No description available.

Studies of affective forecasting examine people’s ability to predict (forecast) their emotional (affective) responses to future events. Affective forecasts underlie nearly all decisions people make and the actions they take. However, people engage in systematic cognitive errors when making affective forecasts and most often overestimate the intensity and duration of their emotional responses. Understanding the mechanisms that lead to affective forecasting errors (e.g., immune neglect) and examining the utility of methods for improving affective forecasting errors (e.g., surrogation) can provide highly valuable information for clinicians as they assist clients in determining their goals both for therapy and for life. The first purpose of the current study was to determine if affective forecasting errors due to immune neglect lead to misjudgments about the relative emotional impact of minor versus moderate negative experiences (i.e., trauma severity). The second purpose was to examine the utility of surrogation for improving affective forecasts. Potential interaction effects between these two variables were also examined. The current study utilized a 2 (Trauma Severity: minor, moderate) X 3 (Prediction Information: surrogation information only, simulation information only, both types of information) experimental design. Undergraduates were recruited via the SONA system and randomly assigned to one of the six experimental conditions. A preliminary study was conducted to obtain surrogation information for use in the main study. All participants in the main study predicted how they would feel 10 minutes after receiving negative personality feedback, using a 10-point scale ranging from (1) very unhappy to (10) very happy. These predictions constitute their affective forecasts. All participants then actually received the negative personality feedback (ostensibly from another participant, a peer, in a nearby room) and reported their actual affective states ten minutes later, using the same scale. These ratings constitute their affective reports. Affective forecasting error was calculated as the difference between affective forecasts and affective reports. Results showed the affective forecasts of participants in the moderate trauma severity condition were significantly less accurate than those of participants in the minor trauma severity condition, providing evidence of immune neglect. Surrogation information significantly improved the accuracy of affective forecasts when participants were deprived of simulation information. Limitations of the current study and implications of the findings are discussed.

This dissertation contributes to a growing literature on affective forecasting showing that people are often inaccurate when predicting their future emotions, particularly the emotion of regret (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). In the current program of research I explored the differences in the anticipated and experienced regret of participants who worked (or imagined working) either alone or as part of a group. In Experiment One I demonstrated that participants anticipated more regret from failing a task when alone than from failing a task that when working as part of a group. I speculated that this occurs because working with a group allows one to blame others for a failure, thus reducing one’s own regret. In Experiment Two I demonstrated that although participants anticipated more regret from an individual relative to a group failure, the regret they actually experienced is equivalent in these conditions. I hypothesised that this is because the psychological immune system (Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, & Wheatley, 1998) works hard to reduce the regret of the participants who worked alone to levels matching that of the participants who worked in groups. I also demonstrated that this psychological immune system takes time to reduce regret differences in levels of regret were found between participants in the group and alone conditions when participants reported their regret immediately, but when regret was reported after a delay, these differences were no longer found. In Experiment Three I ruled out a potential confound by demonstrating that the differences between Experiments One and Two were not due to participants thinking of different time frames while reporting their regret. In Experiments Four and Five I extended my program of research by investigating whether the anticipated and experienced regret that is caused by failing a task varies depending on whether one is working with in-group or out-group partners. I found that while participants anticipate more regret from failing a task with an in-group compared to an out-group partner, the regret they ultimately experience is not affected by the group status of their partner. Implications and future directions are discussed. / Thesis (Ph.D, Psychology) -- Queen's University, 2010-09-10 15:45:04.097

Syftet med föreliggande studie var att försöka reda i litteraturen kring två välkända begrepp inom Affective Forecasting nämligen Impact Bias, som innebär att människor har en tendens att överskatta i vilken utsträckning de kommer att uppleva en viss känsla i en framtida situation än vad som senare visar sig vara fallet, och Empathy Gaps, som innebär att människor har en tendens att underskatta i vilken grad känslotillstånd kommer att påverka deras preferenser i en framtida situation samt pröva dessa begrepp i en och samma enkätundersökning. Etthundra sextiotvå studenter, slumpvist uppdelade i två grupper, Känslogrupp och Preferensgrupp, deltog frivilligt i undersökningen. Enkätundersökningen var en mixad design med grupp (känsla kontra preferens) som mellangruppsfaktor och förtest kontra eftertest som inomgruppsfaktor. I studien visade samtliga gruppers resultat i linje med Impact Bias teorin, dvs. att deltagarna i både Känslogrupp och Preferensgrupp skattade lägre i eftertest (actual) än pretest (forecasting). Resultatet diskuteras bla. utifrån Construal Level Theory, CLT. Förslag på vidare forskning ges.

No description available.

There is much evidence that people are inaccurate in predicting the impact of future situations on their emotions. At the same time, affective forecasts have important implications for behavior, decision-making, and current mood, and may play an important role in the maintenance of emotional disorders. This study investigated two factors that influence affective forecasting: (1) Whether affective forecasting is associated with depressive symptoms and (2) Whether strategies people use to regulate their current affect influence their predictions of future emotional responses. Participants ruminated or reappraised in response to a sad mood and completed a measure of depressive symptoms (BDI). Results indicated that severity of depression symptoms was related to forecasts of greater sadness and anger to positive scenarios, as well as negative appraisals of future negative events. As expected, both BDI score and habitual use of emotion regulation strategies were correlated with participants' predictions about use and effectiveness of emotion regulation strategies in response to future scenarios. Results reinforced the usefulness of examining future-oriented cognitive processes in depression, providing insight into the role of hopelessness in the disorder. This study also shed light on the relationship between depression and predictions about the use and effectiveness of various emotion regulation strategies.

Vi ställs dagligen inför väldigt många val och beroende på vilka val vi väljer att göra kommer dessa till stor del att påverka hur vi lever vårt liv och även hur tillfreds vi kommer att vara med livet. Vi baserar många av våra val på känslomässiga förutsägelser som är våra antaganden om hur framtida händelser kommer att påverka oss känslomässigt. Våra känslomässiga förutsägelser är dessvärre ofta påverkade av olika bias som gör att vi missbedömer hur starkt och under hur lång tid vi kommer att reagera känslomässigt på kommande händelser, vilket i sin tur påverkar vilka val vi kommer att göra. Den här uppsatsen kommer att undersöka hur våra känslomässiga förutsägelser påverkar vårt subjektiva välbefinnande och även hur förståelse för detta skulle kunna användas i psykologisk coachning i form av interventioner för att hjälpa människor att göra fler val som leder till ett ökat subjektivt välbefinnande.

No description available.

No description available.

This thesis investigates individual and interpersonal predictions of future affect and explores their relation to implicit theories of emotion, prediction recall, debiasing, and focalism. Studies 1, 2, and 3 assessed affect predictions to upcoming reasoning tests and academic results, and Studies 4, 5, and 6 concerned predictions for self-identified events. The first study investigated the influence of implicit theories of emotion (ITE; Tamir, John, Srivastava, & Gross, 2007) on impact bias and prediction recall manipulating ITE between participant pairs who predicted and reported their affective reactions to feedback on a test of reasoning skills. Neither impact bias nor recalled predictions were affected by the manipulation. Recalled affect predictions differed from original affect predictions, but were not influenced by experienced affect. Study 2 further investigated the effects of target event timing on impact bias and affect prediction recall. The results showed no differences between individual and interpersonal impact biases across conditions. Again, recalled predictions differed from original predictions, and were not influenced by experienced affect. Study 3 investigated the influence of prior information about impact bias on interpersonal affective forecasting involving real-world exam results. The results demonstrated no differences in predictions due to information, however, significantly less unhappiness was predicted for participants’ friends compared to self-predictions. Study 4 examined the effect of different de-biasing information on affective predictions. The results demonstrated no differences in affective predictions by condition and found that participants’ ITE were not associated to affect predictions. Study 5 examined individual and interpersonal affect predictions using a between-subjects design in place of the within-subjects design. The results demonstrated no differences between the affect predictions made for self and for friends, and ITE were not associated with predictions. Study 6 examined the impact bias in interpersonal affective forecasting and the role of focalism. The results demonstrated distinctions between individual and interpersonal affecting forecasting with individual impact bias for positive reactions for negative events and individual and interpersonal reverse impact bias for calm emotional reactions to positive events. Immune neglect was found not to be associated with predictions. Overall, the studies found evidence for similar individual and interpersonal predictions which are resistant to influence.