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published_or_final_version / Philosophy / Master / Master of Arts

published_or_final_version / Philosophy / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

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<p> Nietzsche famously calls for a revaluation of all values, repudiating the Christian moral tradition. As famously, it has never been clear on what basis Nietzsche condemns morality. Some have looked to Nietzsche's analysis of master morality and his celebration of power and have concluded that Nietzsche is a modem version of Callicles. For example, Brian Leiter argues that, according to Nietzsche, people come in two types-higher and lower. According to him, Nietzsche believes morality is good for lower types but bad for higher types. On this basis, Nietzsche repudiates morality. In contrast, this thesis concludes that morality is bad for all people, according to Nietzsche. Nietzsche evaluates morality on the basis of what promotes human flourishing, not the flourishing of higher types only. Finally, Nietzsche's higher types, unlike Callicles', are moral exemplars who foster a strong culture, challenging Leiter's implicit assumption that they are intrinsically valuable, to Nietzsche. </p>

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In order to work toward right relationships among humanity and all other things, what is required is an ethical theory that concerns itself with interests that include but are not limited to the human. James M. Gustafson's theocentric ethics, which centres value on God, can accomplish this in the religious sphere. Gustafson's ethical theory also has the potential to work within nontheistic secularism as a way of construing all things as interrelated and interdependent. Underlying Gustafson's theology and value theory is a commonsense ontology, which appreciates evidences from the sciences, affective orientation, and resembles certain webs of beliefs held by many outside religious communities. In order to illustrate the transition to secular Gustafsonian ethical theory, functional surrogates of theology found in secular philosophy, and particularly in the work of Mary Midgley, are identified. Gustafson's ethical theory is used to identify certain obligations and restrictions with regard to environmental ethics.

Whereas the literature on English as a Second Language (ESL) instruction has flourished over the last thirty years, very little in the literature addresses issues concerning research with participants who are non-native speakers of English (NNSE). For this qualitative study, six researchers affiliated with a western prairie university were interviewed and asked to reflect on what ethics means to them, which ethical issues are of greatest importance to them when working with NNSE participants, and the role of research ethics boards (REBs). Issues of language, culture and power were found to be key themes as was a deep respect on the part of the researchers towards their participants. In addition, REBs were found to be lacking and in need of reconsideration. These findings suggest that there exists a distinction between institutional ethics (ethics as it pertains to REBs) and individual ethics (ethics as envisioned by researchers).

The thesis is divided into two parts. In the first part, Mark Rowlands’ Neo-Rawlsianism is outlined and discussed as an application of social contract theory to animal ethics. It is shown that we can make a social contract with animals, and that there is nothing ridiculous about the idea. It is even shown that animals should (in principle) participate in negotiating a social contract (if we make one). Rowlands’ argument for vegetarianism is outlined as an example of how his Neo-Rawlsianism is applied. This argument relies to some extent on the claim that animals are harmed by a painless death, and an attempt is made to support this claim. But it is ultimately argued that Rowlands’ Neo-Rawlsianism falls foul of a reductio ad absurdum that puts it out of contention, thus implying that we should not make a social contract with animals. In the second part of the thesis, Tzachi Zamir’s approach to animal ethics is outlined and discussed as a minimalist approach. Zamir proposes a Speciesist-Liberationism. This is explained, and it is shown how it avoids the reductio ad absurdum Neo-Rawlsianism falls foul of. Zamir’s argument for vegetarianism is outlined as an example of how his Minimalism is applied. Various weaknesses are observed in Zamir’s argument, and a more minimal Minimalism is suggested as providing the best argument for vegetarianism and animal liberation, at least until a better substantive moral argument is found.

<p> In this dissertation, I examine the prospects for moral particularism. Moral particularism, which, like most views, comes in a variety of flavors, is essentially the view that the role general principles have traditionally played in moral theorizing is overstated. In Chapter One, I lay out the groundwork for the theories which I will discuss in Chapters Two through Four &ndash; a framework which I will ultimately reject. The most prominent variety of particularism in the literature, and the subject of Chapter Two, is the one offered by Jonathan Dancy in his <i>Ethics Without Principles</i>. (Dancy 2004) Dancy argues for a holistic conception of practical reasons -- reasons that sometimes count in favor of &Phi;ing can, in other situations, count against &Phi;ing. He claims that the truth of holism leads rather immediately (though not directly) to moral particularism. The literature on particularism is flooded with arguments against Dancy. In Chapter Two, I discuss Dancy's particularism and rehearse what I take to be the strongest objections against his view. I take some of those arguments to be rather decisive. And so I suggest that for particularism to survive, we must move beyond Dancy's view. </p><p> In Chapter Three I examine another variety of moral particularism - that offered by David McNaughton and Piers Rawling. Given the objections leveled against Dancy, one maneuver for preserving particularism would be to have a variety that is less objectionable by being more like traditional generalist theories. McNaughton and Rawling's particularism is just such a view. However, for various reasons which I discuss in that chapter, I find McNaughton and Rawling's view also to be unsatisfactory. </p><p> Given that I take these two, the most prominent, strains of particularism to be the best developed, and given their problems, I suggest in Chapter Four that perhaps if particularism is untenable, particularists might best serve their aims by adopting quasi-generalist views. Essentially what particularists seem to be looking for is a view that privileges moral contexts over moral rules. The rules cannot adequately guide us, not exceptionlessly, at least, given the variety of moral situations in which we find ourselves. So, in this chapter I examine the moral contextualism offered by Margaret Olivia Little and Mark Norris Lance, as well as Pekka V\"{a}rynen's theory of hedged moral principles. If extant varieties of particularism face insurmountable problems, then perhaps there are varieties of generalism which privilege moral contexts enough to satisfy particularist intuitions. Ultimately, I find these views also to be inadequate. </p><p> The overarching theme of this work is that extant particularist views are inadequate in various ways all relating to their conception of a practical reason. And so, with that in mind, in Chapter Five, I argue that for particularists to maintain a foothold in the debate, they must rethink the conception of a practical reason they employ in their views. I suggest that there is room for a variety of particularism that rejects the traditional conception of practical reasons as holistic contributory considerations that we weigh together and against each other to determine what we ought to do. I call the view I am offering `Eliminativism', as it is an attempted elimination of contributory-reasons-talk from the discourse. I reject the contributory conception of reasons and offer a more coarse-grained conception of reasons for action that privileges context above all else, thereby giving particularism a coherent conception of reasons for action that enables them to eschew general principles.</p>