2020 has been a year thoroughly marked by the global COVID-19 pandemic, and the ways in which different governments have sought to manage the crisis have sparked controversy. This paper aims to challenge and ultimately falsify the theory of “authoritarian advantage” in crisis management using a single-case study design of most-likely logic. This is done by performing a case study of the initial outbreak of COVID-19 in China based on the argument that contrary to suggestions made by previous research, the measures undertaken by the Chinese regime in the initial phase of the crisis do not exhibit the advantages expected of an authoritarian political system. The study goes on to reconstruct the chain of events during the initial response and analyzes whether the response unfolds as expected by set theoretical criteria of benefiting from China’s institutional preconditions. The analysis finds that the theory of “authoritarian advantage” loses credibility in this case, and further allows for the conclusion that any “advantages” of the regime are largely offset by critical “disadvantages”. This leads to a discussion opening up for the possibility that there is no single political system that is best suited for crisis management, as different systems enjoy different strengths as well as weaknesses. Understanding the circumstances of this is also recommended as a field of future research.