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The automobile driving performance of 18 mildly demented subjects was compared to that of 18 normal elderly and 18 mid-age controls. Driving tasks were grouped according to a three-level hierarchical model that characterizes driving as a problem solving skill involving (a) low-level vehicle control skills, (b) intermediate level manoeuvring skills in response to on-road events, and (c) higher level driving-related judgemental abilities. Driving simulator measures of brake reaction time and steering accuracy were selected to represent the lowest level of hierarchy. A Motor Vehicle Branch (MVB) road test and a test of emergency braking distance indexed the intermediate level. Driving-related judgment was assessed by evaluating the accuracy of subjects' appraisals of their own driving skills, and by examining whether the demented subjects evidenced an increased level of driving avoidance that might be commensurate with the extent of their driving deficits. Overall the demented subjects performed significantly less well than did controls on the driving behaviour measures. Particularly striking were their deficits at the highest and lowest levels of the hierarchical task analysis. They were markedly impaired on the driving simulator tasks and they showed a clear tendency to over-estimate their driving competence relative to their actual performance. However, from a practical standpoint it was noted that despite significant group differences at the intermediate level, the overlap in performance scores between the demented and the normal elderly was considerable for these in-car tasks. Also, although the mildly demented subjects had significantly more demerit points on the MVB road test than did the elderly controls, nearly 70% were able to pass the licensing exam. Mildly demented drivers might best be characterized as having marginal driving abilities, a fact which may pose considerable challenges to clinicians and policy makers. A second component of the study involved evaluation of the correlations between the driving measures and several common psychometric tests of attention, perception, and psychomotor speed. After group membership was accounted for, the psychometric tests failed to add precision to the prediction of driving performance.

In North America, automobile prices are largely determined through negotiation. Recognizing that some consumers have a strong aversion to negotiation, some manufacturers and dealers are now offering consumers the option of buying cars at a “no-haggle”, or fixed price. This dissertation consists of three essays which address how a fixed price alternative impacts both consumer behavior and firm strategies. The first essay explores the conditions under which a dealer would simultaneously offer a “no-haggle” Internet price and a negotiable price on the lot (which we term a dual-channel), and studies the marketing strategies adopted under this structure. We use consumer haggling cost as a key to understanding a dealer’s choice of pricing strategy. We find that a dual-channel is optimal for the dealer when there is sufficient diversity in consumer haggling cost. We also find that it is optimal for a dealer to specify a higher-than-cost “minimum acceptable price” to the salesperson as a price floor for negotiations. Surprisingly, a dual-channel may serve fewer customers while still being more profitable than a single channel structure. The second essay examines the competitive implications of a no-haggle pricing policy. By using Toyota’s fixed pricing policy in Canada as a natural experiment, we explore the impact of such a strategy on the prices and sales of Toyota and that of its close competitor, Honda. We find that the program has had important competitive consequences. While prices of both Toyota and Honda were higher in provinces with the program, there was an increase in Honda’s sales but with no effect on the sales of Toyota. The third essay determines the impact of a consumer’s bargaining behavior and information she collects on the final price paid. Using an extensive dataset, we find that a consumer’s negotiation skill and attitude toward negotiating significantly influences the negotiation outcome. In particular, consumers that enjoy negotiating have a greater propensity to search for price information which then allows them to obtain a better deal. In addition, we find that, while Internet users pay a lower price, the savings depend on the type of information collected by the buyer.

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There is no abstract available for this thesis.

Thesis (M.S.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 86-88). / viii, [89] leaves, bound ill. 29 cm

In North America, automobile prices are largely determined through negotiation. Recognizing that some consumers have a strong aversion to negotiation, some manufacturers and dealers are now offering consumers the option of buying cars at a “no-haggle”, or fixed price. This dissertation consists of three essays which address how a fixed price alternative impacts both consumer behavior and firm strategies. The first essay explores the conditions under which a dealer would simultaneously offer a “no-haggle” Internet price and a negotiable price on the lot (which we term a dual-channel), and studies the marketing strategies adopted under this structure. We use consumer haggling cost as a key to understanding a dealer’s choice of pricing strategy. We find that a dual-channel is optimal for the dealer when there is sufficient diversity in consumer haggling cost. We also find that it is optimal for a dealer to specify a higher-than-cost “minimum acceptable price” to the salesperson as a price floor for negotiations. Surprisingly, a dual-channel may serve fewer customers while still being more profitable than a single channel structure. The second essay examines the competitive implications of a no-haggle pricing policy. By using Toyota’s fixed pricing policy in Canada as a natural experiment, we explore the impact of such a strategy on the prices and sales of Toyota and that of its close competitor, Honda. We find that the program has had important competitive consequences. While prices of both Toyota and Honda were higher in provinces with the program, there was an increase in Honda’s sales but with no effect on the sales of Toyota. The third essay determines the impact of a consumer’s bargaining behavior and information she collects on the final price paid. Using an extensive dataset, we find that a consumer’s negotiation skill and attitude toward negotiating significantly influences the negotiation outcome. In particular, consumers that enjoy negotiating have a greater propensity to search for price information which then allows them to obtain a better deal. In addition, we find that, while Internet users pay a lower price, the savings depend on the type of information collected by the buyer.

Diss. (sammanfattning) Stockholm : Karol. inst. / Härtill 7 uppsatser.

Thesis (B.A.Hons.1977) - Dept. of Politics, University of Adelaide.