This essay looks at the connection between the design and techniques of longswords. The longsword is perhaps the most iconic weapon of the late medieval and early modern period. However, there are few academic studies on how longswords were used. As well as the use of longswords in general the essay seeks to understand how certain characteristics like blade design or decor can offer clues to how specific swords may have been used. To find out how this kind of weapon was used 10 longswords from northern and central Europe was analysed in terms of design. As well as the longswords four historical fencing manuals from the holy roman empire were studied. The source material was chosen to reflect my own experience whit Germanic medieval/renaissance fencing. Combining study of artifacts and written sources gives this essay the opportunity to explore the several attributes pertaining to the use longswords. As well as examining the books and swords several of the techniques in the manuals have been tested by me and Fencers of Wisby historiska fäktskola.  The study of the source material as well as the tests of the techniques reveal the construction of a sword had an impact on how it can be used. Certain design like the shape of the blade, crossguard and pommel change what techniques are more effective with a particular type of longsword. The early longwords for example seem to have had an emphasis on cutting whilst the later swords became more adapted for thrusting to combat armour. Some of the examined longswords appear to be ornamental and not intended for combat. The more ornamental longswords could however possibly have functioned as a weapon and a symbol at the same time. Sometimes the symbolism is emphasised but even in those cases the swords could often have been used as a weapon if desired or needed.

Poser la question du divin chez Aristote, c’est déterminer à quelle question la conception aristotélicienne du divin est censée répondre. L’examen méthodique de l’intégralité du corpus aristotelicum et, tout particulièrement, des trois textes dans lesquels Aristote place l’étude des réalités divines au centre de son enquête (Physique, VII-VIII ; De Cœlo, I-II, Métaphysique, Lambda) permet de formuler deux conclusions principales. En premier lieu, il apparaît clairement que la question du divin n’est pas, aux yeux d’Aristote, de nature théologique, mais archologique. Nulle part, en effet, l’étude du divin n’est menée pour elle-Même ; elle s’ancre, au contraire, dans un examen explicitement dédié aux principes premiers de la phusis ou des ousiai. La conception aristotélicienne du divin et des dieux est ainsi le produit d’un examen méthodique des êtres premiers et des principes, examen grâce auquel Aristote espère produire une détermination rigoureuse du mode d’être du principe en tant que tel et résoudre, par là même, certaines apories relatives à la question de l’archè. En second lieu, il convient de noter que les principaux textes dévolus à l’étude des êtres divins se distinguent les uns des autres par des nuances méthodologiques significatives. Selon que la question du divin prend naissance au sein de la science naturelle ou de la science des substances, selon qu’elle appartient à la physique ou à l’ousiologie, la preuve de l’existence des réalités divines, de même que la description de leur nature et de leurs fonctions, font l’objet de formulations diverses, toutes inféodées à la logique conceptuelle de la science qui les rend possibles. En somme, chaque examen des réalités divines se distingue par sa tournure singulière, qui n’est autre que le produit de la régionalisation des discours, c’est-À-Dire de leur adaptation méthodologique aux outils de la science qui les engendre. / Studying the question of the divine in Aristotle implies to determine to which problem the Aristotelian conception of the divine is supposed to answer. Two conclusions can be drawn from close examination of the corpus aristotelicum in its entirety, and particularly of these texts in which the study of divine realities is Aristotle’s major concern (Physics, VII-VIII; De Cœlo, I-II, Metaphysics, Lambda). In the first place, it clearly appears that, according to Aristotle, the question of the divine is not a theological question, but an archological one. Indeed, nowhere Aristotle studies the divine beings in order to explore deeply the nature of the gods, but rather with the intention of investigating the first principles of phusis and ousiai. The Aristotelian conception of the divine is thus the consequence of the detailed examination of the first principles, thanks to which Aristotle thinks he will be able to define precisely the nature of the principle qua principle and then to solve some aporia about the archè. In the second place, it is worth noting that each of the three main texts in which Aristotle develops his conception of the divine is characterized by slight but significant differences in method. Depending on whether the question of the divine belongs to the science of nature (physics) or to the science of ousia (ousiology), the demonstration of the existence of divine beings and the description of their nature and causality are expressed in different ways, in accordance with the concepts employed in each science. In short, each investigation about divine beings is characterized by its singular form, which is the product of the regionalization of each inquiry, i.e. of its methodical adaptation to the conceptual tools of the science to which it belongs.