In recent years consumers, NGOs, and governments alike have become increasingly concerned about the problem of `conflict¿ or `blood¿ diamonds in relation to on-going armed conflicts in Angola, Sierra Leone, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Allegations by NGOs, governments and the UN that many conflicts are fuelled by illicit exports of diamonds have begun to be acknowledged by the diamond industry. Diamonds, and the money they generate, have been used to purchase arms, ammunition, uniforms and other equipment, as well as to pay soldiers and to cultivate strategic alliances for those armed groups in control of territory rich in this lucrative resource. This has facilitated the intensification and protraction of violent conflicts in Africa. Additionally, the wealth to be gained from the illicit extraction and sale of diamonds has contributed to the prominence of economic agendas in many civil wars that motivate faction leaders to continue the conflict in order to protect their businesses.1 For example, the Angolan rebel group UNITA (União Nacional para a Inedepência Total de Angola) is believed to have received US$3.7 billion in a six year period during the 1990s - a far greater amount than the foreign aid received from patrons like the United States and South Africa during the Cold War. This money has both funded large scale arms purchases and swelled the personal coffers of UNITA leaders, thereby contributing to the intransigence of those leaders in agreeing and implementing peace and facilitating continued violence.2 In Sierra Leone the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) has funded its arms acquisitions with illicit diamond revenues and the extraction of diamonds is seen as one of the main factors behind the lack of implementation of the Lomé peace accord and the subsequent resurgence of violence. In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) both the government and rebel forces have financed their war efforts through the diamond trade, as have some of the intervening regional powers. As a result the fighting around diamond rich areas and trading centres has been particularly intense. For example, in spite of a unilateral ceasefire declared by Rwanda on the 29th of May 1999, it is believed to have sent 7,000 fresh troops to the DRC in June as the battle for the diamond rich area of Mbuji-Mayi escalated. However the prominence of `conflict diamonds¿ in the policy discourse related to these conflicts and their resolution has served to obscure a range of other issues which are equally, if not more, central to finding lasting solutions to these wars. In spite of the fact that the arms flows which sustain these conflicts are only partly financed by `conflict diamonds¿ they are often only mentioned as one aspect of the illegal diamond trade rather than as a core issue. Even more concerning, perhaps, is that the discourse of `greed¿ rather than `grievance¿ as the foundation and driving force of conflicts obscures the complexity of political, social, and other economic dimensions of these wars. Thus, while efforts to reduce the conflict diamond trade may be an essential element of the resolution of these conflicts, other factors of potentially greater import are pushed down the agendas of many of the governments and NGOs whose input into those processes may be the key to success. In short, therefore, the issue 2 of conflict diamonds is one aspect of the complex dynamics and processes of ongoing African conflicts, not vice-versa.

Student Number : 0517117G - MA research report - School of International Relations - Faculty of Humanities / This study has analysed the experience and legitimacy of South Africa’s Foreign Policy in resolving African conflicts, using comparative study of Burundi and Lesotho. The main findings of the study are as follows: First, since 1994 South Africa’s foreign policy has evolved and directed at ensuring peace and stability in African continent. During Mandela era, the policy was dominated by human rights. When Mbeki took over in 1999 the policy was reconfigured and moved towards peace and economic prosperity in African continent to achieve African Renaissance. Second it has been argued that the interventions in Lesotho and Burundi were legitimate and successful despite the controversies in particular Lesotho. Last, the experience and lessons learnt in Lesotho helped to shape South Africa’s foreign policy when mediating in Burundi conflict which had led to a notable success.

The purpose of this dissertation is to examine and evaluate the role of the Organization of African Unity as an international organization in the solution of intra-African conflicts. For the purpose of this paper, eight conflicts from 1963 to 1980 were investigated. Utilizing these cases, the paper (a) examines four assumptions: (1) that regional actions promote settlements by isolating soluble local conflicts from more complex ones; (2) that intrastate conflicts are more difficult to resolve by regional organizations than interstate or border disputes; (3) that most of the boundary disputes in Africa are due to the arbitrary colonial boundary demarcations; and (4) that most of the causes of the ineffectiveness in its conflict resolution is as a result of poor administrative set-up, lack of resources, and failure of its commissions to operate effectively; (b) it answered the following questions: (1) Did the O.A.U. stop, help stop, or fail to stop the fighting; (2) Did the O.A.U. settle, help settle, or fail to settle the conflict; and (3) Was there super power intervention, and if so, to what effect? The methodology used is primarily case study method. Most attention is given to the way the O.A.U. handled the conflicts.