Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-28T20:39:26Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Luciana E S Mennucci.pdf: 443670 bytes, checksum: 014c895f99e43904481117d01b5f4ff0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-05-18 / In this dissertation I proceeded from the certification of the difficulty imposed by the standard psychoanalytic practice in the treatment of patients with feeding problems, to obtain positive results in the patient s relationship with his or her feeding, which would oblige me to introduce changes to the technique to the treatment of these patients. I sought, therefore, to study the field of feeding and the consequent feeding problems, which permitted me to enter some of the rules constituting this field such as: the social conditions of the production of symptoms, the diet mentality, the psychomechanics and the psychodynamics of feeding. Another route followed was of a search for legitimization in the changes of technique by penetrating the difference between techniques and psychoanalytic method. Maintaining in the background the studies of Susan Orbach, I took as a hypothesis that the diet mentality is a cause for great part of feeding problems and not their cure. I had to sustain myself in systematic readings about psychoanalysis, gastronomy and anthropology of feeding, as well as proceeding to the systematic study of the Multiple Fields Theory in the thematic of the psychoanalysis of the quotidian. Thus, in the course of this dissertation it became increasingly clearer that, as some of the rules of the field were revealed, specifically of the diet mentality, the route that favors an autonomy of feeding possible to the patient could be reached by the utilization of an active technique capable of touching the pure act regime that conforms the diet mentality. In this way, I could also organize the results of the reflection about my clinical work and in the conclusion that the diet mentality is both cause and consequence of a great part of feeding problems. It alienates the man of the contemporary world from the vital signs of feeding. To this man, the act of feeding, regulated by the pure act regime, ceases to be a personal decision, becomes imposed from the outside and turns into the meaning that would previously be attributed by thought / Nesta dissertação, parti da constatação da dificuldade enfrentada pela clínica psicanalítica padrão no atendimento a pacientes com problemas alimentares. Em minha clínica, para obter resultados positivos na relação do paciente com sua alimentação, via-me freqüentemente obrigada a introduzir mudanças de técnica no atendimento desses pacientes. Procurei, então, estudar o campo da alimentação e os conseqüentes problemas alimentares, o que me permitiu adentrar algumas de suas regras constitutivas, como: as condições sociais da produção dos sintomas, a mentalidade de dieta, a psicomecânica e a psicodinâmica alimentar. Outro caminho seguido foi o da busca de legitimação nas mudanças de técnica pela problematização da diferença entre técnicas e método da psicanálise. Tendo por pano de fundo os estudos de Susan Orbach, pude tomar como hipótese ser a mentalidade de dieta a causa de grande parte dos problemas alimentares, e não sua cura. Precisei amparar-me em leituras constantes sobre psicanálise, gastronomia e antropologia da alimentação, além de proceder ao estudo sistemático da Teoria dos Campos no tema da psicanálise do quotidiano. Assim, no discorrer da dissertação, foi-se tornando mais claro que, ao se revelarem algumas regras do campo da alimentaçao especificamente da mentalidade de dieta, abre-se o caminho favorecedor da possibilidade de uma autonomia alimentar para o paciente, a qual pôde ser alcançada pela utilização de uma técnica ativa capaz de tocar o regime do ato puro que conforma a mentalidade de dieta. Dessa forma, pude também organizar os resultados da reflexão sobre meu trabalho clínico na conclusão de que a mentalidade de dieta é causa e conseqüência de grande parte dos problemas alimentares. Ela aliena o homem contemporâneo dos sinais vitais da alimentação. Para esse homem, o ato de alimentar-se, regulado pelo regime do ato puro, deixa de ser uma decisão pessoal, impõe-se de fora e passa a ser o sentido que lhe seria previamente atribuído pelo pensamento

Poser la question du divin chez Aristote, c’est déterminer à quelle question la conception aristotélicienne du divin est censée répondre. L’examen méthodique de l’intégralité du corpus aristotelicum et, tout particulièrement, des trois textes dans lesquels Aristote place l’étude des réalités divines au centre de son enquête (Physique, VII-VIII ; De Cœlo, I-II, Métaphysique, Lambda) permet de formuler deux conclusions principales. En premier lieu, il apparaît clairement que la question du divin n’est pas, aux yeux d’Aristote, de nature théologique, mais archologique. Nulle part, en effet, l’étude du divin n’est menée pour elle-Même ; elle s’ancre, au contraire, dans un examen explicitement dédié aux principes premiers de la phusis ou des ousiai. La conception aristotélicienne du divin et des dieux est ainsi le produit d’un examen méthodique des êtres premiers et des principes, examen grâce auquel Aristote espère produire une détermination rigoureuse du mode d’être du principe en tant que tel et résoudre, par là même, certaines apories relatives à la question de l’archè. En second lieu, il convient de noter que les principaux textes dévolus à l’étude des êtres divins se distinguent les uns des autres par des nuances méthodologiques significatives. Selon que la question du divin prend naissance au sein de la science naturelle ou de la science des substances, selon qu’elle appartient à la physique ou à l’ousiologie, la preuve de l’existence des réalités divines, de même que la description de leur nature et de leurs fonctions, font l’objet de formulations diverses, toutes inféodées à la logique conceptuelle de la science qui les rend possibles. En somme, chaque examen des réalités divines se distingue par sa tournure singulière, qui n’est autre que le produit de la régionalisation des discours, c’est-À-Dire de leur adaptation méthodologique aux outils de la science qui les engendre. / Studying the question of the divine in Aristotle implies to determine to which problem the Aristotelian conception of the divine is supposed to answer. Two conclusions can be drawn from close examination of the corpus aristotelicum in its entirety, and particularly of these texts in which the study of divine realities is Aristotle’s major concern (Physics, VII-VIII; De Cœlo, I-II, Metaphysics, Lambda). In the first place, it clearly appears that, according to Aristotle, the question of the divine is not a theological question, but an archological one. Indeed, nowhere Aristotle studies the divine beings in order to explore deeply the nature of the gods, but rather with the intention of investigating the first principles of phusis and ousiai. The Aristotelian conception of the divine is thus the consequence of the detailed examination of the first principles, thanks to which Aristotle thinks he will be able to define precisely the nature of the principle qua principle and then to solve some aporia about the archè. In the second place, it is worth noting that each of the three main texts in which Aristotle develops his conception of the divine is characterized by slight but significant differences in method. Depending on whether the question of the divine belongs to the science of nature (physics) or to the science of ousia (ousiology), the demonstration of the existence of divine beings and the description of their nature and causality are expressed in different ways, in accordance with the concepts employed in each science. In short, each investigation about divine beings is characterized by its singular form, which is the product of the regionalization of each inquiry, i.e. of its methodical adaptation to the conceptual tools of the science to which it belongs.