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Ce travail aborde la question des lieux d'art non pas, comme c'est souvent le cas, pour leurs répercussions sur leur voisinage, mais pour leur apport à la création plastique elle-même. Dans sa première partie sont précisés les termes de la recherche : le mot "stratégie" à la fois dans le contexte artistique et dans d'autres contextes ; les "quartiers d'art" selon leur usage: création, exhibition et habitation ; les "gens de l'art", considérés comme le groupe qui crée, conceptuellement, l'œuvre d'art. La deuxième partie présente, en plus d'une synthèse historique, six territoires de l'art contemporain : le Fbg Saint-Denis (Paris), qui constitue la colonne vertébrale de ce travail, la Macarena (Bogota), San Telmo (Buenos Aires), Belleville (Paris), le Red Hook (New York) et la ville de Berlin. La troisième partie analyse le travail individuel de sept personnalité de l'art ayant habité le Fbg Saint-Denis depuis l'année 2000 : Nathalie Heinich, Nicolas Bourriaud, Jean-Philippe Antoine, Thomas Hirschhorn, Esther Shalev-Gerz, Pierre Huyghe et Olga Kisseleva. La dernière partie relie cette recherche avec l'œuvre de son auteur. La conclusion met en évidence une série d'hypothèses qui se dégagent de cette étude : les lieux d'art comme instrument d'identification des différents groupes œuvrant dans l'art ; la notion de débat comme forme de stratégie, avec un niveau interne (qui participe et à quel titre) et un niveau global (le rôle de l'art dans la société) ; les artistes considérés non pas comme une catégorie socio-professionnelle, mais comme "produits" de chaque groupe social ; l'art comme une forme de participation à un territoire commun plus que comme un espace en soi. / This work concerns the question of art territories, but not, as is often the case, for their repercussions on their neighbourhood, but for their contribution to the plastic creation itself. In the first part, the terms of the research are defined: the word "strategy" in the artistic context as well as in other contexts; the "art districts". according to their use: creation, exhibition and residence; the "people of art", considered as the group that creates, conceptually the artwork. The second part presents, in addition to a historical synthesis, six territories of contemporary art: Faubourg Saint-Denis (Paris). which is the backbone of this work, Macarena (Bogota), San Telmo (Buenos Aires), Belleville (Paris), the Red Hook (New York) and the city of Berlin. The third part analyses the individual work of seven contemporary art personalities who lived in Faubourg Saint­Denis since 2000: Nathalie Heinich, Nicolas Bourriaud, Jean-Philippe Antoine, Thomas Hirschhorn, Esther Shalev-Gerz, Pierre Huyghe and Olga Kisseleva. The last part links this research with the work of its author. The conclusion highlights a series of hypotheses emerging from this study: places of art as an instrument of identification of the different groups working in art; the notion of "debate" as a form of strategy, with an internal level (who participates and in what capacity) and a global level (the role of art in society); artists considered not as a socio-professional category, but as "products" of every social group; art as a form of participation in a common territory more than as a self-space.

There is little solid research that explores counterinsurgency practices against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), not only from the standpoint of what is being done, but, rather, what should be done based on past COIN successes. Notable works on counterinsurgency in Colombia include the research of Tom Marks, who focused on operational strategy and tactics; Kevin Self, who professes the importance of controlling territory in defeating the FARC, by addressing the social and institutional ills within Colombia itself; and Dennis Rempe, who notes US involvement in shaping Colombia's COIN strategy. Using a comparative case study model, this thesis provides an analysis of Colombia?s counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies and tactics through the lens of successful and unsuccessful COIN operations in Iraq, Algeria, Malaya, South Vietnam, Thailand, Algeria and El Salvador over the course of the 20th and early 21st centuries. After all, no matter how successful a COIN force is militarily, their accomplishments will ultimately be fruitless if the conditions which fuel insurgency remains present. This paper begins by providing the historical context for the conditions which shaped the Colombian social order, which led to the revolutionary movement. It then follows the growth of the FARC, examining that organization?s strengths and weaknesses. The FARC is contrasted by outlining recent COIN transformation efforts within the Colombian government, to include little acknowledged failures and successes, strengths and weaknesses. An important focus is placed on Colombian President Alvaro Uribe Velez? Democratic Security Policy as the model for Colombia?s current COIN efforts. After next examining various ongoing factors contributing to the Colombian insurgency?to include institutional failures, illicit funding and the problem of paramilitary groups?this thesis examines past COIN efforts by other governments. Finally, after applying lessons learned from thee past COIN efforts?cross-referencing historically successful and unsuccessful tactics with tactics used and not used by Bogota in its fight against the FARC?I provide recommendations to the government of Colombia (GOC) on how to improve its COIN efforts. Although it is important to look at this problem set from an external standpoint, we must still factor in internal factors that have limited Colombia?s ability to emerge victorious, such as allowing porous borders, airspace and coastlines; placing a priority on killing or capturing the enemy and not on engaging the population; and the primacy of military direction of counterinsurgency; disregard of basic human rights; an insufficient judiciary structure; failure to halt financial support mechanisms; and the lack of an outlet for political inclusion . From this vantage point, we will be able to see that these elements?when properly implemented?have proven successful over time and may enhance GOC success and ultimately result in victory over the insurgency that has plagued their country for 40+ years