Between 1870 and 1901, seventeen officers from the British army were appointed by the governments of the Australian colonies and New Zealand as commanders of their colonial military forces. There has been considerable speculation about the roles of these officers as imperial agents, developing colonial forces as a wartime reserve to imperial forces, but little in depth research. This thesis examines the role of the imperial commandants with an embryonic system of imperial defence and their contribution to the development of the colonial military forces. It is therefore a topic in British imperial history as much as Australian and New Zealand military history. British officers were appointed by colonial governments to overcome a shortfall in professional military expertise but increasingly came to be viewed by successive British administrations as a means of fulfilling an imperial defence agenda. The commandants as ???men-on-the-spot???, however, viewed themselves as independent reformers and got offside with both the imperial and colonial governments. This fact reveals that the commandants occupied a difficult position between the aspirations of London and the reality of the colonies. They certainly brought an imperial perspective to their commands and looked forward to the colonies playing a role on the imperial stage but generally did so in terms of a personal agenda rather than one set by London. This assessment is best demonstrated in the commandants??? independent stance at the outset of the South African War. The practice of appointing British commandants in Australasia was fraught with problems because of an inherent conflict in the goals of the commandants and their colonial governments. It resembles the Canadian experience of the British officers which reveals that the system of imperials military appointments as a whole was flawed. The problem remained that until a sufficient number of colonial officers had the prerequisite professional expertise for high command there was no alternative. The commandants were therefore the beginning rather than the end of a traditional reliance upon British military expertise. The lasting legacy of the commandants for the military forces of Australia and New Zealand was the development of colonial officers, transference of British military traditions, and the encouragement of a colonial military identity premised on the expectation of future participation in defence of the empire. The study provides a major revision to the existing historiography of imperial officers in the colonies, one which concludes that far from being ???imperial agents??? they were largely marching to their own drum.

Between 1870 and 1901, seventeen officers from the British army were appointed by the governments of the Australian colonies and New Zealand as commanders of their colonial military forces. There has been considerable speculation about the roles of these officers as imperial agents, developing colonial forces as a wartime reserve to imperial forces, but little in depth research. This thesis examines the role of the imperial commandants with an embryonic system of imperial defence and their contribution to the development of the colonial military forces. It is therefore a topic in British imperial history as much as Australian and New Zealand military history. British officers were appointed by colonial governments to overcome a shortfall in professional military expertise but increasingly came to be viewed by successive British administrations as a means of fulfilling an imperial defence agenda. The commandants as ???men-on-the-spot???, however, viewed themselves as independent reformers and got offside with both the imperial and colonial governments. This fact reveals that the commandants occupied a difficult position between the aspirations of London and the reality of the colonies. They certainly brought an imperial perspective to their commands and looked forward to the colonies playing a role on the imperial stage but generally did so in terms of a personal agenda rather than one set by London. This assessment is best demonstrated in the commandants??? independent stance at the outset of the South African War. The practice of appointing British commandants in Australasia was fraught with problems because of an inherent conflict in the goals of the commandants and their colonial governments. It resembles the Canadian experience of the British officers which reveals that the system of imperials military appointments as a whole was flawed. The problem remained that until a sufficient number of colonial officers had the prerequisite professional expertise for high command there was no alternative. The commandants were therefore the beginning rather than the end of a traditional reliance upon British military expertise. The lasting legacy of the commandants for the military forces of Australia and New Zealand was the development of colonial officers, transference of British military traditions, and the encouragement of a colonial military identity premised on the expectation of future participation in defence of the empire. The study provides a major revision to the existing historiography of imperial officers in the colonies, one which concludes that far from being ???imperial agents??? they were largely marching to their own drum.

[Truncated abstract] The senior Imperial officers who took part in the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879 are comparatively well known and their service in that brief period has been well documented, as indeed has that of many of their junior colleagues. Much less, however, is known about the officers who served as commandants of the Natal Native Contingent, although more than half of them were Imperial officers on special service duties. Most of the rest were British ex-officers who lived in South Africa, while one of the remaining two was an adventurer and mercenary. Many of them had already found service with the South African force during the Ninth Cape Border War against the Ngqika and Gcaleka which had only ended in mid-1878. According to official documents, the Natal Native Contingent initially numbered more than 8,000 native troops, in three regiments, under the command of European officers and non-commissioned officers. At the time of the invasion of Zululand in January, 1879, the contingent therefore made up about 62% of the invading force. This bald statistic, as so often, hides the true story. The thesis examines each of the commandants, and the extent to which their abilities and personalities were reflected in the performance of the native troops under their command, while at the same time revealing the evolution of the Contingent itself as an arm of the invading force under Lieutenant General Lord Chelmsford ... The haste with which the regiments were assembled, their often inhuman treatment by their officers, the minimal or non-existent training they received and the way they were armed and dressed all combined to qualify their subsequent performance in the field. A comparison of the NNC is drawn with the performances of the Native Mounted Contingent, and the men of Colonel, later Brigadier General, Evelyn Wood?s Irregulars. The conclusion of the thesis is that the commandants did indeed have a profound effect on the quality and performance of the Africans who served under them. In general, the units under serving British officers performed best, while the colonial officers did less well. The mercenary officer was almost certainly the worst, but by only a slim margin.