Boredom is a common human experience that has received little attention in the literature. To date, researchers have been unable to agree on a unified theory and definition of the construct. The present study investigated the nature of boredom by exploring its relationship to three phenomenologically similar affective states, namely apathy, anhedonia and depression. Structural equation modeling revealed that although related to apathy, anhedonia and depression to varying degrees, boredom is an empirically distinct construct. Establishing boredom as an independent construct provides an important first step in bringing the field closer to a universally accepted definition of boredom, which will undoubtedly facilitate more effective assessment and treatment of the experience of boredom, particularly in individuals with psychopathological and neuropathological illnesses in which boredom is a pervasive symptom.

Beginning with an overview of the appropriation of Heidegger’s thought to environmental philosophy, I proceed to identify two themes as holding a prominent place within the current literature: Heidegger’s conception of primordial nature or physis as well as the notion of “poetic dwelling”. Drawing on both of these themes, I argue that a prominent implication of Heidegger’s thought for environmental philosophy concerns the conservation of the natural world’s “natural otherness”—its differences from and indifference to humanity. However, within the current discussion concerning the conservation of nature’s otherness little is said concerning nature itself. The question arises as to whether or not non-human natural beings compel us to protect and conserve their differences. How does nature “call” us to protect its otherness? Following this, Chapter Two seeks to establish the relevance of Heidegger’s theory of moods for answering the question at hand. In particular, I illustrate the potential of moods by comparing the occurrence of an “equipmental breakdown” with the mood of “anxiety” (Angst). While the former experience exposes Dasein to nature’s “ownness”—its Being outside of the worldhood—its potential insight is easily re-subsumed into the world of work and projects. In contrast, the experience of anxiety avoids such a shortcoming while simultaneously disclosing Dasein as responsible for what it makes of its existence. These features, or so I argue, demonstrate the relevance of moods in answering the question of this project. Having established the relevance of moods I return, in Chapter Three, to the question posed at the outset of this thesis. Specifically, I investigate the nature of nature’s call by exploring the phenomenology of “profound boredom” as Heidegger presents it in The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude. Significantly, profound boredom discloses nature in a distinctly primordial manner, while simultaneously revealing Dasein to be responsible for its own there-being. In light of this disclosure, I argue that within the experience of profound boredom primordial nature can be interpreted as calling Dasein towards responsibility, not by demand or challenge, but through its ambiguous indifference towards Dasein and its choices. / Thesis (Master, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2007-09-27 17:11:17.45

Thesis (M.A.)--Florida State University, 2004. / Advisor: Dr. Eric Walker, Florida State University, College of Arts and Sciences, Dept. of English. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed Jan. 12, 2005). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Kentucky, 2002. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains ix, 111p. : ill. Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 103-108).

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / A presente dissertação de mestrado tem em vista adentrar a noção heideggeriana de tédio, de um tal modo que seja possível delinear sua relação com o horizonte histórico da era da técnica e o modo como a psicologia, em meio a um tal cenário, se encontra em crise enquanto disciplina acadêmica. A trajetória percorrida será a de, a princípio, indicar as principais influências ao pensamento heideggeriano, i.e., a fenomenologia e a hermenêutica em busca da mudança que Heidegger imprime a tais disciplinas. Posteriormente será visto que a noção de ser-aí se torna essencial para a compreensão do que está em jogo com a tonalidade afetiva do tédio. Dito de maneira enxuta, a tonalidade do tédio é inerente ao esquecimento e abandono do modo de ser do ser-aí, enquanto ente marcado fundamentalmente por ser abertura de mundo. A partir de um tal esquecimento e abandono, o homem da técnica se pauta pela animalidade para encontrar sua própria essência. A partir da certeza da animalidade como critério para o homem avaliar a si mesmo, a psicologia se encontra rebaixada a uma posição de subdisciplina das ciências biológicas, em particular das neurociências. Em um cenário como esse urge a construção de uma psicologia de resistência, que se paute pela medida do homem como ente originariamente livre

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / A presente dissertação de mestrado tem em vista adentrar a noção heideggeriana de tédio, de um tal modo que seja possível delinear sua relação com o horizonte histórico da era da técnica e o modo como a psicologia, em meio a um tal cenário, se encontra em crise enquanto disciplina acadêmica. A trajetória percorrida será a de, a princípio, indicar as principais influências ao pensamento heideggeriano, i.e., a fenomenologia e a hermenêutica em busca da mudança que Heidegger imprime a tais disciplinas. Posteriormente será visto que a noção de ser-aí se torna essencial para a compreensão do que está em jogo com a tonalidade afetiva do tédio. Dito de maneira enxuta, a tonalidade do tédio é inerente ao esquecimento e abandono do modo de ser do ser-aí, enquanto ente marcado fundamentalmente por ser abertura de mundo. A partir de um tal esquecimento e abandono, o homem da técnica se pauta pela animalidade para encontrar sua própria essência. A partir da certeza da animalidade como critério para o homem avaliar a si mesmo, a psicologia se encontra rebaixada a uma posição de subdisciplina das ciências biológicas, em particular das neurociências. Em um cenário como esse urge a construção de uma psicologia de resistência, que se paute pela medida do homem como ente originariamente livre

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Department of Psychology, The Committee on Human Development, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Captive animals are sometimes very inactive, which can elicit concern for their welfare. However, inactivity is difficult to interpret in terms of welfare, since while some forms reflect chronic fear (hiding), apathy, or depression-like states, others reflect positive states (e.g. relaxation). This thesis aimed to determine whether high levels or particular sub-types of inactivity indicate poor welfare in fur-farmed mink (Neovison vison), and to identify the specific psychological states involved. These questions were addressed by studying individual differences within populations on three commercial farms, and comparing mink in standard, non-enriched cages to those in enriched cages. Two hypotheses were tested on farms: that the most inactive mink experience chronic stress, and that this would impair reproduction. Inactive females did have smaller litters, a difference that was not attributable simply to their greater body fat. However, there was no evidence of endocrine stress nor increased fear in “glove tests”, and their kits also grew more quickly. This suggests that inactive females do not experience more chronic stress than active females do. Tests of responsiveness to stimuli (measured in terms of contact and orientation) showed that, compared to mink in enriched cages, non-enriched mink were more responsive to all types of stimuli, especially neutral ones. This finding is inconsistent with the hypothesis that inactive individuals in these conditions are apathetic or depressed; instead, it supports the alternative hypothesis that non-enriched cages induce boredom. However, this boredom-like hyper-responsiveness did not co-vary with inactivity levels. Finally, non-enriched cages did not consistently elevate total inactivity. However, they did induce specific types: inactivity in the nest box, lying alert (vs. sleeping), and lying belly down rather than curled up were all more common than in enriched cages. Inactivity in the nest box may reflect hiding; it seemed linked to fearfulness in glove tests and to endocrine stress responses. In sum, while non-enriched conditions induce poor welfare, they do not increase overall inactivity; furthermore, within populations, the welfare of highly inactive individuals is no more compromised than that of their more active counterparts. However, subtypes of inactivity provide more information about welfare than total inactivity. / NSERC (PGS)

Thesis--Zürich. / Vita. Some text in Portuguese. Includes bibliographical references (p. 482-486).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--State University of New York at Binghamton, Department of Psychology, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references.