Approved for public release; distribution in unlimited. / This thesis uses an agent-based simulation model named EINSTein to perform an exploratory study on the feasibility of using Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) to augment or replace the current defenses of Expeditionary Strike Groups (ESG). Specifically, LCS's ability to help defend an ESGs in an anti-access scenario against a high-density small boat attack is simulated. Numbers of CRUDES (CRUiser, DEStroyer, Frigate) ships are removed and LCSs are added to the ESG force structure in varying amounts to identify force mixes that minimize ship losses. In addition, this thesis explores various conceptual capabilities that might be given to LCS. For example, helicopter/Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (helo/UCAVs), Stealth technology, close-in high volume firepower, and 50+ knot sprint capability. Using graphical analysis, analysis of variance, and large-sample comparison tests we find that being able to control aircraft is the most influential factor for minimizing ship losses. Stealth technology is another significant factor, and the combination of the two is highly effective in reducing ship losses. Close-in high volume firepower is effective only when interacting with helo/UCAVs or stealth. 50+ knot sprint capability is potentially detrimental in this scenario. An effective total sum of CRUDES ships and LCS is between five and seven platforms. / http://hdl.handle.net/10945/855 / Lieutenant, United States Navy

This is a research-based thesis building upon the study conducted over the past two years with Dr. Elizabeth English on the Buoyant Foundation Project (BFP). The BFP is currently developing an amphibious foundation system to retrofit vernacular wooden ‘shotgun’ houses in the Lower Ninth Ward in New Orleans. This neighbourhood was chosen because of its unique cultural heritage and the severe, but recoverable, damage incurred in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. The BFP system will allow homes to float when flooding occurs, rising and descending vertically to avoid flood damage. It provides an alternative solution to permanent static elevation, the mitigation strategy currently recommended by the United States federal government. The thesis will demonstrate how the Buoyant Foundation Project is a culturally supportive, technically feasible, economical, sustainable and resilient form of flood mitigation for post-Katrina New Orleans.

This is a research-based thesis building upon the study conducted over the past two years with Dr. Elizabeth English on the Buoyant Foundation Project (BFP). The BFP is currently developing an amphibious foundation system to retrofit vernacular wooden ‘shotgun’ houses in the Lower Ninth Ward in New Orleans. This neighbourhood was chosen because of its unique cultural heritage and the severe, but recoverable, damage incurred in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. The BFP system will allow homes to float when flooding occurs, rising and descending vertically to avoid flood damage. It provides an alternative solution to permanent static elevation, the mitigation strategy currently recommended by the United States federal government. The thesis will demonstrate how the Buoyant Foundation Project is a culturally supportive, technically feasible, economical, sustainable and resilient form of flood mitigation for post-Katrina New Orleans.

Thesis (M.M.A.S.)--U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2007. / Cover title. AD-A475 691. Includes bibliographical references. Electronic version available on the Public STINET.

Amphibious ships, configured with floodable well decks, present a unique challenge to the Ship Design Team to incorporate maximum troop, cargo and vehicle capacity, along with sufficient well deck size, to facilitate efficient operation of LCAC (Landing Craft Air Cushion) and other amphibious assault craft in support of power projection operations. Analysis of the various LSD 49 Class alternative designs, revealed significant variance in the stability limits for each design. These variations appeared to be directly attributable to wing wall size, as well as to the geometry of the well deck. In order to better understand the effect of these items, and to develop guidelines for future design efforts, this study concentrated on evaluating the stability limitations for various combinations of beam, well deck configuration, and wing wall size using an LSD 49 Class proposed hull form. The results indicated that the most significant parameter affecting the stability of the LSD 49 Class is the height of the well deck above the baseline. The higher the well deck, the smaller the loss of waterplane inertia caused by the entrance of flooding water into the well deck compartment. For lower well decks, the loss of waterplane inertia is more critical at smaller values of beam, but becomes less critical at the upper values of beam considered. In these cases, off-center wing wall flooding becomes more critical, and it is more advantageous to devote larger percentages of beam to the well deck compartment. / M.S.

Thesis (M.S.)--Air Force Institute of Technology, 2005. / "September 2005" Also available as a PDF file on the Air Force Institute of Technlogy website.

<p>De klassiska sjökrigsteorierna har åtskilliga år på nacken. Fortfarande anses emellertid Julius S. Corbetts och Alfred T. Mahans idéer äga sin giltighet – trots att den tidigare var verksam under första halvan 1900-talet och den senare under framförallt den andra halvan av 1800-talet. Syftet med arbetet har varit att undersöka huruvida dessa teoretikers syn på strategier i sjökriget som fenomen kan anses relevanta i det moderna sjökriget. Slaget om Falklandsöarna i början 1980-talet har betecknats som en av de första drabbningarna till sjöss som utspelats i en modern telekrigsmiljö. Utgångspunkt har varit att studera i vilken utsträckning Corbetts och Mahans teorier kan skönjas i utförandet av den brittiska operationsplanen i Falklandskriget. Genom en kvalitativ textanalys av Mahans och Corbetts litterära verk, och litteratur om dessa, har adekvata indikatorer tagits fram. Dessa har jämförts med en fallstudie som utgjorts av Falklandskriget. Slutsatsen blev att teorierna – och då framförallt Corbetts tankar – äger sin giltighet, om än inte bokstavligen och i varje detalj, men som en övergripande förklaring på vilket sätt framgång i modern sjökrigsföring kan uppnås.</p> / <p>The classic naval theories have been around for a considerable sum of time. Despite of these circumstances the ideas of Julius S. Corbett and Alfred T. Mahan are still regarded to be obligated their validity – even though that the foremost of them was active under the first part of the 1900 and the latter active particularly during the second part of the 1800. The purpose of the paper has been to examine whether these naval thinker view on strategy in naval warfare could be considered to be relevant in the modern naval warfare. The battle for the Falklands islands in the beginning of 1980 have been designated as one of the first encounters on the high seas that was situated in a modern electronic warfare environment. The starting point has been to study in which extension Corbett’s and Mahan’s theories could be notices in the execution of the British campaign plan in the Falklands war. Through a qualitative text study of Mahan’s and Corbett’s literary creation, and literature about them, adequate indicators have been brought forward. These have been comprehended with a case study consisting of the Falklands war. The conclusion where that the theories – particularly Corbett’s thoughts – still posses, if not figuratively and in every aspect, but as an overlooking clarification through in which way the success in modern navel warfare ought to be accomplished.</p>

De klassiska sjökrigsteorierna har åtskilliga år på nacken. Fortfarande anses emellertid Julius S. Corbetts och Alfred T. Mahans idéer äga sin giltighet – trots att den tidigare var verksam under första halvan 1900-talet och den senare under framförallt den andra halvan av 1800-talet. Syftet med arbetet har varit att undersöka huruvida dessa teoretikers syn på strategier i sjökriget som fenomen kan anses relevanta i det moderna sjökriget. Slaget om Falklandsöarna i början 1980-talet har betecknats som en av de första drabbningarna till sjöss som utspelats i en modern telekrigsmiljö. Utgångspunkt har varit att studera i vilken utsträckning Corbetts och Mahans teorier kan skönjas i utförandet av den brittiska operationsplanen i Falklandskriget. Genom en kvalitativ textanalys av Mahans och Corbetts litterära verk, och litteratur om dessa, har adekvata indikatorer tagits fram. Dessa har jämförts med en fallstudie som utgjorts av Falklandskriget. Slutsatsen blev att teorierna – och då framförallt Corbetts tankar – äger sin giltighet, om än inte bokstavligen och i varje detalj, men som en övergripande förklaring på vilket sätt framgång i modern sjökrigsföring kan uppnås. / The classic naval theories have been around for a considerable sum of time. Despite of these circumstances the ideas of Julius S. Corbett and Alfred T. Mahan are still regarded to be obligated their validity – even though that the foremost of them was active under the first part of the 1900 and the latter active particularly during the second part of the 1800. The purpose of the paper has been to examine whether these naval thinker view on strategy in naval warfare could be considered to be relevant in the modern naval warfare. The battle for the Falklands islands in the beginning of 1980 have been designated as one of the first encounters on the high seas that was situated in a modern electronic warfare environment. The starting point has been to study in which extension Corbett’s and Mahan’s theories could be notices in the execution of the British campaign plan in the Falklands war. Through a qualitative text study of Mahan’s and Corbett’s literary creation, and literature about them, adequate indicators have been brought forward. These have been comprehended with a case study consisting of the Falklands war. The conclusion where that the theories – particularly Corbett’s thoughts – still posses, if not figuratively and in every aspect, but as an overlooking clarification through in which way the success in modern navel warfare ought to be accomplished.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Canterbury, 2008. / Typescript (photocopy). Includes bibliographical references (leaves 160-171).

During the Second World War, training was the Canadian Army’s longest sustained activity. Aside from isolated engagements at Hong Kong and Dieppe, the Canadians did not fight in a protracted campaign until the invasion of Sicily in July 1943. The years that Canadian infantry units spent training in the United Kingdom were formative in the history of the Canadian Army. Despite what much of the historical literature has suggested, training succeeded in making the Canadian infantry capable of succeeding in battle against German forces. Canadian infantry training showed a definite progression towards professionalism and away from a pervasive prewar mentality that the infantry was a largely unskilled arm and that training infantrymen did not require special expertise. From 1939 to 1941, Canadian infantry training suffered from problems ranging from equipment shortages to poor senior leadership. In late 1941, the Canadians were introduced to a new method of training called “battle drill,” which broke tactical manoeuvres into simple movements, encouraged initiative among junior leaders, and greatly boosted the men’s morale. The Canadians participated in numerous military exercises of varying sizes that exposed problems with their senior leadership. The replacement of unsuitable officers greatly enhanced the fighting potential of Canadian units and formations. As time went on, infantry training became more rigorous and realistic, and tactical concepts became increasingly sophisticated. By the time of the invasion of Normandy in June 1944, infantry training was intense, suited to units’ assigned tasks, and highly technical, which belied the false prewar assumption that the infantry was an unskilled arm. By the time Canadian divisions entered battle, they were as prepared as they would ever be. The exception to this was the training of the overseas reinforcement units, which reached an acceptable standard only in the last months of the war. This study ultimately represents a substantial contribution to understanding the history of the Canadian Army and its role in the Second World War.