I define and defend a non-democratic authority with the power to annul the decisions of democratic branches of government when such decisions infringe upon citizens’ basic rights and liberties. I refer to this non-democratic authority as Liberal Aristocracy. The argument for Liberal Aristocracy has two parts: the first part demonstrates that Liberal Aristocracy will arrive at decisions that further the moral end of sustaining citizens’ rights; the second part holds that Liberal Aristocracy is a moral means to this end. First, I discuss two existing arguments for non-democratic authorities – Platonic Aristocracy and Constitutional Court Judges. I claim that Plato’s argument is unsuccessful because it relies on controversial metaethical premises that are unlikely to provide a basis for rights. Liberal justifications of the power of Constitutional Courts are argued to be incomplete because they do not designate an authority that is qualified to decide when citizens’ rights are infringed by democratic branches of government. Nor do they show that such an authority is in fact required if citizens’ rights are to be protected. In order to supplement the liberal argument for the power of Constitutional Courts I develop an account of Liberal Aristocracy, which rests on the idea that Constitutional Court Judges should possess moral expertise. I claim that (i) moral expertise qualifies Judges to decide when citizens’ rights are violated by democratic decisions. Furthermore, I argue that (ii) decisions taken democratically will sometimes encroach on citizens’ rights. Claims (i) and (ii) are shown to justify the non-democratic authority of Liberal Aristocracy. The second part of the argument for Liberal Aristocracy examines arguments to the effect that only democratic procedures can be morally legitimate, even if other decision procedures arrive at outcomes that provide greater support for citizens’ rights. Three claims are offered in support of this idea. First, democracy is claimed to be necessary to support deliberation. Second, democracy is seen as the only procedure that can uphold the value of autonomy by securing citizens’ consent. Third, it is argued that non-democratic procedures will not recognise the equal status of citizens. I hold that these three claims are false and that Liberal Aristocratic procedures can be morally legitimate.

M.Ed. (Educational Psychology) / Please refer to full text to view abstract

J’examine les conditions de transposition du modèle de la « communauté épistémique » au domaine de la délibération et des évaluations pratiques. Je réponds ainsi à la question suivante :comment les droits de l’homme acquièrent-ils une signification objective dans le système de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme ?Dans la première partie (analyse institutionnelle), je montre que la « sociabilité » est le premier enjeu de la protection des droits de l’homme au Conseil de l’Europe (ch. 1). Cet objectif de « sociabilité » n’est pas étranger à la question de leur « signification objective » car, au minimum, l’effectivité du système européen est suspendue à la réalisation d’un « ordre public » en la matière (ch. 2). Dans la deuxième partie (analyse épistémologique), je montre qu’une perspective épistémique sur les droits fondamentaux permet de rendre compte de l’effectivité (« praticabilité », rationalité) du système européen mais suppose le développement d’un critère dynamique (« d’acculturation ») de la rationalité d’un système de droit international (ch. 3) ainsi qu’un modèle épistémologique dans lequel « l’acceptabilité sociale » vaut comme instance d’adjudication rationnelle, et non seulement d’acceptation empirique, d’une définition des droits (ch. 4). Je teste, dans la troisième partie (analyse argumentative), les conditions de réalisation d’une telle « communauté épistémique » à la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme à travers l’analyse critique du contrôle des ingérences par les juges européens (ch. 5). Je défends enfin la valeur opératoire d’une théorie philosophique de l’argumentation pour la protection des droits de l’homme en Europe (ch. 6). / I consider the conditions of adaptation of a model of « epistemic community » to the field of practical deliberation and evaluations. By doing so, I am able to answer the following question: how do human rights acquire an objective meaning within the system of the European Convention of Human Rights? In the first part (institutional analysis), I show that “sociability” is what is primarily at stake in the protection of human rights within the Council of Europe (ch.1). This goal of ensuring “sociability” is not foreign to the issue of the “objective meaning” of human rights, for in that regard, the mere efficiency of the European system depends on the implementation of a “public order” in the field of human rights (Ch. 2). In the second part (epistemological analysis), I show that an epistemic perspective on fundamental rights allows one to account for the efficiency (“practicability”, rationality) of the European system, but that it presupposes the development of both a dynamic criterion (“acculturation”) for the assessment of the rationality of an international system of rights (ch. 3) and of an epistemological model in which “social acceptability” would not only serve as a benchmark for the empirical acceptation of a definition of rights but also as a benchmark for their rational adjudication (Ch. 4). In the third part (argumentative analysis), I test the conditions in which such an “epistemic community” is carried out by the European court for human rights, through a critical analysis of the way European judges deal with interferences in human rights (Ch. 5). Eventually, I defend the operating value of a philosophical argumentation theory for the protection of human rights in Europe (Ch. 6). / Doctorat en Philosophie / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Doctorat en philosophie et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished