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Although Great Powers are often thought to be the most influential actors in terms of international arms control efforts, during the 1990s Canada showed itself capable of successfully leading several arms control initiatives. This research sets out to (a) explain why Canada has been able to enjoy these successes while other recent Canadian arms control leadership efforts have failed, and (b) further the abstract thinking around Canadian foreign policy. This is done by introducing the Identity Management model of arms control to explain the process by which Canadian arms control processes succeed or fail, and testing it against four post-Cold War Canadian-led initiatives: the Open Skies initiative, the landmines initiative, the MOX fuel initiative, and the small arms initiative. / Within the Identity Management model, Canada is classified as an Activist State, a categorisation that rejects and improves upon the popular, yet heavily flawed, Middle Power concept. Blending together critical insights from realism and constructivism, the Identity Management model focuses on the foreign policy preferences of states, distinguishing between the preferences of Great Powers, such as the United States, and the preferences of Activist States. The foreign policy preferences of Activist States are designed and promoted by important elite domestic actors, and expressed as the country's chosen identity on a given arms control issue. The Identity Management model thus postulates that while states such as Canada can express independent policy initiatives, these identities are offered up into the international system, the character of which is defined by the foreign policy preferences of Great Powers. Overall, the Identity Management model establishes that Canadian arms control initiatives are successful only when Canada's chosen identity accurately reflects the constantly changing character of the international system.

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This paper will rather seek to uncover and emphasize Cold War imperatives that served as significant guiding factors in shaping the Canadian response to the Suez Crisis. The success of Canadian diplomacy in the 1956 Suez Crisis was in the ability of Secretary of State for External Affairs Lester B. Pearson and his Canadian colleagues to protect Western interests in the context of the Cold War. Suez threatened Anglo-American unity, and the future of the North Atlantic alliance. It also presented the Soviets an opportunity to gain influence in the Middle East. The United Nations Emergency Force ensured that Britain and France had a means to extricate themselves from the Crisis. Canada wished to further protect Western credibility in the eyes of the non-white Commonwealth and Afro-Asian bloc. It was, therefore, important to focus international attention on Soviet aggression in Hungary, and not Anglo-French intervention in Egypt.

On 4 April, 1957 Egerton Herbert Norman, Canada's Ambassador to Egypt, committed suicide in Cairo. Norman's death was a direct result of sustained American allegations that he was threat to western security. The controversy surrounding his suicide was rekindled in 1986 with the publication of two biographies of Norman. James Barros contends in No Sense of Evil that Norman should have been removed from his high position in Canada's Department of External Affairs because he constituted a security risk. Barros hypothesises about the possibility of a DEA cover-up of Norman's Marxist past (Norman had briefly been a member of the British Communist Party when he was a student at Cambridge) and indeed suggests that Minister of External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson might have been Moscow's ultimate 'mole' who, by defending Norman, was protecting his espionage ring. In Innocence is Not Enough, author Roger Bowen takes issue with such interpretations of Norman's life, scholarship and career. Although Norman had been a Communist, Bowen concludes that no evidence exists to suggest that he was disloyal to Canada. Norman was caught up in a maelstrom of anti-communist hysteria which caused him to be unjustifiably vilified and harassed by the agents of McCarthyism in an era of Cold War paranoia. Instead of choosing a side in the current debate, I have sought to widen it by approaching the story of Norman as a case study in Canadian foreign policy. An examination of Canadian internal security policies in the postwar era, Canada's relationship with the United States and Great Britain, and of Norman himself reveals that the issue at hand is far too complex to be amenable to easy analysis. This thesis was written with the achievement of a more objective analysis as its primary goal. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

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