Thesis--School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., 1998-99. / Title from title screen (viewed Oct. 9, 2003). "November 2000." Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.S. in Information Systems and Operations)--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2003. / Thesis advisor(s): Steven J. Iatrou, Karen Guttieri. Includes bibliographical references (p. 67-68). Also available online.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2002. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 203-220). Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, June 2003. / Thesis advisor(s): Donald Abenheim, Daniel J. Moran. Includes bibliographical references (p. 83-92). Also available online.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2002. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 203-220). Also available on the Internet.

States that sponsor terrorism pose one of the greatest policy and security challenges of the 21st century. Over the past decade, the United States and coalition allies have invested over a trillion dollars in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, both waged, in part, to end their support for terrorism. Iran's support for Hezbollah and Hamas makes negotiations over its nuclear program tremendously difficult and the prospect of an Iranian nuclear umbrella, under which these groups could operate, especially concerning. Likewise, Qaddafi's overthrow and the siege on Assad's regime in Syria have both been justified in the context of their historic support for terrorists, as well as the more recent normative concern for the repression of their people. This paper moves beyond a simple explanation of state sponsorship as covert war or way to persuade target states to concede policy objectives. Rather, it models state sponsored terrorism as a leader survival strategy that leaders choose when facing simultaneous internal and external threats. By investing a portion of the state's military power outside the control of the military and into terrorist groups and the security services that arm and train them, the leader is able to signal competency to other elites in his coalition and insulate himself from existing threats of coup d'état from the military while avoiding defeat in external conflict. Using a newly constructed dataset on state sponsorship that uses the leader-year (1968-2001) as the unit of analysis (N=5139), this study finds that many existing explanations for state sponsorship do not withstand empirical testing and that the combined level of high external threat and elevated threat of coup d'état are key determinants of a leader's decision to sponsor terrorist groups. This work has tremendous implications for US security policy as current practices, such as regime-targeted sanctions, may have the unintended effect of increasing the level of threat that the leader experiences and thus the likelihood of state sponsorship. These insights highlight a major reason why military strikes and economic sanctions are less successful than regime change for ending state sponsorship. Furthermore, it suggests that carefully reducing the external and internal levels of threat the leader faces may be the most effective method to end state sponsorship of terrorism. / text

How does interservice rivalry affect American civil-military relations? In three essays, I develop theoretical propositions about the relationship between interservice rivalry and civil-military outcomes; propose a two-stage model of civil-military interaction surrounding use of force decisions; and investigate the correlates of interservice rivalry with a focus on budget pressure.

Abstract not available. / Thesis (M.Soc.Sc.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, [2008].

This dissertation explores the emerging relationship between the U.S. military and the commercial video game market. Specifically, this study situates this relationship in terms of the U.S. military's evolving role in a variety of media-such as Hollywood feature films, television, and television news-for the purposes of propaganda and the influencing of public opinion. Consequently, an analysis and critique of the U.S. military's production and commissioning of commercial video games will be advanced that takes into account contemporary analyses and media critiques with respect to war and representation. Since these games are also a part of the larger field of entertainment and cultural production, this study will attempt to understand these products for the complex ways they combine cultural expression, modern spectatorship and the desire to influence or mediate popular conceptions of war. Consideration will also be given to situating these products within the emerging field of video game studies and aesthetics, as well as questions concerning genre, realism, historical revisionism, and the ethics of simulation.

This dissertation seeks to contribute to our understanding of the role played by civilian leaders in the consolidation of democracy examining changes in levels of military influence over politics. This study departs from typical military-centric civil-military relations literature by employing a civilian-centric analysis. In particular, it shows how the former's focus on changing levels of internal threat cannot account for variations in the levels of civilian control over the military. The study instead adopts a framework that focuses on the incentive structure of civilian leaders as determined by competitive elections; the political capacity of leaders as reflected in their parliamentary majority, political experience and the effectiveness of their economic policies; and institutional rules, such as the system of government and organization of the parties. The thesis argues that, depending on their incentive structure and political capacity, the civilian leaders will either challenge a politically powerful military or ally with that military by adopting its preference structures. The relevance of this model for understanding civil-military relations in the aftermath of a transition to democracy is explored in the Turkish case by examining the shift from low to high levels of military influence between late 1980s and mid-1990s. The thesis identifies this shift by looking at the incentive structure and the political capacity of two civilian leaders: Prime Minister/President Turgut Ozal and Prime Minister Tansu Ciller.