The thesis deals with the transformation of the Brazilian Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT). Its aim is to identify reasons for more than a decade interval between the renewal of direct presidential election under the universal suffrage and the victory of the left in a society that is marked by extreme inequality of wealth distribution. The second issue which is covered is how the party managed to consolidate power and keep it for three consecutive terms. Using modified concepts of mass, catch-all and cartel party the author tests the hypothesis that the electoral victory of the left was conditioned by the domination of the leftist side of political spectrum by the PT, as a result of building a mass (program-oriented) party, which subsequently tailored its campaign to focus on centrist voters (shift to the catch-all format, or votes-oriented party). The maintenance of power is based on crafting oversized coalitions with parties across the political spectrum, i.e. including the right-wing parties. However, these coalitions are created only to support government; the Workers' Party never forms electoral coalitions with prominent rightest parties. Furthermore, the thesis discusses the functioning of the so-called coalitional presidentialism, the typologies of current leftist governments in Latin America and also presents the basic elements of the Brazilian political system.

(English) Brazil is not gifted by greatest conditions for its existence - president do have strong legislative powers, which allow him to dominate politics, and he is confronted by severely fragmented legislature. This kind of political constellation should cause strong political crises and should be responsible for unstability of political regime. In this paper, we are trying to describe reasons why it is not so. Thanks to the change of international ideological and political context (i.e. end of Cold War) democracy has been internalized by various political actors and army returned back to barracks. Parliament and president were left alone to face their own fate. Even though president dominates legislative process (thanks to his strong powers) and can structure parliament's choices, constitution (de facto) forces him to seek support in parliament and create wider coalitions. On the other hand parliament has strong tools how to offer president alternative proposals and de facto decides if president's policy will be permanent or not. In extreme cases (i.e. political crises) is parliament proactive actor, which controls presidents survival.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-12-17T13:51:34Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 JoaoMRN_DISSERT.pdf: 3197339 bytes, checksum: 8679305ed89e4c7f00dd0dbd6382c8b9 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-07-18 / Public policies have been studied in the various fields of humanities and social sciences, from different theoretical and technical aspects. However, there is still a lack of studies that incorporate the dimension that encompasses the political action and its interference in such actions, also recognizing the importance of the institutional setting of the Brazilian presidential model in implementing these policies. This fragmented and multiparty system has led to power heterogeneous sets of political parties. Thus, the ministerial offices, more than assisting the President?s government project, manage particularized agendas, which are party biased and have the influence of interest groups in hegemonic themes addressed by government agencies. When these agendas operate in sectoral and specialized policies, the friction level is apparently low. However, when this occurs in intersectoral actions, such as in regional development, there is evidence of strong signs of competition among government agencies, which in theory, should operate in an integrated manner. Although this is not a specific feature of Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva?s government- the period to be studied- there was similar behavior in Fernando Henrique Cardoso?s presidency, one realizes that the expansion of coalition on behalf of governance is increasingly interfering in the outcome of intersectoral public policies, due to these multiple arguments in action. In order to understand these processes, this study focused on the Sustainable and Integrated Development Programme for Differentiated Meso-Regions (PROMESO), part of the National Policy for Regional Development (NPRD). The program provides interface with various government agencies and their public policies in a clear intersectoral design. The research sought to identify and analyze the relationships between government agencies and their programs with interest groups, whether political parties or other segments of civil society, highlighting the logic of favoritism, which poses in second place the integration of actions in the intersectoral policies. Therefore, besides the theoretical debate that incorporates several categories of political science, public administration, public policy, geography and economics, the study focused on secondary sources, using different government agencies databases in order to raise information. It was observed that the interference of partisan politics has been disastrous for some public policies. Thus, the research confirms that cooperative character is fragile within government agencies, often limited to official documents, and that there is indeed, a striking feature of competition, especially when it comes to transversalized policies / As pol?ticas p?blicas t?m sido estudadas em diversas ?reas das ci?ncias humanas e sociais, a partir de diferentes aspectos te?ricos e t?cnicos. No entanto, ainda h? car?ncia de estudos que incorporem a dimens?o do exerc?cio da pol?tica e suas interfer?ncias em tais a??es, reconhecendo inclusive a import?ncia da arquitetura institucional do modelo presidencialista brasileiro na implementa??o dessas pol?ticas. Esse sistema multipartid?rio e fragmentado tem levado ao poder conjuntos heterog?neos de partidos pol?ticos. Dessa forma, os gabinetes ministeriais, mais do que auxiliarem o projeto de governo do presidente da Rep?blica, passam a operar agendas particularizadas, que possuem marcas partid?rias e influ?ncia de grupos de interesse hegem?nicos nos temas tratados pelas ag?ncias governamentais. Quando estas agendas operam em pol?ticas setoriais e especializadas, o n?vel de atrito aparentemente ? baixo. Por?m, quando isto ocorre em a??es intersetoriais, a exemplo do desenvolvimento regional, evidenciam-se fortes tra?os de competi??o entre ag?ncias governamentais, que em tese deveriam operar de forma integrada. Embora este n?o seja um tra?o especifico do governo de Luiz In?cio Lula da Silva o per?odo que ser? estudado , encontrando-se comportamentos similares na presid?ncia de Fernando Henrique Cardoso, percebe-se que a amplia??o da coaliz?o em nome da governabilidade vem interferindo cada vez mais no resultado das pol?ticas p?blicas intersetoriais, em virtude destas m?ltiplas l?gicas que se manifestam. Para se entender estes processos, elegeu-se como foco do estudo o Programa de Desenvolvimento Integrado e Sustent?vel de Mesorregi?es Diferenciadas (PROMESO), parte da Pol?tica Nacional de Desenvolvimento Regional (PNDR). O programa estabelece interfaces com diversas ag?ncias governamentais e suas pol?ticas p?blicas em um claro desenho intersetorial. A pesquisa buscou identificar e analisar as rela??es das ag?ncias governamentais e seus programas com grupos de interesse, fossem eles partidos pol?ticos ou outros segmentos da sociedade civil, evidenciando as l?gicas de favorecimento, que secundarizam a integra??o de a??es nas pol?ticas intersetoriais. Para tanto, al?m do debate te?rico que incorpora categorias diversas da ci?ncia pol?tica, da administra??o p?blica, das pol?ticas p?blicas, da geografia e da economia, o estudo debru?ou-se sobre fontes secund?rias, utilizando bases de dados das diferentes ag?ncias governamentais, com a finalidade de levantar informa??es. Evidenciou-se que a interfer?ncia da pol?tica partid?ria tem sido um aspecto nefasto para algumas pol?ticas p?blicas. Assim, a pesquisa confirma que ? t?nue o car?ter cooperativo no ?mbito das ag?ncias governamentais, muitas vezes limitado aos documentos oficiais, e que de fato h? um tra?o marcante de competi??o, sobretudo quando se fala em pol?ticas transversalizadas