This study of civil control of the military in Zambia was undertaken in order to ascertain why in contrast with many other former British colonies in Africa such as Ghana and Uganda the military in that country has consistently supported the ruling elite and not sought to obtain political power for itself. In answering the question why this was the case, this study used the qualitative methods and analytical concepts of coercive and consensual measures of control, although the two types of measures are often used in combination, as the main tools that determined civil control of the military in four periods, namely the colonial period, the immediate post-independence period, the period of one-party rule, and the period of reinstated multiparty democracy. Using either coercive or consensual measures as our tools of analysis, comparative profiles were constructed of the nature, character and degree of civil control of the military in each period, and how these were reconfigured by the different political transitions that ushered in the four periods. This assisted in ascertaining which elements of civil control of the military remained constant, and which changed. Data was collected from primary and secondary sources, and verified in in-depth interviews with 20 role players. The main findings are that Zambian governments used two main methods to exert civil control over the military. During the colonial period (1900–1963), the dominant method was coercive measures which was reflected in the policies of racial discrimination and implemented through racialised structures like parliament, the executive and the judiciary. Consequently, relations between the government, the military, and white settlers were harmonious, while those with Africans were antagonistic and explosive. Under the Independence Constitution of the First Republic (1964–1972), the use of consensual measures was manifested in the normative frameworks found in non-racial multiparty democracies and spelt out in the constitution and other specific legislation. In the Zambian case, this was supported by the new government’s motto of ‘One Zambia, One Nation’. Under the One-Party Constitution of the Second Republic (1973-1990), the dominant method was largely through the use of coercive measures characteristic of one party states in terms of which military and civil intelligence officers monitored the political activities of all military personnel as well as ordinary civilians. This helped to remove all anti-government elements from the military. Under the Multi-Party Constitution of the Third Republic (1991-2004), the dominant methods were a combination of all good practices inherited from the previous republics but largely through consensual measures which were manifested in the reintroduction of strong parliamentary and executive oversight over defence expenditure and activities. This study concludes that stable civil control of the military in Zambia in the 20th century was as a result of effective use of either coercive or consensual measures or the mixture of the two and this sets Zambia apart from many other African countries. Further more, it is important to emphasize one point on the relevance of this study’s findings for the study of civil-military relations. This is that despite that both these types of measures worked as a solution for Zambia, upon closer scrutiny, civil control of the military cannot be indefinitely secured by coercive means, and that the only sustainable way of securing civil control of the military is to maintain consensual relations between the core ‘triumvirate’ namely: the political authorities/government/ruling elite; the military and military elite; and the citizenry

滿清末年以來，中國文官節制武官的傳統受到嚴重破壞，地方團練取代政府軍，地方軍隊演變成軍閥主義，國家領導人都是由戰場上勝利的軍人擔任。江澤民時期開始，中共實施世代交替，黨、政、軍高層領導人，轉移給一批技術官僚與軍事專業人員手上，此期間中共黨、政、軍互動關係為本文研究之目的。透過歷史比較，江澤民，是一個幾乎與解放軍毫無淵源的文官，沒有任何服役與作戰的經驗，卻能順利掌握軍隊與國家，本研究證明在中國中斷數百年來「文官統制武官」的歷史傳統，已經恢復。此外，近二十年來，中共軍事現代化成就確實令人刮目相看，與江澤民的外語專長及電機專長有密切關係，這些人格特質也是他令軍隊信服的重要工具。軍政軍民關係上，江澤民堅持民主集中制，排除多黨制，造成軍隊遠離政治紛擾，並與黨充分合作，以獲致預算並做好軍民與軍政關係。在解放軍內部，推動軍事教育的改革，也造就解放軍戰略思維的重大轉變，形成解放軍現代化的動力之ㄧ。然而，敏感性的軍文關係議題，例如一黨領軍，中共有禁忌而且沒有試驗場，台灣的寶貴經驗，很值得大陸參考。 關鍵字：中國共產黨、軍隊現代化、解放軍、文人統制、軍事專業主義 / During the decline of Chin Dynasty, as an unintended result to rely upon localized National Guard defeating upraise event, the Chinese traditional Civilian Control system was replaced by warlord system. Since then, the war hero was the one who advanced to political leadership. Until Jiang Zemin, a civilian with civil college certificate took leadership over the PLA, CCP, and PRC. The purpose of this paper is to exam the civil-military interaction during Jiang Zemin’s journey. Through historical comparison, this paper confirmed that the Chinese traditional Civil-Control system has been revived. Also, Jiang Zemin was the military leadership over PLA modernization. With personal attributes of profound languages and electronic profession, he shaped his position successfully in PLA community. This paper also recognized significant relationship between one-party theory and PLA, and the relationship between PLA　NDU and strategic thinking. Key Words: Chinese Communist Party, Military Modernization, People Liberation Army, Civil-Control and Military Professionalism.