Coal has been used as a fuel for electricity generation for centuries. Inexpensive electricity from coal has been a key component in building large industrial economies such as USA and China. But in recent decades the negative aspects of coal, mainly carbon dioxide emissions, has changed the view on the fuel. Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is a solution to be able to continue using coal as an energy source, while limiting carbon emissions. One of the drawbacks of CCS is the energy need associated with the capture process, the energy penalty. This study aims to gather and analyze the energy penalties for the most developed types of carbon capture technologies. It also aims to model how the implementation of CCS would affect the future coal consumption. The results show that the range of energy penalties for a given type of technology is wide. Despite obtaining the energy penalty with the same simulation software, the energy penalty for post- combustion with MEA can range between 10.7% and 39.1%. Comparing mean energy penalties show that pre-combustion capture is the most efficient capture method (18.4% ± 4.4%) followed by oxy- fuel (21.6% ± 5.5%) and post-combustion (24.7% ± 7.9%). Further on, CCS implementation scenarios were compared and used as a starting point for coal consumption calculations. Three pathways were constructed in order to investigate how different distributions of technologies would affect the amount of needed coal. The pathways describe a implementation with only the most efficient technology, the least efficient and a middle option. The results suggest that a large scale implementation of CCS on coal power plant will have a significant impact on the global coal consumption. Under certain assumptions it takes up to 35 % more coal to deliver the same amount electricity with CCS in comparison without CCS. It is also found that certain implementation scenarios will struggle to produce the amount of coal that is needed to power the plants. A sensitivity analysis was performed to examine the impact of assumptions made on for instance plant efficiencies. The analysis shows that optimistic assumptions on development in plant efficiency and deploying only the best technology, uses less coal than a development without CCS and with current plant efficiencies.

La Première Guerre mondiale prive la France d’une partie des mines du Nord et du Pas-de-Calais, d’un grand nombre de mineurs et des importations de combustible allemandes et belges. En dépit des principes libéraux de la Troisième République, l’État, pour résoudre la pénurie, est conduit à intervenir de plus en plus dans la production, le transport et la commercialisation du charbon. À partir de l’été 1917, le ministre de l’Armement Louis Loucheur organise une administration spécifique, le Bureau national des Charbons, qui exerce la mainmise sur ce marché en regroupant les producteurs et les consommateurs, en fixant les prix et en réglementant la répartition. Après l’armistice, l’augmentation des prix anglais et la faible exécution des livraisons de charbon allemand rendent nécessaires le maintien du contrôle de l’administration. L’objectif du Bureau national des Charbons est alors d’unifier le marché national en essayant d’instaurer des prix de vente uniques sur tout le territoire. Mais en avantageant certaines catégories de consommateurs, il devient également un instrument de politique économique. Ce régime de guerre est supprimé brutalement au début de 1921. La France fait alors face à une crise industrielle de surproduction qui met fin à la pénurie et remet en cause l’intervention de l’État dans le marché. / During the First World War, France loses some coalmines in Nord and Pas-de-Calais, a large number of miners and German and Belgian imports. Despite the liberal principles of the Third Republic, the French State intervenes more and more into the production, the transport and the commercialization of coal to fix the shortage. From summer 1917, the Minister of Armament Louis Loucheur settles a specific administration, the Bureau national des Charbons, which controls the whole market: it gathers producers and consumers, fixes prices and rules the repartition. After the Armistice, increased English prices and insufficient German deliveries impose on the administration to keep controlling the market. The Bureau national des Charbons aims to unify the national market with single sales price for the whole country. It also becomes an instrument of economic policy since it can give some advantages to specific categories of consumer. At the beginning of 1921, this war system is suddenly dismantled. France faces then an industrial overproduction crisis which gives an end to the shortage and questions the State’s market intervention.