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  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
1

Une interprétation formaliste de la signification et du statut logique de la critique quinienne de la distinction analytique-synthétique

Tardif, Pier-Alexandre 20 April 2018 (has links)
L'auteur entreprend dans ce mémoire de proposer une interprétation formaliste de la signification et du statut logique de la critique que mène Quine, dans son article Two Dogmas of Empiricism de 1951, à l'encontre de la distinction classique en philosophie entre les énoncés analytiques et synthétiques. Contre l'interprétation standard qui persiste à concevoir cette critique comme un rejet catégorique de la distinction, l'auteur reconstruit la théorie de la signification quinienne afin de relever la distinction renouvelée qu'introduit Quine entre "analytique" et "synthétique" dans son dernier ouvrage, From Stimulus to Science. Par une étude comparative de la conception de Quine et de celles de Churchland et Searle sont spécifiés le sens et le statut que l'on doit assigner à sa notion de "signification". Réinterprétée à la lumière de ces considérations, la critique quinienne se révèle être une remise en question de niveau métaépistémologique de la pratique philosophique de l'empirisme logique. / In this dissertation, the author proposes a formalist interpretation of the meaning and logical status of the critique that Quine put forward against the classical philosophic distinction between analytic and synthetic statements in his 1951 article Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Against the standard interpretation that prevails in the literature, according to which this critique is categorical and without appeal, the author undertakes to rationally reconstruct Quine's theory of meaning in order to reveal the renewed distinction between "analytic" and "synthetic" as it was introduced in his last book, From Stimulus to Science (1995). The meaning and logical status that ought to be assigned to his notion of "meaning" are specified by means of a comparative study between Quine's own conception and that of Churchland and Searle. Reinterpreted in the light of these considerations, the Quinian critique proves to be a metaepistemological reassessment of the logical empiricism's philosophical practice.
2

The antinomies of a monological use of language : a defense of ordinary language in cognitive science /

Van Mil, Elizabeth M., January 1996 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 1994. / Permission to use letters at end of volume 2. Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 462-595). Also available on the Internet.
3

The antinomies of a monological use of language a defense of ordinary language in cognitive science /

Van Mil, Elizabeth M., January 1996 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 1994. / Permission to use letters at end of volume 2. Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 462-595). Also available on the Internet.
4

Le néo-réductionnisme et la matérialisme éliminativiste de Paul M. Churchland

Côté Charbonneau, Mathieu January 2008 (has links)
Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.
5

Le néo-réductionnisme et la matérialisme éliminativiste de Paul M. Churchland

Côté Charbonneau, Mathieu January 2008 (has links)
Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal
6

Meaning : the move from minds to practices

Sloss, Jay January 2007 (has links)
For centuries referential theories of language and meaning have dominated Western philosophy. The idea that noises and scratches become meaningful words and writing by virtue of a mental grasp one has on the referents they are talking about has become deeply entrenched. Starting with Plato, and reinvented by Locke, contemporary theorists continue to reproduce this mental fix requirement (MFR) in their philosophies of language and intentionality-Physicalists, such as Paul and Patricia Churchland are typical. Plato, Locke and the Churchlands all share the view that bits of language reach out to extra-linguistic entities by some act of mind (for Plato the mind grasped referents via the Forms, for Locke Ideas bridged the relation, and the Churchland's, brain states). In each case a self-referential mental act gets language up and running, i.e. mental connections (or representations) to referents do the trick. My question also concerns what makes squiggles and noises meaningful. The question is a nested one-ancillary to it are questions of what makes language work? How do words mean or relate to the world? How do speakers mean certain things and not others? I will approach the question from a contextualist perspective where roles in rule-governed activities are the bottom line, not representations in the mind/brain.

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