Thesis (D.H.L.)--Jewish theological seminary of America. / "Hebrew authorities cited": p. 85-89.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--York University, 2002. Graduate Programme in Administrative Studies. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 170-193). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?pNQ82766.

Konstanz, Univ., Diplomarb., 2003.

Universiẗat, Habil.-Schr., 2001.

Thesis--University of Wisconsin--Madison. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 120-127).

Universiẗat d. Bundeswehr, Diss., 1999--Hamburg.

University, Diss., 2003--Mannheim. / Erscheinungsjahr an der Haupttitelstelle: 2002.

Universiẗat, Diss., 2004--Münster (Westf.).

In this thesis I propose that emotions and rationality are integrated, and jointly constitute our moral agency. I argue against the influential ‘sentimentalist’ claim that emotions are the only constituents of the moral reasons for which we act, by showing that emotions are inextricably bound up with our sensory and conceptual capacities. In contrast, I propose we act for moral reasons when we act in light of the narratives we create and understand. Narrative understanding here is the capacity to inhabit a chain of events. It is embodied and action-­‐ orientated, and is co-­‐constituted through our emotional, conceptual and sensory capacities.

On the common sense view, an agent is an individual. Communities are collections of individuals, but the community itself is not understood to possess a collective, unified agency. Nevertheless, this view stands at odds with frequent ascriptions of communal agency; e.g., "Oregonians are environmentally conscious," "The team played to win," "The LGBTQ community is pro-gay marriage." If we are to vindicate such ascriptions, we need a theory of the "reality of community," the thesis that under certain conditions, a community possesses a unified, collective agency. This work reconstructs Royce's theory of communal agency through his views of purposiveness and the use he makes of C.S. Peirce's "theory of interpretation." I argue that, for Royce, agency is purposiveness and purposiveness always bears the triadic structure of the process of interpretation. Thus, the process of interpretation entails agency whether at the level of the individual or at the level of the community. / 10000-01-01