<p>Publiceringsår: 2024</p><p>Termin och läsår: Vårterminen 2024</p>

In this thesis I have examined Anti-Natalism, specifically arguments by David Benatar, which conclude that human procreation is under all circumstances wrong, and Seana Shiffrin, which concludes that procreation is a “moral hard case.” I provide objections and responses to each argument of my own, as well as those from Saul Smilansky, Rivka Weinberg, and David Wasserman. I also examine the manner in which female unemployment rates (as well as aggregate female and male) unemployment rates in a year between 2005 and 2014 impact fertility rates in the following year (from 2006-2015).

David Benatar’s axiological asymmetry argument for antinatalism states that it is always bad for a sentient being to come into existence. There has been a lot of discussion about this argument since its publication in 2006, but this discussion has often been lacking by not accepting some ground rules, or assumptions, that Benatar establishes. In this paper I accept these ground rules, which is the person-affecting view, and the idea that the axiological asymmetry argument provides a lot of explanatory power, by single handedly being able to explain four other, primafacie plausible asymmetries. In this paper I investigate these other asymmetries to see (i) if they are true and (ii) if some other, more plausible theory, can explain them. My investigation shows that two of these asymmetries are false when understood in a theoretical way. When these two asymmetries are understood in a practical way, they are true, but then they don’t lend support to the axiological asymmetry argument. The third asymmetry, while true, is better explained by the so-called existence requirement. The fourth asymmetry, while true, doesn’t lend support to the axiological asymmetry argument since it doesn’t provide anything new to this argument. The conclusion drawn from this is that the explanatory power of the axiological asymmetry argument, with regards to these other asymmetries, is not that strong, which in effect weakens the plausibility of the axiological asymmetry argument for antinatalism. / David Benatars axiologiska asymmetri-argument för antinatalism säger att det alltid är dåligt för en kännande varelse att börja existera. Det har varit mycket diskussion kring detta argument sedan dess publicering år 2006, men denna diskussion har ofta varit bristfällig genom att inte acceptera några grundregler, eller antaganden, som Benatar etablerar. I den här uppsatsen accepterar jag dessa grundregler, som dels är den så kallade person-affecting teorin, och dels tanken att det axiologiska asymmetri-argumentet ger mycket förklaringskraft, genom att på egen hand kunna förklara fyra andra, prima facie rimliga asymmetrier. I den här uppsatsen undersöker jag dessa andra asymmetrier för att se (i) om de är sanna och (ii) om någon annan, rimligare teori, kan förklara dem. Min undersökning visar att två av dessa asymmetrier är falska när de förstås på ett teoretiskt sätt. När dessa två asymmetrier förstås på ett praktiskt sätt är de sanna, men då ger de inte stöd för det axiologiska asymmetri-argumentet. Den tredje asymmetrin är sann, men förklaras bättre av det så kallade existens-kravet. Den fjärde asymmetrin är sann, men ger inte något stöd till det axiologiska asymmetri-argumentet eftersom den inte tillför något nytt till detta argument. Slutsatsen som dras av detta är att förklaringskraften hos det axiologiska asymmetri-argumentet, med avseende på dessa andra asymmetrier, inte är så stark, vilket som en följd försvagar rimligheten hos det axiologiska asymmetri-argumentet för antinatalism.

M.A. (Philosophy) / Consider a couple planning to have children. There are many reasons one could offer these potential parents for reconsidering bringing new people into existence. One could for instance say to them that they currently lack the finances, or maturity, to adequately take care of any children they produce. If it were almost certain that this couple would pass on a terrible genetic disease to their offspring, one could see it as one’s duty to warn them against reproduction. One could even draw attention to the plight of orphans, and suggest to these (and other) potential parents that a more pressing responsibility lies not in planning to give homes to persons not yet in existence, but in attempting to give homes to those already in existence. However, when deciding whether or not to create children, rarely does one consider, over and above the preceding considerations, whether there might be some fundamental wrongness to the very act of procreation. In other words, rarely does one consider the possibility that creating people might, all things considered, never be permissible. At its extreme, “anti-natalism” implies the view that coming into existence is always a harm that outweighs any of its benefits. This position is defended by David Benatar (Benatar 1997, 2006). However, one need not believe that coming into existence is always an overall harm in order to favour an anti-natal perspective; one need only believe that it is morally problematic to inflict serious, preventable harms upon others without their consent. Such a consent-based anti-natal position can be derived from the argument put forth by Seana Shiffrin (1999). To be clear, according to either of these versions of anti-natalism, creating a new person is considered an impermissible harm. When I refer to “anti-natalism” in this dissertation, I will be referring to this negative judgement regarding procreation. Anti-natalism has a rich philosophical heritage, with its roots stretching back to antiquity. For instance, Ecclesiastes (1:1-18) of the Hebrew Bible bemoans the apparent meaninglessness and futility of existence—a state of affairs with which any number of generations of humans must cope. Not until very recently, however, has the anti-natal position been given due consideration by philosophers. Arthur Schopenhauer (1851), for instance, is perhaps best known for advocating a pessimistic philosophy that is, broadly speaking, anti-natal in its implications. The key figure in this field, however, is Benatar, who defends an unequivocally anti-natal position.