As is clear from the title, this thesis presents a comparison of Schenkerian and Ciceronian principles. The thesis will focus mainly on the characteristics of the creative process essential for producing a sublime and intellectual work. Admittedly comparing a Roman lawyer/philosopher (Cicero) to a 20th century musician/theorist (Schenker) will bring forth many obstacles and will suffer from numerous imperfections. Stressing the commonalties between two men of time frames too far apart is an arduous task. I found it most helpful to go about this problem through three stages: first, by presenting an overview of the lives, historical circumstances, and careers of the two mentioned figures; second, by presenting a basic comparison of the two branches of thought; and third, by dealing with some of the more complicated philosophical issues for a better understanding of the two doctrines. Since many of the Schenkerian and Ciceronian principles are heavily rooted in Platonism, an overview of Plato's theory of 'forms and ideas' is presented to guide the reader toward a better grasp of the concepts. The reader may, however, be uncertain regarding the objective of this thesis: is this a comparison of the two philosophies or an evaluation of them? Of course, in order to achieve a satisfactory comparison, one must first understand the two philosophies; this demands an explicit analysis which, in my view, is a form of evaluation. I have also shown and questioned some of the ambiguities of the two philosophies without offering any solutions. This will perhaps help the reader to understand the path I had to take in completing this thesis. I have included these philosophical remarks in the endnotes. Furthermore, Schenkerian philosophy reveals many other important influences other than Platonism; although not the focus of this thesis, numerous references to great thinkers such as Nietzsche, Spinoza, Hanslick, and Freud illustrate this point. Much of the presented bibliographical material on the life of Cicero can be found in the On the Commonwealth and On the Laws. Furthermore, Michael B. Fuster's Masters of Political Thought has been used as a source of reference for a great portion of the philosophical interpretations. Much of what I have presented on Schenker and Schenkerian literature has been gathered through my studies and conversations with Dr. Benjamin, my advisor: the most reliable source with whom I am acquainted. This is perhaps the reason for not including any other philosophical writings on Schenkerian literature in the bibliography. / Arts, Faculty of / Music, School of / Graduate

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No description available.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Heidelberg, Heidelberg, 1992. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 163-170).

Traditional accounts of ancient law make the following generalizations: Athenian law was a system of amateurs and, consequently, arbitrary and irrational. Roman law, by contrast, gradually became a system of specialized professionals. Legal scholars (jurists) interpreted and developed the law and advocates represented litigants. Thanks to specialization, Roman law became rational and consistent--a foundation for Rome's imperial administration as well as many modern legal systems. Bruce Frier has argued in a landmark book that this development ("the rise of the Roman jurists") began in the last century of the republic, and that it was endorsed by Cicero. By examining how Cicero and the Attic orators discuss legal expertise and litigation, I seek to revise this standard picture in two ways. First, I argue that Athenians were not hostile to legal knowledge per se, but to expertise in litigation. I find, furthermore, that learning from the laws was part of the moral training of Athenian citizens. I then argue that Cicero's attitude towards legal expertise was not progressive, but reactionary. Litigation was a moral issue in the Roman republic no less than in democratic Athens. In Cicero's opinion, the true legal expert--whether an orator, a jurist, or a statesman--is a figure with the moral authority to resolve conflicts without debate. Cicero promulgates an ideology of law wherein litigation ideally would be unnecessary, and citizens' disputes would be resolved by their "natural" superiors. / text

Thesis--Pennsylvania, 1969. / On cover: Horace, Ciceron, et la rhétorique du seizième siècle. Bibliography: p. xi-xix.

Thesis--Pennsylvania, 1969. / On cover: Horace, Ciceron, et la rhétorique du seizième siècle. Bibliography: p. xi-xix.

Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of St Andrews, May 2010.

No description available.

The thesis consists of five chapters: the first functions as an overture; the second, third and fourth deal with Plato, Cicero and Montaigne respectively; and the fifth raises some questions. The overture explores the ways in which Odysseus, Lucretius and Seneca approached death, and in the process introduces some obvious distinctions - between death viewed as the act of dying and death viewed as the state of being dead, between the death which comes to everyone and the death which comes to me, between our own death and the death of others - and anticipates certain recurring themes. The second chapter, on Plato, is concerned chiefly with the Phaedo and the question of what is involved in "the practice of death". This entails an examination of related concepts and terminology in the Gorgias and the Republic, and of the whole subject of Platonic myth. The third chapter discusses Cicero's views on death and immortality - both the considered reflections of the philosopher and the spontaneous reactions of the bereaved father - principally as these emerge from the Tusculan Disputations and the letters to Atticus. The fourth chapter approaches Montaigne - his own experiences of death, the relationship between his earlier and later approaches, the tension between his professed Catholicism and his pagan inclinations, the difficulty and perhaps undesirability of extracting a 'message' from the Essais on this or any other subject. The conclusion asks to what extent these various approaches succeed in what they set out to do, and whether any generalised, objective approach to death can ever successfully address the individual predicament, either in relation to one's own death or in facing bereavement.