<p> This theoretical dissertation utilizes alchemical hermeneutic methodology to identify, compare, and critique core assumptions in modern physics and the Freudian, Jungian, and neuroscience paradigms. Common ideas and parallels in modern physics and analytical psychology are outlined and offered as a way to deepen understanding of contemporary neuroscience research on transference/counter-transference in psychotherapy. From the perspective of Freudian theory, based on Western rationalism, humans are understood as objects among objects operating in a universe of linear causality; the unconscious is understood as an epiphenomenon of biological processes, limited to personal dimensions. Consequently, the analytic process focuses on intrapsychic experience and transference is treated reductively. Neuroscience implicitly shares this worldview.</p><p> Analytical psychology understands consciousness as a temporary state born from and subordinate to the unconscious, which is archetypal in nature. Focus is on ego and archetype operating within the context of a dialectic relationship, each being relatively autonomous, proportionate to its scope. Essentially, archetype is understood as psychophysical in nature, existing in a transcendent unitary reality beyond the apparent duality of psyche and matter, which exhibits <i>acausal orderedness</i> expressible in patterns of archetypal number. Archetypal patterns describing the relationship between ego/matter and archetype/spirit are discerned and shown to reflect a <i>purposive course of psychic energy</i>. These include: spirit/archetype moves towards matter/ego and vice versa, but only reluctantly. Transference, ultimately, could be understood as manifestation of spiritual instinct, consistent with the purposive course of energy, therefore, also expressible in terms of patterns of archetypal number. These same patterns are expressed in terms of analogies to ideas from modern physics.</p><p> Consistent with analytical psychology, neuroscience demonstrates that right-brain (unconscious) develops prior to left-brain (conscious); with brain development dependent upon quality of early attachment relationship, which is <i>re-lived</i> in transference. The <i>double helix approach </i> to therapy is a psychophysical phenomenon in transference/counter-transference that displays dialect between the two brain hemispheres and centers of the psyche (ego and unconscious), thus, demonstrating remarkable parallels to the above described archetypal patterns. These patterns are expressed in terms of archetypal number. This suggests neuroscience might be better served by adopting a worldview consistent with analytical psychology and modern physics. </p>

<p> One conceptualization of emotional awareness is described as attention to one&rsquo;s emotions and clarity of one&rsquo;s emotions. Clarity has been further divided into source awareness (i.e., knowing the causes of emotions) and type awareness (identifying actual emotions). Emotional awareness has been examined in relation to suspiciousness, one of four cognitive-perceptual disturbances in schizotypy. Studies have not, however, examined all three facets of emotional awareness in the other three cognitive-perceptual disturbances and have not examined attributional styles in conjunction with emotional awareness and their relation to cognitive-perceptual disturbances in schizotypy. In addition, previous studies have not examined self-report measures of emotional awareness in conjunction with behavioral/qualitative measures. The current study examined these factors using a cross-sectional design. In this study, 178 undergraduates completed self-report measures of emotional awareness, cognitive-perceptual disturbances, emotional arousal, and attributional style, in addition to completing behavioral tasks assessing type awareness and attention to emotions and a qualitative interview assessing source awareness. Results showed that low type awareness significantly predicted ideas of reference (after controlling for emotional arousal, source awareness, and attention to emotions) and suspiciousness (after controlling for sex, emotional arousal, attention, and source awareness). In addition, low internality for negative events was significantly associated with suspiciousness and odd beliefs/magical thinking. These findings build upon previous work in this area and have implications for potential treatments for cognitive and perceptual disturbances associated with schizotypy. Future directions for additional research are also discussed. </p><p>

<p> At any given moment, the mind needs to decide <i>how</i> to think about <i>what</i>, and for <i>how long</i>. The mind's ability to manage itself is one of the hallmarks of human cognition, and these meta-level questions are crucially important to understanding how cognition is so fluid and flexible across so many situations. In this thesis, I investigate the problem of cognitive resource management by focusing in particular on the domain of <i>mental simulation</i>. Mental simulation is a phenomenon in which people can perceive and manipulate objects and scenes in their imagination in order to make decisions, predictions, and inferences about the world. Importantly, if thinking is computation, then mental simulation is one particular type of computation analogous to having a rich, forward model of the world. </p><p> Given access to such a model as rich and flexible as mental simulation, how should the mind use it? How does the mind infer anything from the outcomes of its simulations? How many resources should be allocated to running which simulations? When should such a rich forward model be used in the first place, in contrast to other types of computation such as heuristics or rules? Understanding the answers to these questions provides broad insight into people's meta-level reasoning because mental simulation is involved in almost every aspect of cognition, including perception, memory, planning, physical reasoning, language, social cognition, problem solving, scientific reasoning, and even creativity. Through a series of behavioral experiments combined with machine learning models, I show how people adaptively use their mental simulations to learn new things about the world; that they choose which simulations to run based on which they think will be more informative; and that they allocate their cognitive resources to spend less time on easy problems and more time on hard problems.</p><p>

<p> The tendency for humans to give preferential attention to animate agents in their immediate surroundings has been well-documented and likely reflects an evolved specialization to a persistent adaptive problem. In uncertain or ambiguous cases, this tendency can result in an over-detection of animacy, as the potential costs of failing to detect an animate agent far outweigh those of mistaken identification. In line with this, it seems likely that humans have evolved a sensitivity to specific cues which are indicative of animacy such that the mere presence of these cues will lead to detection, regardless of the objective category membership of the entity in question. There exists a wealth of research speaking to this effect with regards to motion cues, specifically in terms of the capacity for self-propulsion and goal-directed action. Morphological cues have also been implicated - most especially the presence of facial features &ndash; as they specify a capacity for perceptual feedback from the environment, which is essential for goal-directed motion. However, it remains an open question as to whether the capacity for animacy detection is similarly sensitive to facial information in the absence of motion cues. </p><p> The experiments reported here attempted to address this question by implementing a novel task in which participants were asked to judge the animacy or inanimacy (or membership in animal or object categories) of different images: animals with and without visible facial features, and objects with and without visible facial features. Beyond replicating a general advantage for detecting animate agents over inanimate objects, the primary predictions for these experiments were that facial features would have a differential effect on performance, such that they would improve performance when visible in animals, and would hinder performance when visible in objects. Experiments 1a and 1b provided a preliminary confirmation of this pattern of responses using images of familiar and unfamiliar animals (e.g., dogs versus jellyfish), and unaltered images of objects with and without faces. Experiment 2 improved on the design of this task by more closely matching the sets of images (the same animals facing toward or away from the camera, and objects with faces which had been digitally altered to disrupt the facial features), and by changing the prompt of the task from yes/no judgments of animacy to categorization into animal or object groups. Experiment 3 examined the face inversion effect, or the failure to recognize familiar faces when their orientation is inverted, on animal-object categorization. Lastly, experiments 4 and 5 attempted to extend the findings from experiment 2 to preschool-aged children, by implementing a card sorting task (experiment 4) and a computerized animal detection task (experiment 5). The results of this series of experiments highlight the prominent role of facial features in detecting animate agents in one&rsquo;s surroundings.</p><p>

<p> Working memory is a collection of cognitive resources that allow for the temporary maintenance and manipulation of information. This information can then be used to accomplish task goals in a variety of different contexts. To do this, the working memory system is able to process many different kinds of information using resources dedicated to the processing of those specific types of information. This processing is modulated by a control component which is responsible for guiding actions in the face of interference. Recently, the way in which working memory handles the processing of this information has been the subject of debate. Specifically, current models of working memory differ in their conceptualization of its functional architecture and the interaction between domain-specific storage structures and domain-general control processes. Here, domain-specific processing is when certain components of a model are dedicated to processing certain kinds of information, be it spatial or verbal. Domain-general processing is a when a component of a model can process multiple kinds of information. One approach conceptualizes working memory as consisting of various discrete components that are dedicated to processing specific kinds of information. These multiple component models attempt to explain how domain-specific storage structures are coordinated by a domain-general control mechanism. They also predict that capacity variations in those domain-specific storage structures can directly affect the performance of the domain-general control mechanism. Another approach focuses primarily on the contributions of a domain-general control mechanism to behavior. These controlled attention approaches collapse working memory and attention and propose that a domain-general control mechanism is the primary source of individual differences. This means that variations in domain-specific storage structures are not predicted to affect the functioning of the domain-general control mechanism. This dissertation will make the argument that conceptualizing working memory as either domain-specific or domain-general creates a false dichotomy. To do this, different ways of measuring working memory capacity will first be discussed. That discussion will serve as a basis for understanding the differences, and similarities between both models. A more detailed exposition of both the multiple component model and controlled attention account will follow. Behavioral and physiological evidence will accompany the descriptions of both models. The emphasis of the evidence presented here will be on load effects: observed changes in task performance when information is maintained in working memory. Load effects can be specific to the type of information being maintained (domain-specific), or occur regardless of information type (domain-general). This dissertation will demonstrate how the two models fail to address evidence for both domain-specific and domain-general load effects. Given these inadequacies, a new set of experiments will be proposed that will seek to demonstrate both domain-specific and domain-general effects within the same paradigm. Being able to demonstrate both these effects will go some way towards accounting for the differing evidence presented in the literature. A brief conceptualization of a possible account to explain these effects will then be discussed. Finally, future directions for research will be described.</p><p>

<p> The purpose of the study is to investigate accuracy of the Arnold et al. Finger Tapping cut-offs in a new, large sample of &ldquo;real world&rdquo; credible and non-credible male and female patients. The purpose of the research is to cross-validate cut-offs for use of the Finger Tapping Test as a performance validity measure. The original cut-offs were published by Arnold et al. (2005) and it is important to cross-validate cut-offs on new populations to show that specificity/sensitivity data are stable and replicable. The data used from the archival data set are finger tapping test scores, age, educational level, gender, ethnicity, diagnosis, compensation-seeking status (whether or not the person is in a lawsuit or attempting to obtain disability), and scores on other performance validity tests used for assigning subjects to credible and noncredible groups.</p><p>

<p> It was not known if and to what extent there was a relationship exists between an affirmative presence of insomnia and less need for sleep to cognitive impairments in bipolar disorder type 1 patient population. Lacanian topology and memory consolidation theory provides a comprehensive theoretical foundation for this quantitative correlational study design to determine whether a correlation exists between impaired sleep and cognitive impairments in BP-1 patients. This study included a convenience sample of 286 BP-1 patients collected from the Genetics of Bipolar Disorder in Latino population study. The Schedule for Affective Disorders and Schizophrenia Change in Symptomology was used to measure presence of insomnia and decrease need for sleep, and the South Texas Assessment of Neurocognition was used to measure cognitive functioning related to verbal memory, spatial memory, attention, executive function, speed of processing and inhibition. Spearman&rsquo;s rank order correlation analysis was conducted to answer the first and second research questions, and multiple regression to answer the third research question. The results of the study showed significant inverse correlations between insomnia, speed of processing (<i>rs</i> = -.129; <i>p</i> = .029), executive functioning (<i>r_s</i> = -.116; <i>p</i> = .05), decreased need for sleep and speed of processing (<i>r_s</i> = -.118; <i>p</i> = .046). Moreover, it revealed that insomnia and decreased need for sleep as a set were significant predictors for the speed of processing, <i>F</i> (2, 283) = 3.08, <i> p</i> = .048. The findings of this study added to the literature on how sleep disturbances effects cognitive functioning in BP-1 patients and resulted in several implications for clinicians and researchers.</p><p>

<p> Sensory systems are believed to take advantage of the properties of natural stimuli. Natural images, for example, follow normality and a power-law which are reflected in the dynamics of visual cells. In order to better understand the vestibular system we examined natural human motion. We measured torso and head angular velocities of human subjects who walked, jogged, and climbed a staircase. Angular velocity distributions of the head and torso were fit well by Cauchy distributions, while power spectral densities did not follow a power law. We found that neither a power law nor a two-line-segment fit were sufficient to fit power spectral densities of angular velocity. Increases in power at the gait frequency and its harmonics are not well fit by lines. Differences between torso and head motion show a more evenly distributed reduction of angular velocities, presumably by the neck, in the semicircular canal frame of reference. Coherence between torso and head angular velocity did not show a linear relationship over all frequencies, but did suggest a linear relationship at the fundamental gait frequency and its harmonics. Reduction in angular velocity between the torso and head was then modeled by an adaptive linear filter. Results were mixed and depended on subject, condition, and axis. Qualitatively, predictions of angular velocity were good, capturing both the amplitude and periodicity of the actual head velocity. Finally, initial results were replicated while normalizing gait cycles using linear length normalization. Natural walking and running conditions were compared to treadmill walking and running. Subjects showed significantly different peak velocities during natural and treadmill conditions despite similar movement speeds. Coherence was also different between natural and treadmill conditions. These results provide evidence that natural and treadmill locomotion are treated differently, possibly due to the lack of visual input during treadmill locomotion. Subjects also walked with their heads turned to either the left or right, separating direction of motion and direction of the head. Angular velocity during these conditions show that head direction is not important for stabilizing the head, suggesting that efference copies play a role in head stabilization.</p><p>

The majority of humans develop a facility with music effortlessly and in the absence of explicit training. However some individuals show a distinct lack of musical ability despite seeming to have otherwise normal cognitive functioning. Based on initial studies into congenital amusia, poor pitch discrimination ability and poor pitch memory have been ascribed a central role in the condition. However, the extent to which these play a causal role in the more global difficulties associated with the disorder remains unclear. Furthermore, with the disorder increasingly being conceived of as one of awareness rather than perception, an integrated account of the disorder in which the relative importance of observed impairments are clearly delineated is becoming essential. Critically, such an account would describe congenital amusia in those terms that are commonly used to account for how musical listening ability typically develops. Further, it would be based on the results of investigations using ecologically valid stimuli and methods. In a series of four experiments, this thesis seeks to contribute towards such an account. Firstly, using behavioural methods, the state of statistical learning processes known to be necessary for the internalisation of musical regularities in typical individuals is examined. Secondly, the thesis examines the state of musical anticipatory mechanisms, a corollary of such learning, which has been shown to play a critical role in the ability to recognize and discriminate melodies. Next, using electroencephalography recordings, the neural basis of abnormal melodic pitch processing in congenital amusia is studied, while in the final chapter, a social science technique is used to investigate the extent to which amusics show normal appreciation of music in everyday life. By combining findings from current and previous studies, this thesis will contribute towards a comprehensive description of congenital amusia based on findings from a number of different levels of inquiry.

The visual processing of a stimulus is facilitated by attention when it is at an attended location compared to an unattended location. However, whether attentional selection operates on the basis of visual features (e.g., color) independently of spatial locations is less clear. Six experiments were designed to examine how color information as well as location information affected attentional selection. In Experiment 1, the color of the targets and the spatial distance between them were both manipulated. Stimuli were found to be grouped based on color similarity. Additionally, the evidence suggested direct selection on the basis of color groups, rather than selection that was mediated by location. By varying the probabilities of target location and color, Experiments 2, 3 and 4 demonstrated that the use of color in perceptual grouping and in biasing the priority of selection is not automatic, but is modulated by task demands. Experiments 5 and 6 further investigated the relationship between using color and using location as the selection basis under exogenous and endogenous orienting. The results suggest that the precise nature of the interaction between color and location varies according to the mode of attentional control. Collectively, these experiments contribute to an understanding of how different types of information are used in selection and suggest a greater degree of flexibility of attentional control than previously expected. The flexibility is likely to be determined by a number of factors, including task demands and the nature of attentional control.