Thesis (doctoral)--Johann Wolfgang Goethe Universität zu Frankfurt am Main, 1977. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 180-190).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Catholic University of America, 1927. / Vita. Bibliography: p. 126-131.

Thesis (M.A.)--Ohio State University, 1928. / Includes bibliographical references. Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 1968. / Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 139-141). Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center.

Thesis (M.A.)--Marshall University, 2002. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains vi, 90 p. Includes bibliographical references (p. 42-43).

<p> The composer John Cage adopted Indian aesthetics, Zen philosophy, and anarchism to underpin his music and aesthetic. Although his interest in each ideology has been studied, the reason why he incorporated ones from disparate values remains unclear. Considering the trajectory of his intense quest for the theories that reinforced his music and aesthetic, elucidating the commonalities and differences among Indian aesthetics, Zen philosophy, and anarchism should reveal what he ultimately pursued. This dissertation explores comparative analyses of his interests in order to detect the notion of the coexistence of independence and interdependence. </p><p> Cage drew on Indian aesthetics first to dispel his doubt about his attitude relying on self-expression. The aesthetics denied expression of individual emotion, centering on the interdependence between a divine realm as an artistic source and art as its manifestation. Because Indian aesthetics contains no independent aspects, he turned to other philosophies. He next turned his attention to Zen. This philosophy is interested in discovering the independent, innate self not disturbed by delusion caused by self-centered thinking. That is, Zen believes that the purified self is directly connected with the world. The Zen tenet associates the interdependent nature with its teachings of salvation of others. </p><p> Under the tumultuous social circumstances in the 1960s, Cage was fascinated by anarchism. Buckminster Fuller advocated the world in which people could achieve comfortable life, not by national politics, but by the redistribution of wealth allowed by the improvement of technology. Such a society, he believed, could realize global welfare with its improved technology. Henry Thoreau&rsquo;s social theory has been regarded as an alternative to Fuller&rsquo;s. However, Thoreau&rsquo;s orientation toward connections with others and the notion of welfare was very limited in comparison with his special emphasis on the independent self. It was with Emma Goldman&rsquo;s anarchism that Cage eventually found the coexistence of individual freedom and supportive environment that allowed welfare for all human beings. </p><p> Cage engaged with these theories in order to discover independence and interdependence within his aesthetic. The pursuit centered on the concept of the self; more specifically a pure self that accepted the universe as it was and is. His exploration of the literature can be referred to, then, as the journey to self-identity. My dissertation is based on a close reading of primary sources, including the treatises by Indian aesthetician Ananda Coomaraswamy, Zen master Huang-Po, Zen scholar Daisetz Teitaro Suzuki, Fuller, Thoreau, and Goldman as well as Cage&rsquo;s writings and interviews. Scholarship of religious studies and political theory, in addition to musicology, supports the interpretation of their various sources.</p>

No description available.

<p> In the dissertation I analyze and interpret Ernst Gombrich's book <i> Art and Illusion,</i> focusing on his view that illusion is involved in pictorial representation. Since Gombrich never gave a concise, systematic account of illusion, my goal will be to fill this void by using the text of <i> Art and Illusion</i> as well as Gombrich's subsequent writings in order to present a coherent account of how illusion might play a role in a picture's representing an object.</p><p> My goal is not to present an unassailable account of pictorial representation. Instead, I offer a version of Gombrich's theory that pushes readers towards a better comprehension of what a Gombrichian theory of illusion involves. In the process I introduce and defend a number of terms and concepts in the service of filling in those places where Gombrich is silent. Among other things, in response to Gombrich's notion of visual substitution I elaborate upon the claims that representational pictures function as relational models and afford recognition of the objects they represent; I reply to Richard Wollheim's "twofoldness" objection to Gombrich; and I contend that Gombrich's use of the notion of illusion is not open to the objections commonly made against it (e.g., that normal picture perception does not involve illusion because "illusion" is synonymous with "delusion").</p>

George Dickie’s institutional theory of art has been subject to extensive debate over the past 30 years. It has been both revered and deplored, garnering such attention for the seemingly controversial way in which Dickie answers the question, “What is art?” In Dickie’s view, an object derives its existence as a work of art in the context of the informal institution of the “artworld,” a concept which was borrowed from Arthur Danto’s earlier work on the theoretical context surrounding works of art. Another significant feature of Dickie’s institutional theory is that it provides a definition of art, a problem that philosophers of art have attempted to solve for the past few centuries. Dickie’s theory inclines one to dismiss other candidates for definitions as implausible, such as those put forth by R.G. Collingwood and Leo Tolstoy, since, as Dickie insists, an acceptable definition of art must be able to account for the many different kinds of practices that are all referred to as “art.” I do not wish to conclude that the task of defining “art” is no longer a viable option for philosophers, as others such as Morris Weitz and Peter Kivy have suggested. Instead, I will provide an alternative way of philosophizing about art that is similar in some ways and yet very different from the methods Weitz and Kivy have proposed. I will illuminate a new way of interpreting the theories of Collingwood, Tolstoy, and Danto which is different from those that have been proposed in the past, one that highlights their normative and institutional features. On the foundations of this new interpretation, I will propose a new role for the philosopher of art, one that takes into consideration the significance of the institutional structure of the artworld and how it can be normatively constrained. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2007-09-24 12:31:06.391

No description available.