This dissertation is an examination of Aristotle’s political science. The first part begins by comparing the Aristotelian conception of the human being as a political animal with subsequent conceptions, notably in the political thought of Cicero, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. This comparative analysis shows that human nature is increasingly conceived as apolitical, a major consequence of which is a rejection of the Aristotelian conception of logos (speech, reason) as a natural capacity for reasoning about justice and injustice. It is then demonstrated that modern political science rejects Aristotle’s argument that there is a good for human beings as such which is constitutive of their end (telos), in the same way that modern science abandoned Aristotelian natural teleology. While contemporary currents of political thought, including neo-Aristotelianism, republicanism and communitarianism, make use of certain elements of Aristotle’s thought, they largely fail to recover the critical notions of action and nature. Having cleared major obstacles that bar our access to Aristotle’s political science, the dissertation moves, in the second part, to a textual analysis of the Politics, which, it is argued, constitutes not a work fractured between its “realistic” and “idealistic” parts, but a unified inquiry into both defective political regimes and the best regime, the guiding question of which is: how to render human beings good. The analysis begins by a consideration of the naturalness of the city and examines the various ways in which the notion of “nature” is used by Aristotle. It is then argued that, according to Aristotle’s presentation, political life is the fulfillment of human nature insofar as it represents the possibility of an ethical and moral life. Accordingly, political science, and legislative or “architectonic” science in particular, is to be devoted to moral education. Aristotle is critical of an education that neglects the virtues necessary for leisure in favour of military virtues alone, while acknowledging that cities must be prepared for war. Through an examination of the legislative science and political prudence, it is shown that Aristotle’s political science is capable of providing action with a moral orientation, without having recourse to metaphysical cosmology.

This dissertation is an examination of Aristotle’s political science. The first part begins by comparing the Aristotelian conception of the human being as a political animal with subsequent conceptions, notably in the political thought of Cicero, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. This comparative analysis shows that human nature is increasingly conceived as apolitical, a major consequence of which is a rejection of the Aristotelian conception of logos (speech, reason) as a natural capacity for reasoning about justice and injustice. It is then demonstrated that modern political science rejects Aristotle’s argument that there is a good for human beings as such which is constitutive of their end (telos), in the same way that modern science abandoned Aristotelian natural teleology. While contemporary currents of political thought, including neo-Aristotelianism, republicanism and communitarianism, make use of certain elements of Aristotle’s thought, they largely fail to recover the critical notions of action and nature. Having cleared major obstacles that bar our access to Aristotle’s political science, the dissertation moves, in the second part, to a textual analysis of the Politics, which, it is argued, constitutes not a work fractured between its “realistic” and “idealistic” parts, but a unified inquiry into both defective political regimes and the best regime, the guiding question of which is: how to render human beings good. The analysis begins by a consideration of the naturalness of the city and examines the various ways in which the notion of “nature” is used by Aristotle. It is then argued that, according to Aristotle’s presentation, political life is the fulfillment of human nature insofar as it represents the possibility of an ethical and moral life. Accordingly, political science, and legislative or “architectonic” science in particular, is to be devoted to moral education. Aristotle is critical of an education that neglects the virtues necessary for leisure in favour of military virtues alone, while acknowledging that cities must be prepared for war. Through an examination of the legislative science and political prudence, it is shown that Aristotle’s political science is capable of providing action with a moral orientation, without having recourse to metaphysical cosmology.

Can explicitly Christian principles be invoked and put into practice in political life without thereby rendering that politics fideistic, exclusionary and immoderate? Could such principles in fact strengthen the rule of reason in politics? Many secular and Christian thinkers agree that the answers to these questions must be no, only parting ways on their practical conclusions. But Aquinas' much-neglected De Regno suggests the matter is not so simple. In his careful pedagogical structuring of De Regno, Aquinas opens up the possibility of a kind of dialogue between convention, reason and revelation, one that permits him to propose and reformulate his political teachings according to diverse but convergent principles. I aim to develop an account of Aquinas' political teaching that reveals itself as indebted to revelation for its principles but grounded in and open to reason, and thus neither irrational, exclusionary nor immoderate. I will focus particularly on his treatment of the natural law. / text

Este trabalho busca desvelar e sistematizar claramente os princípios straussianos de filosofia política clássica e, especificamente, os princípios straussiano-platônicos do melhor regime. Isto é, este trabalho busca desvelar o que Leo Strauss acredita ser o começo da filosofia política clássica, o que Leo Strauss acredita ser a “metodologia” clássica à filosofia política e, especificamente, as conclusões de Platão sobre o melhor regime. Os primeiros são princípios straussianos, porque advêm da interpretação de Leo Strauss sobre vários filósofos clássicos; os últimos são straussiano-platônicos, pois advêm de uma interpretação straussiana de Platão. Por fim, a análise de Leo Strauss sobre a crise da modernidade e sobre a historiografia da filosofia são apresentadas a fim de que possamos entender por que e como trilhar o caminho straussiano aos clássicos. / This work intends to state and arrange clearly the Straussian principles of classical political philosophy and, especially, the Straussian-Platonic principles of the best regime. That is, this work intends to state what Leo Strauss thought to be the beginnings of classical political philosophy, what Leo Strauss thought to be a classical “methodology” for political philosophy and, finally, Plato's conclusions about the best regime. The first two are Straussian principles because they ensued from Leo Strauss' interpretation of various classical political philosophers and the last ones are Straussian-Platonic because they ensued from a Straussian interpretation of Plato. That being said, Leo Strauss' analysis of the crisis of modernity and Leo Strauss' historiography of philosophy are presented as requirements for a better understanding of what consists the Straussian way back to the classics.

Este trabalho busca desvelar e sistematizar claramente os princípios straussianos de filosofia política clássica e, especificamente, os princípios straussiano-platônicos do melhor regime. Isto é, este trabalho busca desvelar o que Leo Strauss acredita ser o começo da filosofia política clássica, o que Leo Strauss acredita ser a “metodologia” clássica à filosofia política e, especificamente, as conclusões de Platão sobre o melhor regime. Os primeiros são princípios straussianos, porque advêm da interpretação de Leo Strauss sobre vários filósofos clássicos; os últimos são straussiano-platônicos, pois advêm de uma interpretação straussiana de Platão. Por fim, a análise de Leo Strauss sobre a crise da modernidade e sobre a historiografia da filosofia são apresentadas a fim de que possamos entender por que e como trilhar o caminho straussiano aos clássicos. / This work intends to state and arrange clearly the Straussian principles of classical political philosophy and, especially, the Straussian-Platonic principles of the best regime. That is, this work intends to state what Leo Strauss thought to be the beginnings of classical political philosophy, what Leo Strauss thought to be a classical “methodology” for political philosophy and, finally, Plato's conclusions about the best regime. The first two are Straussian principles because they ensued from Leo Strauss' interpretation of various classical political philosophers and the last ones are Straussian-Platonic because they ensued from a Straussian interpretation of Plato. That being said, Leo Strauss' analysis of the crisis of modernity and Leo Strauss' historiography of philosophy are presented as requirements for a better understanding of what consists the Straussian way back to the classics.

Este trabalho busca desvelar e sistematizar claramente os princípios straussianos de filosofia política clássica e, especificamente, os princípios straussiano-platônicos do melhor regime. Isto é, este trabalho busca desvelar o que Leo Strauss acredita ser o começo da filosofia política clássica, o que Leo Strauss acredita ser a “metodologia” clássica à filosofia política e, especificamente, as conclusões de Platão sobre o melhor regime. Os primeiros são princípios straussianos, porque advêm da interpretação de Leo Strauss sobre vários filósofos clássicos; os últimos são straussiano-platônicos, pois advêm de uma interpretação straussiana de Platão. Por fim, a análise de Leo Strauss sobre a crise da modernidade e sobre a historiografia da filosofia são apresentadas a fim de que possamos entender por que e como trilhar o caminho straussiano aos clássicos. / This work intends to state and arrange clearly the Straussian principles of classical political philosophy and, especially, the Straussian-Platonic principles of the best regime. That is, this work intends to state what Leo Strauss thought to be the beginnings of classical political philosophy, what Leo Strauss thought to be a classical “methodology” for political philosophy and, finally, Plato's conclusions about the best regime. The first two are Straussian principles because they ensued from Leo Strauss' interpretation of various classical political philosophers and the last ones are Straussian-Platonic because they ensued from a Straussian interpretation of Plato. That being said, Leo Strauss' analysis of the crisis of modernity and Leo Strauss' historiography of philosophy are presented as requirements for a better understanding of what consists the Straussian way back to the classics.