This dissertation examines how Latin American diplomacy helped shape U.S. officials’ response to revolutionary movements at the height of the Cold War. It explains the striking contrast between U.S. patronage of the Bolivian revolution and the profound antagonism with similar leftist nationalist movements in Cuba and Guatemala. Although U.S. policymakers worried that “Communists” were infiltrating the Bolivian Government, Bolivian diplomats convinced the Eisenhower administration to support their revolution. The dissertation demonstrates that even during the peak of McCarthyism, U.S. policymakers' vision extended far beyond Cold War dogmatism. This vision incorporated a subtle, if ultimately contradictory, appreciation of the power of nationalism, a wish to promote developmental liberalism, and a desire for hemispheric hegemony regardless of strategic and ideological competition with the Soviet Union. U.S. officials were eager to exploit the emerging force of third world nationalism and employ it to strengthen the “inter-American system.” The Bolivian revolutionaries presented their political project as copacetic to Washington’s wider regional goals, and thus managed to secure considerable freedom of movement to continue to pursue a radical revolutionary agenda and statist program of development, financed and enabled by hundreds of millions in U.S. aid dollars.

This study focuses on the significant investment in oceanography that typified Cold War Britain. Thanks to the analysis of untapped archival records, it documents the remarkable growth of marine research in the UK, and its underlying ambitions, from the end of Second World War naval exercises to the deployment of nuclear submarines in the Atomic Age. In particular, it looks at the significance of sea studies in the context of British naval operations, the surveillance of enemy vessels at sea, and the gathering of intelligence on the capabilities of enemy forces. In so doing, it depicts the trajectory of what was at the time dubbed "military oceanography" from its ascendancy in the post-war years to the creation of an national organization (the National Institute of Oceanography, NIO), devoted to pursue novel research, to its re-configuration during the 1970s marking an important transition from military to civilian (environmentally-driven) studies. The thesis discusses the complexities of the Cold War British State. It reveals the connections between leading scientists, government administrators, and military officers, and their interplay in the establishment and development of oceanographic studies. The thesis contends that at the core of the political-scientific interface there are policy networks and that we can gain a better understanding of this interaction by looking at some of the key figures, or "nodes" in these networks. It thus uses the career of the NIO director, the marine scientist George Deacon, as a source to gain entrance into the historical path of British oceanography, and argues that by looking at Deacon as a mediator (or "go-between") one can gain a better understanding of the dynamics and historical evolution of the policy networks he participated in.

Oil is one of the most widespread high-density energy sources in the world: its importance for the military-industrial complex became even more evident in the postwar context. In this framework, establishing the conditions for accessing the world's oil-rich areas became essential for states, not only to provide for their own energy needs, but also to buttress national economic and geostrategic interests, and protect energy security. In addition, regulating the oil flow between countries afforded the ability to influence their operational capabilities. Exploiting oil as a geopolitical weapon was not distinctive of the two global hegemonic powers, but was also employed by less powerful countries, such as France and Italy. My thesis shows how, from the second half of the 1940s, successive Italian and French administrations established agencies for hydrocarbon management, and devised strategies of oil exploration according to their political agendas. Achieving energy autonomy was the main objective of both countries. However, the predominance of Anglo-American interests in both French and Italian oil scenarios led to continuous bilateral diplomatic tensions, especially over issues of exploration rights. Anglo-American governments and companies sought to shape the French and Italian oil scenes to their benefit, also by looking for allies in the political classes of the two countries. It was the outcome of these 'oily deals' that eventually shaped the history of Italian and French oil industries. Conflicting interests were revealed at their fullest during the Algerian war of 1954-62: following the discovery of large oil and gas fields in Algeria, US and Italian companies started to negotiate, first with the French and then the Algerians, their access to, and prospecting rights for Algerian territories. My work shows that negotiation processes involved secret surveillance activities, the establishment of parallel diplomacies, and serious confrontation between Cold War allies. A fundamental role in these deals was played by technocrats and geoscientists, who facilitated the communication of secret data on oilfields to their national authorities. Significant global oil discoveries occurred worldwide in the 1950s, eventually leading to overproduction: an outcome assisted by major progress in geophysical prospecting techniques. France's new role as an oil producer thanks to discoveries in Africa provoked a shift of national interest from exploration to transport. At the same time Italy, after the signing of massive oil-for-technology barter agreements with the Soviet Union, could now dispose of a surplus that needed channelling to potential outlets. For both countries, building pipelines became an essential aspect: however, as both were targeting the West European market, Europe became an arena of bitter competition for pipeline dominance. Italian-Soviet contracts, together with the current level of West European trade with the Soviet Union, prompted an examination of Western security by international organisations. The issue of limiting Soviet oil exports into West European countries was widely debated at the European Community and Nato, as was European technological aid to the Soviet project of constructing a colossal pipeline system. My analysis of the terms of the debates, their development and outcome, reveals the ambiguity of the concepts of security and 'strategic technology' as a ground for decision-making, indicating how these were construed as co-products of negotiations.

Essay about the play by the author Production Notes Acknowledgements Full Text of "...among other things..." by Michael Tisdale

With the Second World War, the U.S. defense establishment attained a scale and permanence it never had before. The new strategic blueprint of the Cold War dictated constant readiness for military confrontation, but it was also clear that the country could not keep up wartime levels of total economic mobilization. Faced with the problem of managing this military behemoth, leaders in the defense bureaucracy looked to private industry for expertise to help them run the emerging national security state. The result was a remaking of defense administration in the image of the post-war corporation. This dissertation explains how and why reformers placed their faith in models of business enterprise, an approach that was neither self-evident nor readily accepted across the military leadership. In the decades after World War II, the reorganization of the defense bureaucracy around values of efficiency and productivity shaped U.S. military operations and affected millions of people around the world. In concrete terms, this dissertation tracks how managerial science changed the ways the military kept accounts, disciplined labor, trained officers, and handled government assets. Interest in improving military management exploded after 1950. In the realm of budgeting and finance, reformers set up transactions between units to imitate buyer-seller relationships, requiring officers to express their needs for supplies and labor in dollar terms. Drawing analogies between military and private industry, defense establishment reformers embraced methods like Taylorist work measurement, which they used to control work ranging from filing to the production of massive weapons systems. Borrowing directly from Harvard Business School’s Advanced Management Program, defense leaders established schools to train high-ranking military officers in the latest trends of business management. While these business-inspired reforms gained traction in many parts of the military bureaucracy, they were not accepted without controversy. After the Vietnam War, many military leaders questioned the dominance of “managerialism” and denounced it in favor of traditional concepts of command and leadership. By the 1970s, however, the language and values of management had become thoroughly embedded in the institutional structure of the military. I argue that the reorganization of the defense bureaucracy in the image of the profit-seeking firm changed the experience of work in the military, redefined what it meant to be an officer, and facilitated the privatization of many of the defense establishment’s functions. Further, I aim to show that understanding how the military governed and produced can reframe key historiographic debates about 20th century American political economy.

The Italian political crisis of 1992-94, often referred to as Tangentopoli, emerged after the revelation of endemic corruption throughout the political system. First and foremost the crisis saw the collapse of the main political parties, the Christian Democracy and the Socialist Party. In a different manner and only one year prior to this crisis, the former Communist Party, also underwent major changes and evolved into a social democratic party, the Democratic Party of the Left. Though this crisis was sparked by a corruption revelation, it became a catalyst for a change in the deformities of a political system, of the partitocracy, which was itself the product of Cold War conditions faced by Italy in the post-war period. The focus of this study has been to re-evaluate the causes of this crisis with particular attention to the role of the Cold War as the over-arching influence which directly and indirectly influenced many of the internal dynamics of the Italian political process. The hypothesis of this research was that the end of the Cold War in 1991 as a factor which provoked this political crisis, was far more important as a cause than has hitherto been acknowledged. The study examines the other indicated possible causes including the impact of the corruption revelations, the role of the magistrates in uncovering corruption, the economic crisis, the role of the new protest movement of the Lega Nord and finally the especially brutal equilibrium with Italian political forces re-established by the Mafia after 1992.

This thesis critically examines the career and significance of America’s first Secretary of Defence James V. Forrestal from a post-Cold War perspective. Within traditional Cold War scholarship, Forrestal’s legacy is problematic. The nature of his role as a defence administrator, combined with his suicide in 1949, has led scholars to underestimate his significance and relegate his legacy to the occasional biography. The few studies that examine his contribution utilise conventional analytical approaches that fail to fully assess his policymaking impact. The end of the Cold War, however, has brought additional insight into the policy concerns that dominated the conflict, new analytical approaches to its scholarship and fresh material on which to base a re-assessment. As this thesis demonstrates, the employment of new methodologies to study Forrestal’s impact is long overdue. By drawing on theories specifically related to leadership and decision-making behaviour, this thesis brings a deeper, fuller understanding of Forrestal’s policy-making impact as a Cold War official through an examination of his professional conduct. Despite Forrestal’s many successes, political controversies surrounding his defence career overshadowed his many achievements. This thesis argues that such controversies were the result of Forrestal’s dedication as a public official, his policy-making and management styles, and the structure of his authority as defence secretary. They were not, as some have argued, the result of his ineffectiveness as a policy-maker, “hawkish” attitudes or declining mental health. His collapse, furthermore, was not the natural conclusion of any paranoid delusions or obsessive nature, but rather a result of Forrestal’s dedication to his work at the expense of his own health. This thesis undertakes a content analysis of Forrestal’s writings and an examination of his policy-making approach, concentrating on the evolution and execution of his policy advice and initiatives, as well as the structure of his authority as secretary of defence. It begins with a biographical overview of his life and public service career, as well as an assessment of existing Cold War scholarship and its general tendency to underestimate Forrestal’s significance. The components of his legacy are then analysed thematically, with chapters devoted to his foreign policy influence, his role in the unification controversy and his administrative efforts as defence secretary. Throughout, Forrestal’s career and significance is reassessed both in the application of new theoretical and methodological insights, and the analysis of recently declassified and reorganised documents, particularly the complete and unexpurgated version of Forrestal’s official diaries.

This thesis critically examines the career and significance of America’s first Secretary of Defence James V. Forrestal from a post-Cold War perspective. Within traditional Cold War scholarship, Forrestal’s legacy is problematic. The nature of his role as a defence administrator, combined with his suicide in 1949, has led scholars to underestimate his significance and relegate his legacy to the occasional biography. The few studies that examine his contribution utilise conventional analytical approaches that fail to fully assess his policymaking impact. The end of the Cold War, however, has brought additional insight into the policy concerns that dominated the conflict, new analytical approaches to its scholarship and fresh material on which to base a re-assessment. As this thesis demonstrates, the employment of new methodologies to study Forrestal’s impact is long overdue. By drawing on theories specifically related to leadership and decision-making behaviour, this thesis brings a deeper, fuller understanding of Forrestal’s policy-making impact as a Cold War official through an examination of his professional conduct. Despite Forrestal’s many successes, political controversies surrounding his defence career overshadowed his many achievements. This thesis argues that such controversies were the result of Forrestal’s dedication as a public official, his policy-making and management styles, and the structure of his authority as defence secretary. They were not, as some have argued, the result of his ineffectiveness as a policy-maker, “hawkish” attitudes or declining mental health. His collapse, furthermore, was not the natural conclusion of any paranoid delusions or obsessive nature, but rather a result of Forrestal’s dedication to his work at the expense of his own health. This thesis undertakes a content analysis of Forrestal’s writings and an examination of his policy-making approach, concentrating on the evolution and execution of his policy advice and initiatives, as well as the structure of his authority as secretary of defence. It begins with a biographical overview of his life and public service career, as well as an assessment of existing Cold War scholarship and its general tendency to underestimate Forrestal’s significance. The components of his legacy are then analysed thematically, with chapters devoted to his foreign policy influence, his role in the unification controversy and his administrative efforts as defence secretary. Throughout, Forrestal’s career and significance is reassessed both in the application of new theoretical and methodological insights, and the analysis of recently declassified and reorganised documents, particularly the complete and unexpurgated version of Forrestal’s official diaries.

Communist Stardom in the Cold War: Josip Broz Tito in Western and Yugoslav Photography, 1943-1980 Nikolina Kurtovic Doctor of Philosophy Department of Art University of Toronto 2010 Abstract This dissertation examines the iconographic and ideological aspects of the public image of Josip Broz Tito, the communist leader of Socialist Yugoslavia and one of the major historical personalities of the twentieth century. By studying the specific historical, political, and cultural contexts of Tito’s changing iconography between 1943 and 1980, I considers a dynamic relationship between the Western and Eastern perspectives on his leadership style, personality, and role, as communicated in the idiom of Western photojournalism and celebrity photography, as well as the style of official presidential photography in Yugoslavia. I analyze photo-essays on Tito published in Life, Time, and Picture Post, and in the official Yugoslav magazines, Yugoslavia and Yugoslav Review, as well as his portraits by Yousuf Karsh and by Ivo Eterovic in his photo-book Tito’s Private Life. I engage the issues of image reception by studying fundamental stereotypes within the canon of Tito photography, exploring their relation to the popular and political discourses on war heroism, resistance myth, masculinity, leadership, communism, disease, romance, family, leisure and celebrity in the U.S. during World War Two and the Cold War. Tito’s photographs are compared with relevant examples in modern portrait photography, photojournalism, and European painting, thereby situating Tito’s example in the tradition of Western political image making, but also in relation to local traditions. My dissertation shows that the practical role of the cult of Tito in the American press during the Cold War was to render him and Yugoslavia as examples for the satellite countries, and to enlist popular support for U.S. policy. It also helped Tito navigate a political crisis following his 1948 break with Stalin. The iconography created in this context contributed to the genesis and modernizing of Yugoslav presidential photography in the 1950s. Appropriating the rhetoric and formal devices of Western celebrity and glamour photography, Yugoslav photographs created a set of presidential stereotypes and their photographs were bearers of the conventional narrative of Tito’s presidency in Yugoslav magazines and books addressing Western audiences between 1960 and 1980. My dissertation underscores the role of cross-cultural contacts and contexts for developing, maintaining, and understanding of Tito’s publicity and celebrity in the West.

The purpose of this study is to analyze how and why Kelly initially began interjecting political satire into his comic strip Pogo and how he was able to avoid being blacklisted during the time of the Red Scare. The scope of this study includes a history of the medium, a biography of the author, and a discussion of humor as a means of dissent and personal artistry. The methodology uses both historical documentation and semiotic analysis of Kelly’s work from high school, the Disney studios, The New York Star and Pogo. Case studies include gender racial, and political analysis. The findings resulted from an analysis of the archive. Conclusions reached were that Kelly’s work created a new form of political dissent that was less satirical than editorial cartoons of the day and more directed toward the enjoyment of the reader rather than at any political affiliation, a form of comedic writing that continues to be used today in such forms as the Daily Show, Colbert Report and Saturday Night Live. This new form of political satire is important to journalistic studies since it reveals a theme of parrhesia, a Socratic term for speaking truth to power, that was further developed in the twentieth century by Star columnist I. F. Stone and French philosopher Michel Foucault. The primary limitation of this study was that Pogo was an extremely personal work, one that could not be duplicated by others successfully after the author died.