This paper examines the relation between competition in the banking sector and the financial stability on country level. Compared to previous research, it takes a different approach in that it uses realized systemic risk in the form of systemic banking crises instead of the total systemic risk. Theory provides us with two opposing theories regarding the role of competition on stability. Previous studies presented mixed results which leaves us with unresolved questions which this paper tries to answer. The results show that there is evidence for both views, but without giving an all comprehending answer.

Thesis advisor: Thomas Chemmanur / My Ph.D. dissertation consists of three chapters focused on topics in entrepreneurial finance, financial intermediation, and FinTech. The first chapter analyzes the effects of bank competition on gender and racial gaps in entrepreneurship. By leveraging interstate bank deregulation from 1994 to 2021, I find that stronger bank competition increases the quantity and quality of banking services offered to minority borrowers. Developing a novel measure of discrimination using narrative information in the complaints filed with the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, I demonstrate that bank competition reduces discrimination, alleviating the financial constraints of female and minority entrepreneurs. Stronger bank competition also reduces gender and racial gaps in firm performance and business equity accumulation, promoting wealth equality and fostering equitable economic growth.The second chapter draws on the context of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) publicly disclosing consumer complaint narratives in 2015. Utilizing a difference-in-differences design, I find that, following disclosure, CFPB-supervised banks whose complaint narratives are disclosed are less prone to discriminate against minority borrowers in the mortgage lending market. This reduces racial disparities in interest rates, default rates, and rejection rates. The disclosure saves minority borrowers $102 million in interest payments and aids over 14,000 minority households in securing loans annually, thereby narrowing the racial gap in homeownership. Stakeholders including consumers, peer banks, and stock market investors facilitate the disclosure's effects on reducing discrimination. The third chapter, co-authored with Bibo Liu and Xuan Tian, studies how policy uncertainty affects household credit access. Using crowdfunding data from a major peer-to-peer (P2P) crowdfunding platform, Prosper.com, and a news-based policy uncertainty index developed by Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2016), we find that policy uncertainty negatively affects households’ access to small loans. Using an instrument variable based on partisan conflicts and a difference-in-differences analysis relying on plausibly exogenous variation in policy uncertainty generated by gubernatorial elections, we show that the relation is likely causal. Investors’ increased caution on deal selection and enhanced value of the “wait-and-see” option appear to be two plausible underlying channels through which policy uncertainty affects P2P crowdfunding. Further evidence suggests that policy uncertainty decreases households’ incentives to borrow at the aggregate level, and increases loan interest rates and default probabilities. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2024. / Submitted to: Boston College. Carroll School of Management. / Discipline: Finance.

The thesis assesses bank performance from two aspects: growth sustainability and the externality impact on the growth of non-financial industries. With regard to sustainability, the study considers two issues. One is financial performance with a focus on understanding what determines profitability and stability, particularly the role of market structure in generating profits. The second aspect is that of exploring what drives bank growth. Do banks grow through a competitive process or a noncompetitive one? In the context of externality, the thesis investigates whether bank competition and stability contribute to the growth of non-financial industries. The thesis starts by investigating the effects of market structure on profitability and stability using the sample data of 1929 banks from 40 countries including both emerging and advanced economies over 1999-2008. It attempts to examine which school of theories provide more explanatory power to profitability and stability in banks: the traditional structure-conduct-performance (SCP) or relative-market-power (RMP) hypotheses. The results show that a greater market share leads to higher bank profitability in favour of the RMP theory evidenced in advanced economies; however interestingly there is no evidence in support of these theories in emerging economies. Furthermore, the RMP effect appears more sustainable when compared with the SCP. This suggests that a more concentrated banking system may be more vulnerable to financial stability. Regarding the second aspect of banking sector performance, we look at an issue of competition by employing data from around 5850 banks across 49 economies during 2001-2010. We employ different industrial economics theories to estimate the degree of bank competition. The results show that bank competition varies across countries in terms of competition intensity and process. Some banks compete more intensity for efficiency and some compete less. Interestingly, all indicators show that emerging banking markets are less competitive than their counterparts in advanced economies. Furthermore, the thesis explores whether competition and stability in the banking sector can affect the growth and market structure of nonfinancial industries and hence economic growth. Empirical evidence from 23 industries for 48 emerging and advanced economies shows robustly that a more vigorously competitive and thus efficient banking sector allows financially dependent industries to grow faster through supporting small firms and new entrants that disconcentrate market structure. Policy implication is clear: competition, rather than market structure, is what we need for restructuring our banks that can help economic growth.

No description available.

隨著金融交易與經濟活動的不斷演變，以及資訊科技的更迭與普及，有別於傳統的、非實體型態的金融中介機構逐漸威脅過去如銀行、保險公司等傳統中介機構的功能與收益，故隨之而來討論新型態金融中介是否仍有助於經濟成長、如何影響金融中介發展等議題也漸漸升溫。有鑒於此，本文第2.3章將探討兩種不同型態的中介機構(銀行與群眾募資平台) 之風險穩定程度，並據此提出新的分析結論。 金融中介在向大眾提供資金融通服務的同時也面臨風險。以信用風險及流動性風險為例，銀行利用創新金融工具，不但能將手中融資貸款部位的信用風險轉移至願冒險投資的投資人手中，藉此增加資金以繼續提供融資服務，成功達到幫助銀行增加利潤、分散信用風險，以及增加流動性等功能，但實際上，這些可能違約的信用風險其實並未消失。 本文試圖重新檢視金融中介的信用風險議題，首先分析銀行產業結構會如何影響銀行的違約風險；並關注次貸後因市場流動性急遽消失而新興的新興金融工具--群眾募資，是否將再次導致市場上高風險項目的出現。

<p>Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in developing countries are reported to encounter difficulties in accessing to formal external financing resource. Banking systems in this category of countries are either under-developed or newly reformed. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether SME financing in China, measured by SMEs per capita, is affected by local bank competition, measured by number of banks per capita or share of foreign banks. Control variables such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), level of infrastructure and geographic location are also included in the regression models.</p><p>The main findings are that: when disregarding the ownership of banks, bank competition has positive impact on SME financing across Chinese provinces, although the relationship is non-linear; and foreign banks do not significantly influence SME bank financing in China. The first finding generally support the conventional theories of industrial organization and the second one offers the basis for further arguments about the role of foreign banks in financing SMEs in China.</p>

This thesis examines the relationship between institutional context and firm performance, from both a theoretical and empirical perspective. The aim is to engage with the debate seeking to explain the observed diversity in the forms of economic organisation prevailing in socio-economic systems. The focus of the empirical work is on investigating the effects of the structure and behaviour of banking institutions on firm performance, in the Italian context. The analysis is comparative in the sense that confronts cooperative and capitalist business structures. The analytical framework is institutionalist in emphasising the institutionally embedded nature of economic performance, and the historical and cultural dimensions of economic behaviour. The institutional complementarity approach is used to investigate the hypothesis that the relative performance of different firm structures is context dependent. The main conclusions are that the economic performance of cooperative firms is strongly conditioned in a sense of institutional complementarity by the degree of development and competition characterising the financial domain. Rejected are the pessimistic predictions of conventional accounts that democratic firms are unequivocally unviable. Instead, there are relations of context dependency, of institutional complementarity that influence the viability of firm types. The overall conclusion is that the dynamics governing the evolution of socio-economic systems are much more complex than mainstream economics suggests; productive organisations may assume a multiplicity of forms. The theoretical claims of a universalistic history in which all production systems must follow the same line of development must be abandoned. This brings about major policy implications at the regional, national and international levels.

Os bancos nunca foram tão grandes como depois da Crise de 2008. No momento de maior pânico, logo após a quebra do Lehman Brothers, autoridades do mundo inteiro autorizaram fusões e aquisições antes vetadas. Era preciso garantir a estabilidade do sistema financeiro alegava-se e tentar preservar a concorrência nesse instante apenas aumentaria o pânico. O Brasil não ficou imune a esse movimento. Fusões como a do Itaú com o Unibanco e aquisições como a da Nossa Caixa pelo Banco do Brasil levaram o setor a um grau de concentração nunca visto antes. A discussão entre o Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (CADE) e o Banco Central, sobre quem deve julgar tais concentrações, faz parecer que existe uma contradição entre a disciplina constitucional da defesa da concorrência e a garantia da segurança e estabilidade das instituições financeiras. O resultado é a proliferação de instituições hipertrofiadas, os megabancos, em prejuízo desses mesmos princípios da ordem concorrencial estabelecidos constitucionalmente. Os principais argumentos em favor dos megabancos seriam, primeiro, o de que as rendas derivadas de poder no mercado que estes auferem (o chamado valor de franquia) formaria um colchão que aumentaria a sua resistência no caso de choques como o de 2008. Em segundo lugar, sugere-se que esses bancos, ao crescerem, acumulariam ganhos de escala, de escopo e de eficiência custo. Este trabalho propõe que não existe nenhum antagonismo entre a defesa da concorrência e a regulação bancária tradicional, de cunho prudencial e sistêmico. Propõe ainda que o modelo dos megabancos coloca um grande risco para a sociedade, tratando-se na realidade de um movimento estratégico de grandes instituições para acumular mais poder no mercado. São dois os motivos pelos quais se defende que não existe nenhum ganho no crescimento dessas instituições. Em primeiro lugar, as economias de escala se esgotam muito cedo, proposição com amplo suporte teórico e empírico. Na previsão mais otimista, bancos com mais do que 25 bilhões de dólares em ativos já estão na área de deseconomias de escala. Tampouco existem economias de escopo que autorizem a concentração de atividades tão diversas como as de banco comercial e de investimento. Bancos que concentram muitas atividades são, na realidade, avaliados negativamente pelo mercado. Mesmo os ganhos de eficiência custo, resultantes de uma melhor gestão de instituições mal administradas, não tem suporte empírico relevante. Em segundo lugar, uma estrutura moderna do setor bancário pressupõe bancos especializados e concentrados nas áreas em que têm maior eficiência. São bancos menores, que dividem com os mercados financeiros e outros intermediários a tarefa de prover o crédito. A concorrência do mercado de capitais, de instituições não bancárias (como gestores de fundos e financeiras) e de instituições não financeiras (como redes de supermercados, correios e empresas comerciais) forçou esses bancos a fazer o descruzamento de subsídios e a abandonar as atividades em que eram menos eficientes. Os megabancos vão na contramão dessa modernização, negando os princípios da Ordem Concorrencial. A reação dessas instituições, entretanto, é contundente. Os bancos procuram o crescimento excessivo, de forma a criar as megainstituições, para colher ganhos que não vêm de uma operação mais eficiente. São ganhos provindos das inconsistências na atuação do regulador. Este trabalho propõe a extensão das doutrinas de comportamento estratégico, de forma a incluir três categorias novas de comportamentos adotados pelos megabancos: 1. Expansão Não-Eficiente de Participação no Mercado: Bancos operam muito além da escala eficiente para obter as vantagens da garantia de socorro aos grandes bancos (o too big to fail), para influenciar a regulação e aumentar lucros e, por fim, para explorar os acionistas não controladores. 2. Saturação Anticompetitiva de Mercados: Bancos acumulam produtos para além do recomendado pelos ganhos de escopo, e também agências além do que geraria ganhos de escala, para bloquear a entrada de novos concorrentes. Mostra-se neste trabalho como o excesso de agências e produtos funciona como uma barreira à entrada, o que explicaria essas expansões como um movimento preventivo. 3. Bloqueio de Modernização Pró-Competitiva: Como uma estrutura moderna do setor obriga uma redução do tamanho dos bancos e, também, uma redução da participação do setor bancário nas atividades de crédito, os bancos tentam bloquear a modernização. O bloqueio é feito através de práticas anticoncorrenciais já conhecidas, como o bloqueio ao acesso de bens essenciais (por exemplo, ao sistema de pagamentos) e as ações concertadas, entre outros. A resposta do regulador para esses comportamentos estratégicos seria a aplicação pura e simples das ferramentas do Direito Concorrencial. Este deve aplicar medidas ordenando a desconcentração de mercados e deve investigar e punir as práticas anticompetitivas. É uma atuação que difere, portanto, da regulação bancária tradicional, em que constantemente se consideram os aspectos prudenciais e sistêmicos. Isso ocorre porque, no caso desses comportamentos, o restabelecimento da livre concorrência é condição necessária e suficiente para garantir a segurança e a higidez dos mercados financeiros. Essa conclusão, aplicada ao Brasil, leva a que se deve proceder à desconcentração no setor, com a adoção de medidas compensatórias para a maioria das fusões recentemente aprovadas. Essas medidas encontram precedente significativo naquelas adotadas tanto na Europa quanto nos Estados Unidos durante a Crise de 2008. Finalmente, algumas das previsões das hipóteses desenvolvidas no trabalho são testadas empiricamente. Foi desenvolvido um modelo jurimétrico que mostra que mais competição resulta em maior estabilidade financeira. O modelo também confronta a abordagem da Nova Economia Institucional com a NeoEstruturalista, mostrando que esta última resulta em mais competição e maior estabilidade financeira. / Banks have never been as great as after the 2008 crisis. At the moment of greatest panic, just after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, authorities all around the world authorized otherwise unlawful mergers and acquisitions. It was necessary to ensure the stability of the financial system, it was claimed, and try to preserve competition right now would only increase the panic. Brazil has not been immune to this trend. Mergers such as Itaú and Unibanco and operations as the acquisition of Nossa Caixa by Bank of Brazil led the industry to a concentration degree never seen before. The discussion between the Council for Economic Defense (CADE) and the Brazilian Central Bank, about who should examine such concentrations, makes it appear that there is a contradiction between the constitutional underpinnings of antitrust policy and the ensuring of soundness and stability of financial institutions. The result is a proliferation of institutions hypertrophied, the megabanks, with unrepairable damages to the principles of competition constitutionally assured. The main arguments in favor of megabanks would be, first, that the income derived from market power they earn (franchise value) form a buffer that increases its resistance to such shocks as the 2008 Crisis. Secondly, it is suggested that banks accumulate economies of scale, scope and cost efficiency as they grow. This research proposes that there is no antagonism between antitrust law and traditiona banking regulation, more focused in prudential and systemic aspects. It also proposes the model of megabanks poses a major risk to society, since it is actually a strategic move from large institutions to accumulate more market power. There are two reasons why it is argued that there is no gain in the growth of these institutions. First, economies of scale are exhausted too early, a proposition that rests in extensive theoretical and empirical support. In the most optimistic forecast, banks with more than $ 25 billion in assets are already incurring in scale diseconomies. Nor are there economies of scope allowing the concentration of activities as diverse as commercial and investment banking. Financial institutions that concentrate many activities are actually evaluated negatively by the market. Even the cost efficiency gains resulting from better management of institutions has no relevant empirical support. Second, a modern financial system requires specialized banks, focused in areas which they have greater efficiency. They are smaller banks, which share with the financial markets and other intermediaries the task of providing credit. The competition provided by non-bank institutions (such as mutual funds and credit unions) and non-financial institutions (such as retail stores and conglomerates) forced these banks to do the unwinding of subsidies and abandon activities they were less efficient. Megabanks go against this modernization, and they are a deny of the principles of the competition order. The reaction of these institutions, however, is striking. Banks seek overgrowth in order to create megainstitutions, seizing profits that does not come from a more efficient operation. They seek gains stemmed from inconsistencies in the work of regulators. This work suggests the extension of the opportunistic behavior doctrines, in a way to include three new types of strategic behavior adopted by the megabanks: 1. Non-efficient Increase of Market Share: Banks operate far beyond efficient scale to take advantage of the implicit government guarantee of the rescuing of large banks (the too big to fail policy), to influence regulation and thus increase profits, and finally, to explore non-controlling shareholders. 2. Anticompetitive Market Crowding: Banks accumulate products beyond what is recommended in order to attain gains of scope, and also agencies in excess of what generates economies of scale, doing so to block the entry of new competitors. It is shown here how the excess branches and products acts as entry barrier, explaining these expansions as a preemptive move. 3. Blocking of Pro-Competitive Modernization: As a modern industry structure requires a reduction in the size of banks and also a reduction in the share of the banking sector in lending activities, banks try to block the modernization. This blocking is done through anticompetitive practices already known, such as denying access to essential facilities (eg, the payment system) and by adopting a collusive behavior, among others. The answer of regulators for such strategic behavior would be a pure and simple application of Competition Law remedies. They should apply measures ordering the deconcentration of markets and should investigate and punish anticompetitive practices. This approach differs from traditional banking regulation, in which constantly consideration of prudential and systemic aspects reign. This is because, in the case of these behaviors, restoring free competition is necessary and sufficient condition to ensure the safety and soundness of financial markets. This conclusion applied to Brazil, means that one must increase competition in the industry, with the adoption of compensatory measures to the most recently approved mergers. These measures have a significant precedent in the measures adopted in both Europe and the United States during the Crisis of 2008. Finally, some of the predictions of these hypotheses are tested empirically. It is developed a jurimetric model, which shows that more competition yields more financial stability. The model also confronts the New Insitutional Economics approach to the question with a neo-structuralist approach, showing that the former entails more competition and financial stability.

Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in developing countries are reported to encounter difficulties in accessing to formal external financing resource. Banking systems in this category of countries are either under-developed or newly reformed. The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether SME financing in China, measured by SMEs per capita, is affected by local bank competition, measured by number of banks per capita or share of foreign banks. Control variables such as Gross Domestic Product (GDP), level of infrastructure and geographic location are also included in the regression models. The main findings are that: when disregarding the ownership of banks, bank competition has positive impact on SME financing across Chinese provinces, although the relationship is non-linear; and foreign banks do not significantly influence SME bank financing in China. The first finding generally support the conventional theories of industrial organization and the second one offers the basis for further arguments about the role of foreign banks in financing SMEs in China.

This study empirically investigates the validity of the competition and stability trade-off hypothesis for the Turkish banking system. To this end, we consider annual bank level accounting data for the 1990-2008 period and compute the most commonly used measures of banking stability and competition. The effects of macroeconomic factors and bank specific indicators including the ownership structure are also taken into account. The fixed effects panel estimation results suggest that the relation between competition and stability is not invariant to the use of alternative indicators. The results based on the Z-Index as a measure of bank stability support the competition-stability and competition-fragility views when concentration ratios and the H-Statistics are used as the alternative competition indicators, respectively. However, when nonperforming loan ratio, a proxy for loan portfolio risk, is used as a stability measure, exactly the opposite outcome is obtained. The results also change when the ownership structure of banks is considered. Consequently, in line with the literature stating that there is no clear-cut relation between competition and stability, the direction of this relation for the Turkish banking system changes with different model specifications.