When explaining the course of action of inferior actors in asymmetric conflicts, Guerrilla Warfare is normative. But when illustrated, the examples are only of battles and wars fought on land. Consequently, there seems to be an insufficient amount of studies that show whether Guerrilla Warfare truly is a theory for maritime forces. The purpose of this study is to test if Guerrilla Warfare can explain the procedure of inferior, but successful, maritime forces in asymmetric conflicts. To extract the principles of guerrilla tactics, the controversial thoughts of Tse-tung, Giap and Guevara has been examined. The cases of this study are the Israeli maritime forces in the Yom Kippur war, and the Sea Tigers in the civil war of Sri Lanka. The results show that Guerrilla Warfare, despite similarities, cannot fully explain the tactical procedures of the Israelis. However, Guerrilla Warfare can, despite one difference, explain the tactical procedures of the Sea Tigers. This essay therefore argues that Guerrilla Warfare can be of use for maritime forces in the search of victory despite inferiority.

The principles of war have been institutionalised in the western world’s military doctrines despite many scientists and military officers having questioned them for a long time. They believe the principles are too broad, unspecific and even invalid. So why are they used in military education and why can they be found in doctrines? The purpose of this study is to examine if the principles of war could explain the outcome of asymmetric maritime conflicts.  Liddell Hart´s theory regarding the principles of war will be analysed through two cases, the battle of Latakia in the Yom Kippur war and the Sea tigers in the Sri Lankan civil war. Liddell Hart´s theory is based on analysing primarily land warfare, yet the principles of war are considered universal in all military arenas. Therefore, the theory should be applicable to maritime warfare. The analysis shows that the principles security and mobility could be identified to a lesser extent in the Sri Lankan case. However, in the case of the Battle of Latakia, the principles of concentration and surprise are identified to a lesser extent. The conclusion being that there could be a difference between irregular and regular forces regarding the use of the principles. Liddell Hart´s theory can explain the outcome of asymmetric maritime warfare because all four principles have been identified in both cases, however, in varying degrees.