This thesis presents the design, analysis, and numerical and experimental evaluation of nonlinear controllers for co-operation among several hydraulic robots operating in the presence of significant system uncertainties, non-linearities and friction. The designed controllers allow hydraulically driven manipulators to (i) co-operatively handle a rigid object (payload) following a given trajectory, (ii) share the payload and (iii) maintain an acceptable internal force on the object. A general description of the kinematic and dynamic relations for a hydraulically actuated multi-manipulator system is presented first. The entire mathematical model incorporates object dynamics, robot dynamics, hydraulic actuator functions and friction dynamics. For the purpose of simulations, a detailed numerical simulation program of such a system is also developed, in which two three-link planar robot manipulators resembling the Magnum hydraulic manipulators manufactured by ISE, interact with each other through manipulating a common object. The regulating control problem is studied next, in which the desired position of the object and the corresponding desired link displacement change step-wise. Initially, a controller is designed based on a backstepping technique, assuming that full knowledge of the dynamics and kinematics of the system is available. The assumption is then relaxed and the control system is analyzed. Based on the analysis, the controller is then modified to account for the uncertainty of the payload, robot dynamic parameters and hydraulic functions. Next, the regulating controller is extended to a tracking controller, which allows the object to follow a given trajectory and is robust against parameter uncertainties. Additionally, an observer is added to the controller to avoid the need of acceleration feedback. To investigate the effect of friction force, the above controllers are examined by introducing the most recent and complete LuGre friction model into the system dynamics. The tracking controller is then redesigned to compensate the effect of friction. Observers are designed to observe the immeasurable friction states. Based on the observed friction states and estimated friction parameters, an appropriate friction compensation scheme is designed which does not directly use velocity in order to avoid the need of acceleration feedback by the controller. Finally, the problem of “explosion of terms” coming from the backstepping method is solved by using the concept of dynamic surface control in which a low pass filter is integrated to avoid model differentiation. Simulations are carried out for analysis of the control system and verification of the developed controllers. Experimental examinations are performed on an available hydraulic system consisting of two single-axis hydraulic actuators.

The theoretical argument of this study is that economic globalization, by default, exerts a downward pressure on the social policies of states largely through the operations of transnational corporations. However, since globalization’s effect on social policy is conditional on endogenous political forces such as regime type, democratization, electoral competition and political participation, its proclivity to retrench the welfare state is averted by the preferences of political actors and institutions to expand social spending. This argument found consistent empirical support via a series of cross-section regressions that estimated the interactive effects of economic globalization and various measures of domestic political institutions and affiliations for a sample of 120 countries from 1970 to 2002. Case studies of South Korea, Chile and Spain provided additional qualitative evidence for the study’s theoretical argument.

<p>[1] s., s. 4-70: sammanfattning, s. 73-153: 4 uppsatser</p> / digitalisering@umu

This paper presents an empirical analysis of top executive compensation from intellectual capital perspective using data from US listed companies and aims to examine whether executives get appropriate compensation. I propose a pay-contribution compensation scheme and extend previous research on agency theory, by exploring how executive compensation contract design may be based on the firm’s intellectual capital (IC). Such features would serve the core purpose of compensation design, which is to create long-term firm value. But inappropriate compensation scheme cannot motivate individual ICs to contribute fully and deteriorate firm value eventually. I view CEO, CFO, COO, CMO, CSO, CTO, CHOs as individual intellectual capital of firms, and through examining key indicators from financial contribution, organizational contribution, relational contribution and growth contribution, I find that their total compensations, total incentive compensations and total cash compensations are not significant on their functions for all executives, implying that free rider problem may exist. I conduct two steps regression models: the first step is to reveal free-rider problem based on the significant relationship between executive compensation and his/her role contribution, and the second step is to examine whether executive compensations rewarded by his/her role contribution have significant influence on firm valuation. The outcome of model 1 shows that CEO and CSO have no free-rider problem, while CTO and CHO may have potential free-rider problem, CFO and CMO may have the risk of free-rider problem, and COO may have moderate free-rider problem. The outcome of model 2 shows that CEO and CFO compensation rewarded by role contribution have significant influence on firm valuation; COO, CMO and CHO compensation rewarded by role contribution have moderate influence on firm valuation; while CTO compensation rewarded by role contribution have little influence on firm valuation and CTO compensation rewarded by role contribution have no influence on firm valuation. My result is consistent with agency theory since free rider may cause executive inertia, reduce individual IC productivity, and impair firm value. The findings suggest that pay-contribution compensation contracts and remuneration schemes focus on different executive positions and strategic roles of individual intellectual capital to avoid free rider problem.

This thesis presents the design, analysis, and numerical and experimental evaluation of nonlinear controllers for co-operation among several hydraulic robots operating in the presence of significant system uncertainties, non-linearities and friction. The designed controllers allow hydraulically driven manipulators to (i) co-operatively handle a rigid object (payload) following a given trajectory, (ii) share the payload and (iii) maintain an acceptable internal force on the object. A general description of the kinematic and dynamic relations for a hydraulically actuated multi-manipulator system is presented first. The entire mathematical model incorporates object dynamics, robot dynamics, hydraulic actuator functions and friction dynamics. For the purpose of simulations, a detailed numerical simulation program of such a system is also developed, in which two three-link planar robot manipulators resembling the Magnum hydraulic manipulators manufactured by ISE, interact with each other through manipulating a common object. The regulating control problem is studied next, in which the desired position of the object and the corresponding desired link displacement change step-wise. Initially, a controller is designed based on a backstepping technique, assuming that full knowledge of the dynamics and kinematics of the system is available. The assumption is then relaxed and the control system is analyzed. Based on the analysis, the controller is then modified to account for the uncertainty of the payload, robot dynamic parameters and hydraulic functions. Next, the regulating controller is extended to a tracking controller, which allows the object to follow a given trajectory and is robust against parameter uncertainties. Additionally, an observer is added to the controller to avoid the need of acceleration feedback. To investigate the effect of friction force, the above controllers are examined by introducing the most recent and complete LuGre friction model into the system dynamics. The tracking controller is then redesigned to compensate the effect of friction. Observers are designed to observe the immeasurable friction states. Based on the observed friction states and estimated friction parameters, an appropriate friction compensation scheme is designed which does not directly use velocity in order to avoid the need of acceleration feedback by the controller. Finally, the problem of “explosion of terms” coming from the backstepping method is solved by using the concept of dynamic surface control in which a low pass filter is integrated to avoid model differentiation. Simulations are carried out for analysis of the control system and verification of the developed controllers. Experimental examinations are performed on an available hydraulic system consisting of two single-axis hydraulic actuators.

The products of the Cdx genes, Cdx1, Cdx2 and Cdx4, are known to play essential roles in many developmental processes including neural tube closure, axial elongation and patterning the anterior-posterior axis of the developing embryo. Cdx1 and Cdx2 are both expressed in the endoderm of the embryo and persist throughout adulthood in the intestinal epithelium, but their functions and mechanisms of action in this lineage are poorly understood, in part due to the peri-implantation lethality of Cdx2-/- mice. To circumvent this limitation, a conditional loss of function strategy was used to inactivate Cdx2 in the intestinal epithelium. These conditional mutants were also crossed to Cdx1-/- mice, which are viable and fertile, to examine potential functional compensation between these family members. The major findings of this study are that Cdx2 regulates patterning and differentiation of the small intestinal epithelium, while Cdx1 does not appear to make a contribution to either process. Furthermore, Cdx operates upstream of Notch ligand Delta-like 1 (Dll1) in endoderm and mesoderm derivatives, demonstrating that Cdx function is similar in different lineages. Finally, Cdx2 cannot fulfill the requirement for Cdx1 in regulation of its own promoter in the intestine. This is the first in vivo evidence that these two family members have context-dependent functional specificity. Altogether, this study underscores critical roles and mechanisms of action for Cdx members in the developing intestine and mesoderm.

<p>In this dissertation I study the role of limited commitment in dynamic models. In the first part, I consider firms that face uncertainty shocks in a principal-agent setting but have only limited ability to commit to long-term contracts. Limited commitment firms expedite payments to their managers when uncertainty is high, a finding that helps to explain the puzzling large bonuses observed during the recent financial crisis. In the second part, I examine a dynamic investment model where firms invest in a risky asset but cannot hedge the risk of their investment because they lack the ability to commit to future repayments of debt. Once firms have access to exogenous supply of risk free assets they may, on the aggregate level, invest more in the risky asset because risk free technology allows them to grow richer in equilibrium. This result helps to explain the asset price booms in emerging countries when those countries experience substantial capital outflow.</p> / Dissertation

The National Football League’s salary cap constrains the available resources each franchise is allotted to spend on player personnel. I examine the effects of executive management’s compensation allocation strategies on team performance from 2006 to 2013. The findings suggest that spending more than the league-average on offensive lineman hurts overall team performance. Spending above the league average on both the offensive line and quarterback positions negatively affects offensive performance as well. This supports previous research stating that taking a superstar-approach to cap distribution negatively affects team performance. Furthermore, I find evidence of increased compensation inequality among players under the Collective Bargaining Agreement of 2011 compared to that of 1993.

We study compensation functions for an infinite-to-one factor code $\pi : X \to Y$ where $X$ is a shift of finite type. The $p$-Dini condition is given as a way of measuring the smoothness of a continuous function, with $1$-Dini corresponding to functions with summable variation. Two types of compensation functions are defined in terms of this condition. Given a fully-supported invariant measure $\nu$ on $Y$, we show that the relative equilibrium states of a $1$-Dini function $f$ over $\nu$ are themselves fully supported, and have positive relative entropy. We then show that there exists a compensation function which is $p$-Dini for all $p > 1$ which has relative equilibrium states supported on a finite-to-one subfactor. / Graduate / 0405 / antoniol@uvic.ca

The thesis examines the claims that may be brought against express trustees for pecuniary compensation. It contends that a difference of principle divides this conventional category in two. Some compensation claims complain that the trustee has breached one of his duties and seek to charge him with reparation for whatever ensuing loss has been suffered by the beneficial interests. These claims resemble claims for damages founded upon a tort or breach of contract. Other compensation claims overlook whatever breach there may have been and demand that the trustee account and perform the trusts, in money where this cannot be done in specie. This second type of claim resembles a claim for the specific performance of a contract, bearing in mind that specific performance may be given with compensation where the defendant cannot deliver what he has promised. The claims are cumulative subject to the principle of full satisfaction.