Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Newcastle, 1987. / Department of Classics. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 330-355). Also available online.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Open University. BLDSC no. DXN020381.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin, 1966. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliography.

Thesis (EDD)--University of Montana, 2009. / Contents viewed on December 28, 2009. Title from author supplied metadata. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2007. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 288-297).

Thesis (M.A.)--Dept. of History and Philosophy of Science, University of Melbourne, 1999. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (p. 65-67).

No description available.

This thesis examines Aristotle’s dynamic, organic model of teleological explanation to see if it is a viable alternative to material reductionism. I argue that his teleology provides both a model for and an overview of the scientific enterprise. Aristotle’s theory of knowledge and perception is capable of exerting a unifying effect on the diversity of knowledge. The adoption of substance ontology gives a deeper understanding of any subject than a strictly cause-effect approach. His hylomorphism provides a clearer idea of the role of necessity in regular natural processes, and identifies the role of chance events as accidental anomalies. His actual-potential distinction is the key to understanding both Aristotle’s teleological approach and the complexity and diversity of living things. Aristotle’s teleology does not use only finality: all four conditions of change are incorporated as necessary and sufficient conditions for explanation and full understanding of change. Aristotle’s teleology, based on the human being as part of nature, is applicable at least in biological sciences to provide both a scientific methodology and a scientific method for the study of nature. It is particularly relevant to ecological studies, while his notion of the ‘good’ could be an acceptable criterion for funding of sustainable development.

In this thesis, I am investigating the nature of e[rwV (eros) and filiva (philia) in Plato and Aristotle. I have confined this project to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (EN) and Metaphysics, with a background discussion of Plato's Symposium and Phaedrus. I will argue for the following claims. First, Plato's Symposium poses a dilemma with respect to the object and nature of e[rwV. The dilemma is that the objects of e[rwV must be either particular individuals or the Beautiful itself. Second, Plato's Phaedrus may be seen as Plato's attempt to solve the dilemma by giving a synthesis: e[rwV is a virtuous maniva and should be directed to particular individuals en route to the Beautiful. However, another problem arises; viz., given Platonic metaphysics, it is difficult to see how the lovers can genuinely love one another in and of themselves when the ultimate object of love is the Form of Beauty. Third, Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics sees e[rwV as an excess of filiva. ErwV in human relationships must be avoided because it is seen as something bad and irrational, even though it is not a vice. The account of e[rwV and filiva in EN may be seen as Aristotle's attempt to propose another kind of solution to the dilemma by escaping the horns, i.e., by deprioritizing e[rwV in favor of filiva with respect to achieving the virtuous life. Fourth, this negative view of e[rwV does not appear in Metaphysics L. In 1072b3-4, Aristotle writes that the Unmoved Mover moves all things as being loved (wJV ejrwvmenon). The best interpretation of the phrase wJV ejrwvmenon is that the Unmoved Mover moves all things by letting them follow their nature. There is a shift of emphasis in Aristotle's philosophy from e[rwV to filiva, which brings another dilemma with respect to the objects of filiva, namely between filiva for particular individuals and filiva for the good. I will not try to solve the dilemma, but will try to circumscribe the issue.

Thesis (D. Phil.)--University of Oxford, 1949. / Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves i-v).