Thesis (Ph. D.)--Yale University, 1986. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 457-473).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1969. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

The highly competitive environment in which companies functions prompts the need to review their operations which may include reconsideration of the manning levels, and or changing terms and conditions of employment in order to be able to survive and prosper economically. The difficulty arises when the employers have to respond to the challenges. By law the employers are legally prohibited from unilaterally effecting the changes to the terms and conditions of employment. Furthermore, changing terms and conditions of employment is dealt with through collective bargaining and as such, the dismissal is outlawed as a legitimate instrument to coerce the employees to concede to the proposals. So the employers have to obtain an agreement or consent with the affected employees. In terms of the 1956 LRA the employer could justifiably terminate the contract of employment within the context of collective bargaining. For the employer to avoid offending the lock out provisions in terms of the 1956 LRA, the lock-out dismissal had to be effected in order to achieve a specific purpose, and it had to be conditional. Unlike its predecessor, the 1995 Labour Relations Act introduced section 187(1)(c) which renders the so-called lock-out dismissal by an employer, within the context of collective bargaining, automatically unfair. Section 187(1)(c) categorises a dismissal as automatically unfair, if the reason is a refusal by employees to accept a demand in respect of any matter of mutual interest between them and their employer. The employers are however permitted in terms of the 1995 LRA, to dismiss the employees based on operational grounds, as long as the requisite process has been adhered to. The employers need to restructure their operations in order to ensure that terms and conditions of employment are responsive to operational needs. Where the employees’ terms and conditions of employment are not in line with the company operational requirements, the need to terminate the employment contracts of the employees may arise. The employers are within their right to terminate the service of the employees who refuse to accept changes to their conditions of service based on the employers’ operational requirements. The court in Schoeman v Samsung Electronics confirmed that employer’s right to run its business in a successful manner, which includes affecting changes to the existing terms and conditions of employment to be aligned with the market demand. The dismissal is outlawed as a mechanism to coerce the employees to acceptance the employer’s demand relating to matters of mutual interest. At the same time, the employers are within their rights terminate the service of the employees who refuse to accept changes to their conditions of service based on the employers operational requirements. There is a clear tension between sections 187(1) (c), 188(1) (ii) and 189 of LRA. When the employers seek to review the terms and conditions of employment, the tension between these sections becomes more common, as it involves the matters of mutual interest which are dealt with through the collective bargaining arena and the dispute of right through arbitration. In Fry’s Metals v Numsa the court rejected the notion that there is tension between section 187(1) (c) and section 188(1) (a) (ii) of the LRA. Instead the court was of the view that, there is a historical context to section 187(1) (c) which is the now repealed 1956 Labour Relations Act. The 1956 LRA included in its definition of a lock-out the termination by the employer. Secondly, the court interpreted section 187(1)(C) to only give protection to employees who are dismissed in order to compel them to accept a demand on a matter of mutual interest, and only where the dismissal was of a temporary nature. The court interpretation in Fry’s metals implied that, section 187(1)(c) will only come to the defence of employees if they are dismissed for the purpose compelling them to accept a demand on a matter of mutual interest, and if the dismissal was of a temporary nature. Where a permanent dismissal is effected because employees would not accept its demands, section 187(1) (c) could not come to the employees’ protection. Considering that the lock out provided for in terms of the 1995 LRA is not a preferred option by most of the employers, they will rather resort to use the loophole created by the narrow interpretation of section 187(1)(c) to circumvent having to secure consensus from the affected employees and rather dismissed them based on operational requirements. This study seeks to deal with the questions relating to the relationship between collective bargaining related dismissals in particular the automatically unfair dismissal in terms of section 187(1) (c) and business restructuring related dismissal. As such the relationship between sections 187(1) (c) and dismissals based on operational requirements will be central to this study.

Dans le premier chapitre, après une présentation des institutions responsables des négociations salariales en France, je me penche sur l'utilisation, par les grandes entreprises, des salaires planchers pour évincer la concurrence. En effet, les salaires négociés au niveau de l'industrie s'appliquent à l'ensemble des entreprises, qu'elles soient présentent lors des négociations ou non. Ce chapitre possède une partie théorique où il est montré que les plus grosses entreprises ont un intérêt à augmenter les salaires planchers, pour réduire le profit des plus petites entreprises, et ainsi récupérer leurs parts de marché. Par conséquent, plus les syndicats patronaux représentent les intérêts des grandes entreprises, plus le salaire négocié au niveau sectoriel est important. Cette prédiction est testée en utilisant des données françaises. L'utilisation d'une stratégie instrumentale permet de montrer que plus les entreprises négociant les salaires planchers sont grosses par rapport à la moyenne de l'industrie concernée, plus le salaire négocié est important.Dans le second chapitre, je regarde l'effet des négociations sectorielles sur l'innovation. J'utilise un modèle avec compétition monopolistique. Je trouve que, dans le cas d'une négociation salariale au niveau de l'industrie, les parties à la négociation prennent en compte le fait que l'augmentation du coût du travail va diminuer les investissements, de leurs concurrents. En effet, avec la négociation sectorielle, l'augmentation du salaire plancher implique que les revenus tirés d'une innovation diminuent. Cette baisse des investissements permet aux entreprises dominantes de sécuriser leur place, ce qui possède un effet négatif sur l'innovation et la croissance.Dans le dernier chapitre, je trouve que la compétition internationale réduit l'importance des effets mis en avant précédemment. En effet, les négociations sectorielles permettent aux entreprises dominantes de former des accords collusifs. Cependant, les entreprises étrangères du même secteur ne sont pas sujettes à ces accords salariaux. Cela vient donc empêcher la mise en place de ces effets de cartel. Ce chapitre est basé sur un modèle de type Melitz. De plus, des donnés sur les salaires négociés en France sont utilisées. L'augmentation des échanges avec la Chine est utilisée comme un choc exogène. Il est prouvé que cela réduit la rente extraite lors des accords de branche. / In the first chapter, after a presentation of institutional settings, I will focus on the use of sector-level agreements by large firms to reduce competition. Indeed, wage floors are binding for all firms of the industry, whether they sit at the negotiating table or not. This chapter provides a theoretical framework showing that such agreements can be used by dominant firms to reduce competition. In this framework, the higher the over-representation of large firms in employers' federations, the larger the bargained wage floors. This leads to the eviction of small firms. This prediction is tested on French administrative data. I document the domination of large firms within federations and devise an instrumental strategy to show that when the bargaining firms are relatively large compared to the industry standard - ie the lower the federation's representativeness, the higher are wage floors.In the second chapter, I look at the effect of sector-level agreements on innovation. It is based on a model with monopolistic competition between products of an industry on the one hand, and between industries on the other hand. First, I find that when the bargaining process occurs at the industry level, negotiating parties take into account that a wage increase will deter investments of competitors. Indeed, when the wage negotiated at the industry-level increases, the labor cost increase implies that the reward for innovations decrease. As this will reduce the probability to be outperformed, this will generate a wage surplus when the bargaining takes place at the industry-level, reducing both production and employment. Furthermore, it will decrease the research effort of the industry reducing the productivity growth.In the final chapter, I find that international competition mitigates the previous effects. Indeed, collective wage bargaining allows firms of a given industry to coordinate. However, international competition makes this collusive equilibrium unsustainable. Indeed, domestic firms face competition from foreign competitors which are not bound by those agreements. To support this argument, a Melitz-type model is developed and its implications tested on French data using the China Shock as a source of exogenous variation. The rent extracted during sector-level agreements no longer exist when domestic firms face Chinese competition.

The aim of this thesis is to examine the relationship between union’s indicators namely union density rate and collective bargaining coverage rate, and the unemployment rate. I have conducted an empirical analysis on 34 OECD countries grouped into three groups based on their bargaining systems. The results indicate that there is no linear relationship between union density and collective bargaining coverage, and the unemployment rate in countries which have centralized co-ordinated, organized decentralized but co-ordinated bargaining systems and that those systems do not have influence on the way unions affect unemployment rate. However, the predominatly centralized but weakly co-ordinated system indicates to have a positive effect on the way unions affect unemployment rate and union density /collective bargaining coverage are positively related with the unemployment rate in this group. I try to argue for possible reasons for these findings.

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Thesis (LLM. (Labour Law)) -- University of Limpopo, 2022 / This study examines the relationship between automatic unfair dismissal under Section 187(1)(c) of the Labour Relations Act,1 and dismissal for operational reasons under Section 189 of the LRA. Dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for dismissal is a refusal by employees to accept a demand in respect of any matter of mutual interest between them and their employer and this is according to Section 187(1)(c) of the LRA Employees have the right to refuse the new terms and conditions of employment, and they cannot be dismissed for doing so. However, if the employer’s business is in decline and thus causes financially loss to the employer, the employer may change the operation of the employment in order to sustain the employment. The employer must initiate consultation process (collective bargaining) with the employees' representatives in order to reach an agreement that protects both the employer's and the employees' interests. To avoid retrenchment, the employer and the employees’ representatives through collective bargaining have to agree to new conditions of the employment and should the parties agree on the new conditions of the employment this will automatically set aside the terms and conditions of the employment contract. In K Ngubane v NTE Limited, 2 “the court observed and noted that the requirement is that the old contract of employment must be terminated with the purpose of inducing acceptance of a demand or proposal, or the employer can simultaneously terminate the contract of employment and give the employee his/her final offer”. Before resorting to dismissal, the employer must exhaust all the alternatives available to him and this could include, inter alia, change of job descriptions since this will not have adverse financial consequences for the workers. If the employees refuse to accept the demands of the employer that were aimed to avoid retrenchments for operational reasons, the employer may dismiss them in accordance with the provisions of section

This thesis explores the impact of the centralization of bargaining in Ontario’s education sector on the internal democracy of the Ontario Secondary School Teachers’ Federation (OSSTF), the province’s second-largest teacher union and self-described defender of public education. Using multiple theoretical lenses of union democracy, public sector unionism, labour geography and teacher professionalism, this thesis examines OSSTF’s history and the evolution of its internal processes and structures, with a focus on the union’s response to the gradual shift to a centralized bargaining regime. Initially formed in 1919 as a conservative organization committed to raising the professional status of teachers, OSSTF expanded into a union that represents both teachers and support staff, bargaining contracts for members with local employers. Positioned within a public sector context of austerity and neoliberal governments looking to contain the costs of public education, OSSTF found itself subjected to legislation intended to upscale education funding and bargaining, beginning in the late 1990s. This thesis finds that the external context of centralization of bargaining has been the most important factor in shaping the internal democratic life of OSSTF, shifting scales of power from the local to the provincial level of the union, exacerbating tensions between provincial and local actors, increasing the overall bureaucracy of the organization, and reducing democratic participation by the rank-and-file. These findings lead to the greater question of whether these internal changes have enhanced or limited the ability of OSSTF to effectively further their members’ interests and resist the neoliberalization of the school system, with a view to considering the role of teacher unions within the future of public education in Ontario. / Dissertation / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / This case study explores the impact of the centralization of bargaining in Ontario’s education sector on the internal processes of the Ontario Secondary School Teachers’ Federation (OSSTF), a union representing 60,000 teachers and education workers in Ontario. It includes an examination of the union’s history, its responses to legislative changes in contract negotiations, an analysis of internal union documents, and semi-structured interviews with key informants. The data and analysis reveal a more bureaucratized union, with members having less ability to direct it actions. This study considers whether a more bureaucratized union can be effective in its defense of public education.

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