designed specifically for this study. This form allowed the analyst to classify the incident report as either containing a Task Prioritization error or not based on the narrative of the report. Twenty-eight incident reports from the advanced technology sample and 15 from the traditional technology sample were classified as containing Task Prioritization errors. Using the Chi Square (x��) test and a significance level of 0.05, this difference was found to be statistically significant. / Graduation date: 1998

Not available / text

It soon becomes apparent to any student of the Government Regulation of Air Transport that most countries have rules appertaining to the maximum number of hours during which a member of the flight crew of an aircraft may be on duty on the ground and in the air, and the minimum number of hours' rest which shall be accorded such a member. [...]

No description available.

No description available.

No description available.

Work Domain Analysis (WDA) and task analysis are methods that can be used to develop complex systems that support human operators. Task analysis can be used to describe the nominal tasks of many complex safety critical systems which are also highly proceduralized. However, complex systems may require human operators to have a greater understanding of the system's dynamics than can be obtained from procedures derived from a task analysis. This is particularly true when off-nominal events occur, for which there is no procedure. By concentrating on the constraints in the work domain instead of tasks, work domain analysis can complement task analysis by supporting operators during off-nominal events that do not have any predescribed procedures. The goal of this study was to use WDA and two forms of task analysis to derive interface and procedure modifications for a new aviation concept called interval management. Interval management is a new concept whose goal is to increase runway throughput by enabling aircraft to achieve a precise interval behind a lead aircraft. This study used data from a human-in-the-loop study conducted at NASA Langley Research Center to develop a Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA), Control Task Analysis (CTA), and WDA. The HTA was used to describe a nominal set or procedures, the CTA was used to describe strategies pilots could use to make decisions regarding the IM operation, and the WDA was used to determine representations and procedures that could convey complete and accurate knowledge of interval management to the flightcrew.

Automation surprises are examples of poor Human-Machine Interaction (HMI) where pilots were surprised by actions of the automation, which lead to dangerous situations during which pilots had to counteract the autopilot. To be able to identify problems that may arise between pilots and automation before implementation, methods are needed that can uncover potentially dangerous HMI early in the design process. In this work, two such methods, simulation and model checking, have been combined and compared to leverage the benefits of both. In the past, model checking has been successful at uncovering known automation surprises. Simulation, on the other hand, has been successful in the aviation domain and human factor issues. To be able to compare these two approaches, this work focused on a common case study involving a known automation surprise. The automation surprise that was examined, is linked to the former Airbus speed protection logic that caused aircraft on approach to change the flight mode, resulting in a sudden climb. The results provided by the model checking with SAL (Symbolic Analysis Laboratory) in a previous work, have been used to provide input for simulation. In this work, this automation surprise was simulated with the simulation platform WMC (Work Models that Compute) and compared to the corresponding results from SAL. By using the case study, this work provides a method to examine system behavior, such as automation surprises, using model checking and simulation in conjunction to leverage the benefits of both.

Since human errors are one of the major causes of flight accidents, the design and operation of the modern aircraft system deals with them seriously. Particularly, the pilot workload on aviation causes human errors. Whenever new procedures are introduced and operated, the aircraft capabilities have been checked in every aspect. However, there has been little study on the impact of the new procedures such as LDLP, SCDA, SATS, and Steep Angle approach on the pilot performance, workload, and stress. In this study, different methods have been tried to understand the relationship between new procedures and the pilots in terms of performance, workload, and stress. The flight factors (e.g. flight experience, gliding angle, and approach area) were examined by the pilot performance, workload, and stress at the "Final Approach to L/D" phase using the single engine Cessna 172R type flight simulator. Five students and five instructor pilots from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University in Dayton Beach, Florida, participated and they flew under four different simulation tasks of gliding angle and approach area. Their Heart Rate Variability (HRV) and NASA-Task Load Index (TLX) were measured to determine their stress level and subjective workload, respectively. In addition, Landing Performance (LP) data (e.g. landing distance, landing speed) and Above Glide Path Tracking Performance (AGPTP) data were also collected to evaluate pilot performance. As a result, the type of approach area showed a significant effect on pilot performance, workload, and stress determined by ANOVA (HRV, TLX, LP, AGPTP: all are p < .05). Flying over "Populated" area (e.g. a large city) resulted in lower pilot performance and higher pilot workload and stress than that over "Non-Populated" area (e.g. a grass field). Similarly, the levels of a gliding angle showed the statistical difference on the performance, workload, and stress (HRV, TLX, and LP: all are p < .05). During the flight with 4.5 degree, the pilots showed lower performance with higher workload and stress. However, the levels of the flight experience did not have any influence on the performance, workload, and stress levels (AGPTP, LP, TLX, HRV: all are p > .05). In conclusion, flying in Populated area and flying with a 4.5 degree gliding angle increases the workload and stress level of the pilots. In addition, when the pilots were flying over Populated area at Final Approach to L/D phase, they showed lower performance on tracking the glide path. Based on the results, stresses and workload can have a significant impact on flight performance. Therefore, in order to reduce the workload and stress that can cause human errors, it is highly recommended to carefully examine the impact of new flight procedures on pilot workload and stress before they are implemented.