In this thesis I argue that the major philosophical arguments in the field of animal ethics, as it has developed in the twentieth century, are inadequate without a robust theological foundation. While these arguments for greater moral respect for animals have acquired some cultural purchase in relation to systematic abuses of animals in factory farming and some forms of hunting, they lack the resources for articulating the many complexities inherent in human relationships with other animals. These positions, expounded most prominently by Peter Singer and Tom Regan, seek to extend to animals the moral frames of earlier Enlightenment thinkers and are thus bound by the same concerns and constraints; they therefore do not sufficiently problematise the modern distinction between humans and other animals that has advanced the modern mistreatment of animals to a degree of systematic cruelty unknown in human history. I argue that the Christian tradition has richer resources for articulating human moral relationships with other animals – and for problematising the modern framing of the human-animal distinction – than these secular theories possess on their own. This is by no means the first theological foray into the field of animal ethics. Previous theological accounts, however, still work predominantly within the confines set by secular philosophers. For example, Andrew Linzey clearly articulates his concept of “Theos-rights” for animals from within the conceptual framework of deontological categories. I will argue instead that a richer theological account of human relationships with other animals can be made by embracing the foundational love ethic found in Christianity. The Christian category of neighborly love represents a normative moral position in its own right rather than a simple addition to or reinterpretation of earlier consequentialist or deontological accounts. Using the parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10:25-37), I outline a theologically informed animal ethic in which animals are seen as potential neighbors. My argument proceeds in two stages. The first and largest section identifies and explores three themes key to interpreting the parable with a view toward animal ethics. First, I explore the theme of responsibility and employ the thought of Emil Brunner and Karl Barth in asking to what degree humans, as imago Dei, are responsible for their relationships with animals. Second, I argue for the importance of caring in human moral encounters with animals. Here, I explore the similarities and deficiencies of feminist theory in relation to the Christian concept of neighborly love. Third, I consider the moral relevance of nearness, or proximity, in human relationships with animals. Here, I outline the different responsibilities inherent in human relationships with wild, domestic working, and pet animals. After expounding these three themes, the second stage of my thesis employs them in critiquing two specific theological issues. I first compare the Christian concept of dominion over animals found in Genesis 1:28 with competing claims from Christian stewardship ethics and environmental land ethics. Then, primarily in conversation with Barth, I conclude with a discussion of the theological arguments for and against Christian vegetarianism.

In this thesis I present a critical explication of Barth’s doctrine of providence in Church Dogmatics III.3. I argue that Karl Barth’s doctrine of providence developed throughout CD III.3 represents a ‘personalist’ revision of Reformed orthodoxy which can only be understood through his ad hoc use of philosophical resources. I claim that critics and supporters alike have missed the depth of Barth’s revision of Reformed providence by failing to perceive his ad hoc use of contemporaneous philosophical tools of the personal. Barth’s doctrine of providence remains theology proper, and not philosophy, but cannot be understood without philosophy. By setting Barth in conversation with three philosophical theologians, Vincent Brümmer, John Macmurray and Austin Farrer, I attempt to show how far Barth is from pre-modern understandings in his articulation of the doctrine of providence. These conversations equip the reader to discern continuities and discontinuities of Barth’s thought with 20th century personal, relational philosophy, thereby making sense of many of Barth’s counterintuitive claims. For Barth, human life is the continual double-agency of human self-determination and divine determination. This life in covenant before God (coram Deo) constitutes the Godgiven opportunity of human personhood. Seen in dialogue with personalist philosophical thinkers, Barth’s doctrine of providence overcomes problematic aspects of traditional Reformed views and grants limited time and space for personal development. Providence sheds light on Barth’s ‘eternalizing’ eschatology in that election establishes the objective reality of salvation for all creatures, while providence explicates God’s active lordship in the human’s self-determination of personal identity in history (the subjective formation of the person who is objectively saved). Election describes God’s salvific work on behalf of creation solely in the work of Jesus Christ. Providence determines the identity of those creatures in relation with the personal God. The conversations I propose with philosophical theologians enable the reader to discern a greater philosophical coherence in Barth’s doctrine of providence. Through contrast with the philosophical theologians, Barth’s christocentric and Trinitarian articulation gains clarity and significance. Building on these philosophical comparisons, I attempt to assess Barth’s elaborations on entrenched debates concerning history as determined by divine action, human freedom under divine providence, and the problem of evil in world-occurrence. I argue that Barth’s ‘personalist’ post-Enlightenment providence as seen in the whole of III.3 points to absolute confidence in God’s determination of all world-occurrence, limited human autonomy of action under God’s universal providence, and an explication of evil that strengthens the Christian in the face of suffering and injustice.

No description available.

The dissertation focuses on Karl Barth's theology as it relates to present issue in Evangelical thought. Chapter 1 states that an Evangelical theology of religions can affirm and apply particular aspects of Barth's doctrine of the Holy Spirit that will serve to redefine some present Evangelical approaches to the content of divine revelation. Chapter 2 surveys the theology of religions models constructed by Karl Rahner, Clark Pinnock, Amos Yong, and Terrance Tiessen. These scholars affirm in some respect that non-Christians need not have explicit knowledge of Jesus Christ and His work in order to appropriate the benefits of redemption. Chapter 3 examines Barth's trinitarian-oriented doctrine of revelation. For Barth, the doctrine ofthe Trinity provides the key to genuine divine revelation because revelation's content cannot be separated from its form in Jesus Christ. Chapter 4 addresses Barth's evaluation of the phenomenon of religion and natural theology. His attack on both concepts as human attempts to fashion God in their own image will be discussed. Chapter 5 will discuss and analyze the Christ-centered nature of Barth's doctrine of the Holy Spirit. The discussion shows how for Barth the Holy Spirit is the sole mediator of Christ's presence who guides persons into objective knowledge of Christ and equips them for Christian service. Chapter 6 details Barth's use of secular "parables" of truth in the world in relation to the one Truth-Jesus Christ. The focus is how these "lights" of truth in creation never exist apart from Christ's reconciling work. Chapter 7 evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of Barth's thought as it relates to thesis of the work. Particular attention is given to Barth's rejection of general revelation and the doctrine of common grace as juxtaposed with the work of Herman Bavinck, whose thought is utilized as a useful alternative to Barth's thought in this area. Chapter 8 will conclude by briefly addressing Bavinck's position in contrast to Barth. Finally, the work seeks to reaffirm the thesis that use of selective aspects of Barth's thought can serve as an aid to on-going Evangelical efforts to formulate a viable theology of religions.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University / PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you. / The problem of this dissertation is to present and to analyze critically the doctrine of sin in Karl Barth's Church Dogmatics, Volumes I/1--IV/3. First the Church Dogmatics is summarised in terms of the doctrine of sin, and three discernible periods, I/1--II/1, II/2--III/4, and IV/1--IV/3, are found. Following the exposition the teachings on sin for each period are restated, their respective Christological presuppositions shown and compared, and the tensions which exist between them explored. Next Barth's mature conception of sin, period three, is analyzed for its New Testament orientation. Finally, problems in Barth's mature doctrine of sin are presented, and a final evaluation is made. These are the major findings: In the first section, Volumes I/1--II/1, sin is portrayed as an objective reality which has drastically altered man's life. Man is under the judgment of original sin, is spiritually dead, and can know God only through the Word of God coming afresh to him. In Volumes II/2--III/4, there is a de-emphasizing of the nature of sin. Sin is objectively impossible. Jesus Christ is the genuine man who actualizes all other men. As He has already rejected sin, man's sin is rejected. From creation God has denied evil by rejecting certain possibilities. Sin is man's choice for these rejected possibilities, das Nichtige. The emphasis is on God's rejection and not on man's choice. Although man sins by choosing the objectively impossible, sin cannot destroy but only pervert. Jesus Christ is the higher truth. The basis for this new understanding of sin is Barth's Christo-absolutism which declares that Jesus Christ is God Himself, the ontic center of creation. Creation is instrumental to this historic center and is in both noetic and ontic synthesis with it. Creation has already been fulfilled in Him. Thus the following tensions arise. (1) Time has no intrinsic meaning since creation is fulfilled. (2) Creation loses its creaturely dimension in its synthesis in Jesus Christ. (3) Sin, overruled by Jesus Christ, has no intrinsic meaning. This entire perspective is found to be unbiblical. In Volume IV/1--IV/3, sin is re-emphasized. In the light of Jesus Christ's reconciliation, sin is seen to have greater reality as man's other determinant. Sin cannot change Jesus Christ's work for man, but man in sin achieves something powerfully real and brings chaos into creation. He contradicts himself damaging both his relationship to God and man. Only God's grace keeps man from falling into das Nichtige. Sin is overcome in Jesus Christ, but man's sinful past is still with him. This understanding of sin rests in Barth's new Christological emphasis that Jesus Christ still fights evil and suffers for sinful man. With this the categories of time, creation, and sin regain Biblical orientation. Barth's mature doctrine of sin is in the main obedient to the New Testament in teaching the following: (1) An understanding of sin must be drawn primarily from Jesus Christ's reconciling act. (2) Sin is volitional rebellion against God. (3) Sin's consequences are horrible, releasing das Nichtige into creation. (4) Evil is not only a power released by sin but attacks man. (5) Theology cannot give a rational explanation for sin without neutralizing it. (6) Man in sin faces judgment and condemnation. Barth does deviate from the New Testament, however, by not developing the law as a background for Christ's reconciling work. Our final evaluation of Barth's doctrine of sin in the third section is positive. The reader is confronted by such a compelling picture of Jesus Christ the Reconciler of sinful man that he knows himself to be a sinner. / 2031-01-01

Thesis advisor: Lisa Sowle Cahill / Contrary to current transhumanist, medical, and cultural perspectives that aging is something solely to lament or even eradicate, this work explores the meaning of aging and death from the perspective of Christian theology, particularly within the schema of St. Augustine and Karl Barth. Both authors describe the complexity of aging in terms of our curse and calling as creatures aimed at participation in God through union with Christ. Locating Christology as central to our understanding of aging illuminates the ways in which the God revealed in Christ enters our humanity, sharing in our vulnerability, dependency, frailty, and even passivity. By turning to the incarnation, Christ's nature and work not only give us future hope, but transforms the daily aging experience - both active and passive waiting within our present, temporal reality for aging individuals and their surrounding communities. By maintaining union with God through contemplation and action, Christ dignifies our status as receptive and active agents. Thus, building from these two authors, I argue that aging serves as a sign and preparation for Sabbath rest by which aging persons might enact virtue through their specific vocation before God. Likewise, those persons surrounding the aging are called to enact virtues that reciprocally respond through interdependent communities that give and receive in union with Christ. Chapter One opens with preliminary questions on the meaning of death and aging while Chapter Two delineates Augustine's view on these realities as a result of the fall and original sin. However, even in Augustine's negative view of death and aging, he highlights the good in the soul/body relation and resurrected bodies. His position legitimizes grief and the human emotions, thus offering an ethics of compassion in loss. Finally, I constructively locate the positive view of aging and death is its sign and preparation for eternal Sabbath rest. Chapter Three considers Barth's analysis of death and aging as both negative and positive, evil and good through his dialectical lens. While death is a sign of judgment, finitude constitutes human identity as good in our temporal end. His ethics mirrors his anthropology in protecting life while accepting limits. He ends by describing the three stages of life including youth, middle age, and old age as composing our vocation. Each stage includes our call before God that legitimizes agency for the old as well as interdependent relationships. Chapters Four and Five explore the Christology of Augustine and Barth. Christ's divine and human natures bring together wisdom and knowledge for Augustine in Chapter Four. Aging persons grow in wisdom and knowledge through contemplation and action in union with Christ. Not only does union with Christ become the foundation for moral agency, but Christ also achieves the benefits for aging persons through his incarnation and atoning work. Christ experiences psychological anguish and forsakenness before God as the Totus Christus. Aging persons also receive the benefits of Christ's person and work that reverses the consequences of aging and death. Chapter Five claims that participation in Christ serves as the key to understanding Barth's Church Dogmatics. God's movement to humanity and our movement to God are embodied in the hypostatic union. Here we see Christ's active agency in his divine humility/obedience through the incarnation and atoning work. Christ's passive agency or human response perfectly embodies gratitude, prayer, and obedience through union with the Spirit in fulfilling his vocation in time. Moreover, in congruence with the work of W.H. Vanstone, Jesus' passive agency that receives the activity of the world legitimizes dignity and worth for those aging stages of life involving decline and dependence. Aging persons are agents who are active and passive, giving and receiving through a mixture of contemplation (prayer) and activity in union with Christ. Finally, Chapter Six synthesizes the Christology and participation present in the theologies of Augustine and Barth as the foundation for a moral virtue theory as it applies to aging persons and their surrounding communities. By emphasizing union with Christ in Augustine's virtue theory and union with Christ in Barth's morality of `vocation,' I argue moral agents are contemplative/acting persons intended for union with God. By receiving and giving in relationship with God and others, aging persons and their communities embody virtues that reciprocally benefit one another. Virtues for the aging include humility, gratitude, generosity, wisdom, prudence, memory, friendship, fortitude, and hope. Virtues for those communities surrounding aging persons entail respect, justice, mercy, and love. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2013. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Theology.

Thesis advisor: Stephen J. Pope / This dissertation provides a multidisciplinary analysis of acedia, a vice that misdirects the natural human love for God and disorders the mind and social structures. Acedia—from the Greek a- + kedos, “lack of care”—is a vice that rejects moral agency, disorders love, and distorts thinking, resulting in a range of psychological effects (such as despair, anxiety, hyper productivity, etc.) and the creation of social structures that hinder human flourishing. This vice was widely discussed as a moral and spiritual problem until the modern period, when three factors led to its neglect: (1) the equation of acedia with laziness in post-Reformation theological literature, (2) the medicalization of acedia as depression in the emerging psychological literature, and (3) the contention that moral and spiritual concepts were out of place in psychological reflection. And as morality, spirituality, and mental health became bifurcated, psychologists began to claim that the Christian tradition discovered depression, but spiritualized it as the vice of acedia. An integrative approach that connects moral theology with the biopsychosocial sciences clarifies the nature of acedia and provides practices to reorder individuals languishing or struggling with its effects. This approach resists the bifurcation of morality and spirituality from mental health; rejects reductive accounts of acedia as slothful laziness, anomie, boredom, melancholy, or depression; and demonstrates the areas of overlap between vices and mental disorders. Beginning with a statement of the problem of acedia, this dissertation indicates how the moral, spiritual, and mental health elements of acedia became separated. Then the strengths and weaknesses in the biopsychosocial literature on mental health and vice is discussed, and it is argued that the sciences can be supplemented with a theological account of vices as habits that result from choices to act, love, and reason which disorder the mind and social structures. This integrative account reveals how vices like acedia can be factors in mental health since they disorder crucial capacities of the mind like agency, love, and reasoning. Nevertheless, vices like acedia are distinct from sloth, anomie, boredom, melancholy, and depression. While vices and disorders involve intentions, choices, habits, and actions, vices may or may not impact neural functioning or cause neural malfunction as mental disorders do. Acedia and these various disorders are distinct even though they may overlap in certain cases. Consequently, vices like acedia can be one of several factors—including biological, psychological, and social ones—involved in the development course of mental disorders, but need not, and will not always be so involved. Recognizing this avoids moralizing mental disorders (by making mental disorder into a purely moral problem with a moral remedy), and medicalizing vices (by affirming that moral problems are at root medical ones requiring a medical remedy). Removing acedia, therefore, requires the adoption of practices that can be tailored to foster the virtue of gratitude, which remove acedia, redirect its disordered inclination to love God, and reorder individuals struggling with its effects. Thus, to discuss acedia adequately, one needs to integrate insights from morality, spirituality, and mental health. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2015. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Theology.

Texte remanié de: Habilitationsschrift--Kiel--Christian-Albrechts-Universität, 1999. / Bibliogr. p. 258-272. Index.

Diss.--Oxford--Oxford University. / Bibliogr. p. 231-254. Index.

Thesis (Doctoral)--Philipps-Universität Marburg/Lahn, 1980. / eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (p. 275-295).