published_or_final_version / Urban Studies / Master / Master of Social Sciences

Thesis (doctoral)--Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, 1991. / Summary in Dutch. Includes bibliographical references (p. 218-230).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 1998. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 157-163). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 1998. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 157-163). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ed. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 1996. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 219-229). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ed. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 1996. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 219-229). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Department of Economics, December 2000. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Thesis PlanB (M.S.)--University of Wisconsin--Stout, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references.

This study examines the relationship between state-wise development expenditures and observed levels of development under the umbrella of the Reserve Bank of India’s implicit guarantee of state bonds. By analyzing the correlation between certain variables outside of each state’s control and levels of development, this thesis aims to determine which Indian states outperform or underperform their predicted levels of development. Moreover, it will aim to identify patterns of development expenditure that led to outperformance or underperformance. States that underperform predicted levels of development while spending above the state-wise average on relevant development sectors can be said to have squandered development expenditures, while those that outperform predicted levels while spending below the state-wise mean likely spend more efficiently. Both of these observations have implications for the central bank’s implicit guarantee policy.

Why and under what conditions do governments borrow before elections? This thesis aims to shed light on this question by exploring governments' incentives that give rise to political budget cycles, i.e. fluctuations in the budget balance during election times, under different political, institutional, and economic contexts. The argument will be developed in three stages. First, the thesis will explain why politicians may choose to use debt strategically to win elections and discuss and evaluate different models that can explain political budget cycles. One model, a moral hazard type competence model is, as will be shown, particularly suited for this study. It will be extended in stages two and three. The second stage will look at the benefits and costs from public debt, with a particular emphasis on the likelihood of re-election (government popularity), party system polarisation, and sovereign risk. Sovereign risk increases the cost of borrowing and thus dampens the magnitude of political budget cycles; the effect of government popularity on strategic debt is conditional on the degree of polarisation. The third stage will take the motives to borrow as given and examine the effectiveness of debt as a strategic instrument. The less voters attribute responsibility for fiscal policy to governments, the less effective debt is as a strategic instrument. Economic volatility, regulatory density, and economic openness, this thesis argues, reduce this effectiveness and in turn the political budget cycle. Similarly, coalition government reduces responsibility associated with individual coalition partners, and thus the strategic value of public debt - yet this effect is moderated by the distribution of cabinet portfolios. The argument in this thesis is based both on formal models and on empirical, time series-cross sectional, analyses. It is arguably the most comprehensive treatment of political budget cycles and adds to an increasing literature on the contextual determinants of fiscal policy.