Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2004. / Supervisors: Maxwell Stinchcombe and R. Preston McAfee. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Zugl.: Heidelberg, Universiẗat, Diss., 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 391-403).

The problem considered in this study is the rapid growth in the number of the treble-damage suits brought under provisions of Section 4 of the Clayton Act and their impact on marketing management in formulating marketing strategies and policies.

Competition among firms is a central feature in all free market economies such as South Africa. One of the biggest threats to competition is the presence of cartels in markets. Cartels are firms which collude and compete unfairly in order to obtain monopoly-like profits. For more than fifty years South Africa’s economic landscape has been dominated by a vast network of cartels invital industries, such as bread, cement and fertiliser. South Africa promulgated the Competition Act 89 of 1998 to eradicate cartels and promote and maintain competition within the South African economy. The Competition Act 89 of 1998 prohibits cartel activity and provides for a fine of 10% of turn over for firms found to have engaged in cartel activity. For a variety of reasons, these administrative fines have failed to deter firms from commencing and/or continuing to engage in cartel activity. This is evidenced by the increasing number of firms engaged in large -scale cartels in essential industries, such as construction and food. Public outcry and global trends have persuaded legislators to enactment more stringent penalties in the Competition Amendment Act 1 of 2009. Section 12 of the Competition Amendment Act , which inserts section 73A, creates a cartel of fence in terms of which a director who causes his firm to engage in cartel activity faces ten year imprisonment or a fine of R500, 000. This research shall critically analyse the Competition Amendment Acts effect on deterring cartel activity in South Africa. Despite the legislators’ aim to provide a bigger deterrent for engaging in cartel activity, section 73A of the Competition Amendment Act arouses scrutiny. Firstly, the promulgation of the new cartel offence is contrary to the decimalisation trend in South African company law which recognises the difficulty in enforcing complex regulatory offences with criminal provisions. Secondly, Section 73(5)A appears to infringe an accused director's right to be presumed innocent. Lastly there are co-ordination issues between the National Prosecuting Authority and the Corporate Leniency Policy relating to the granting of prose cutorial immunity for firms which cooperate with the Competition Commission. There search will out line these problems in full. With regards to the problems caused by section 73A, the research will use a comparative analysis with the positionin the United States. Of all the jurisdictions which criminalise cartel activity, the United States was one of the earliest and the most prolific insecuring convictions for directors who cause their firms to engage in cartel activity. The United States has taken innovative steps to supplement their public cartel enforcement drive such as the prosecution of international cartels and the use of private actions. In this regard, the research will extrapolate favourable cartel enforcement measures from the United States for recommendation in order to assist with South Africa’s cartel enforcement and alleviate the problems caused by section 73A, outlined above.

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Thesis (doctoral)--Universiẗat Bonn, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 233-250).