The thesis examines the speeches and debates in the Australasian Federation Conference of 1890, and the Australasian Federal Conventions of 1891 and 1897-8 for the purpose of establishing what the framers of the Commonwealth Constitution understood to be the meaning and purpose of the individual sections of the Constitution upon which they were called upon either to support or oppose. The particular matters involved in the examination are the manner and form in which the principles of responsible government were incorporated into the constitution, and the relationship of these principles to the powers of the Senate; the crisis in the 1891 Convention in relation to the powers of the Senate over money bills; the significance of the difference in composition of the Convention of 1891 compared with that of 1897-8; the significance of the classification of the Constitution as an indissoluble federation under the Crown; the principles of responsible government and the provisions of s.57 in the context of the deadlock over Supply in 1975; the meaning and purpose of s.41 preserving the rights of voters qualified to vote in State elections for the lower Houses, and the misconceptions in relation thereto the position of aborigines under the Constitution; the meaning and purpose of the special laws power in the light of the 1967 Constitutional referendum, and its interpretation bU the High Court in the Hindmarsh Island Bridge case; the relationship of the intentions of the framers of the Constitution to the interpretation bu the High Court of the Financial Clauses of the Constitution, and the provisions of s.92; and the meaning and purpose of the external affairs power, and the corporations power as understood bu the framers of the Constitution.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Rhode Island, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 260-274).

Thesis (M.S.)--Kutztown University. / Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 45-06, page: 2709. Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 76-77).

Whatever may be the policy of a (declaratory) power in the Crown conclusively to certify the limits of its territorial sovereignty, and whatever be the ultimate fate of such a power [linked, as it is in part, to the policy of. and indeed the existence of, a (constitutive) prerogative of cession] still at all events the constituent function of the Crown is founded upon the (constitutive) prerogative of annexation, as distinct from any declaratory power. To annexation the will and pleasure of the Crown is, as a matter of constitutional law, both sufficient and necessary, without regard to any consideration of international law. The necessity of Her Majesty's pleasure is supported inter alia by the case of Staples v. The Queen (1899) (unreported), heard on application to the Privy Council for leave to appeal from the High Court of Matabeleland. A full report of the proceedings in both courts, including argument and reasons, being appended; the Privy Council deciding that territory remained foreign notwithstanding destruction by armed force of the previous native sovereignty and ensuing complete control by the Crown ... The prerogative of legislation is considered; semble a grant of representative institutions may be held subject to a reservation of the prerogative of legislation contained in an earlier but governing instrument. A prerogative of the Crown to legislate for the subject even in foreign territory, wherever the Crown has assumed a jurisdiction, is supported by limited judicial authority whose correctness is doubted. The true extent is considered of the continuance of existing laws in conquered and ceded territories. The establishment of legislative institutions is considered. The incidents of these institutions are elaborated upon, and particularly the privileges of legislative bodies erected by the Crown. An account is given of the events in Newfoundland in August, 1838, giving rise to the leading case of Dr. Kielley in the Courts of Newfoundland, and, on appeal, in the Privy Council, laying down the rule that only necessary incidents are enjoyed at common law and not the lex et consuetude parliament! as known at Westminster: the rule herein laid down being applied more particularly against a power of committal for contempt. Earlier colonial and Privy Council precedents in the opposite sense are discussed. The rule is suggested to be one dictated by considerations of policy simply, and not determined by any particular view of the true basis of privilege in England. If anything, assimilation of the lex et consuetudo parliamenti to the common law serves as an argument for its passage to the colony, while attribution to lost statute might tend to establish peculiarity to England and colonial inapplicability; but the rule of inapplicability may be applied in any event.

The thesis surveys and analyses Commonwealth Bills of Rights. It examines the content of these Bills of Rights and considers their origin and political implications. The first chapter reviews the political history of Bills of Rights generally. This is followed by a chapter dealing with the initiation and introduction of Commonwealth Bills of Rights. Particular attention is given to the attitudes and influences of British officials and advisors. The third chapter considers the general forms of Commonwealth Bills of Rights and the ways in which such guarantees are qualified. The next three chapters examine the substance of the particular guarantees and note judicial cases that are of particular interest. In the seventh chapter some of the political implications of these Bills of Rights are considered. The eighth chapter concerns judicial attitudes toward the enforcement of a Bill of Rights. This is followed by concluding remarks.

O presente trabalho procura demonstrar a existência de quatro diferentes sentidos de liberdade no sistema filosófico de Hobbes: liberdade como ausência de impedimentos externos ao movimento, liberdade como direito natural de auto-preservação no estado de natureza, liberdade como esfera de ação delimitada pela lei civil e liberdade como direito legítimo de descumprir certas leis civis. Nesse sentido, os resultados da pesquisa contrariam a compreensão do conceito de liberdade em Hobbes a partir de sua apropriação pela tradição liberal, que considera apenas um desses quatro sentidos. As análises permitem ainda inferir que entre os diferentes sentidos de liberdade em Hobbes há relações de analogia e de pertencimento. / This research aims to demonstrate four different ways of understanding the concept of liberty in Hobbes\' philosophical system: liberty as an absent of external impediments to movement; liberty as the natural right of self-preservation in the state of nature; liberty as the field of action limited by the civil law; and liberty as the right to disobey some civil laws without injustice. The research\'s results contradict the liberal use of Hobbes\'s concept of liberty, due to this usage been restricted to only one of the four ways of the concept of liberty in Hobbes\' works.

The following work is an effort to better understand commonwealths by exploring the circumstances, rights, and desires of those who found them or recognize their authority. While it is apparent that mankind’s affairs are governed largely by commonwealths or similar bodies, the reasons that men have for establishing them and the rights upon which their authority is established can be more difficult to grasp. In this work, differing perspectives on the condition of men in nature, the rights they naturally possess, and the primary desires that motivate them are considered in hopes of determining a commonwealth’s purpose. Visions and definitions of commonwealths given by the same philosophers are then reviewed and compared with one another to determine the ways that their respective views on man and his condition mold the arrangements they put forth. Better understanding the relationship between men, their circumstances, and the governments they create could be of great value to those trying to determine why existing commonwealths have taken their present forms. Such insight would also clarify which attributes of a commonwealth are most essential to ensuring that it accomplishes the purposes for which it was established.

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The Commonwealth has a history of crises: 1949, 1965, the 1970s through the 80s, 1991 and 2009. Each of these points will be examined: their historical context, the challenges and changes, and the actions it took to meet these challenges. Analysis of these points indicates that the Commonwealth is a reactive and adaptive organization that is affected by, and strives to affect, world events; that it is shaped and influenced by its members, and that crises have resulted in the Commonwealth re-focusing and revising itself. The primary suggestions are that the Commonwealth generate a culture of constant revision, while simultaneously focusing its principles and values. It may also adopt better forecasting measures as organizational theory suggests, so that it can remain an agile organization. The dissertation will also compare the OIF, the CPLP and the OEI and will draw forth lessons that these organizations can learn from the Commonwealth’s history of crisis.

Abstract not available. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of Natal, 1960.