金融海嘯爆發後，突顯了許多經營績效不佳之公司，卻仍支付高薪予其管理階層之問題，使社會大眾開始關注企業肥貓現象。針對此不合理現象，投資大眾期望能透過公司所揭露之資訊，對公司進行監督並瞭解其經營績效與經理人薪酬間是否具合理之關聯性。我國目前對於高階主管薪酬資訊揭露之要求，僅需總額揭露即可，這樣便給予公司有模糊地帶的空間，且對比修法前之條文，台灣之規範是由個別揭露走向總額揭露，就揭露實益來看，其實是讓資訊越發不透明，使投資人無法透過薪酬資訊來分析企業經營狀況，也有違證券交易法保障投資人之意旨，本研究建議台灣之薪酬資訊揭露規範應參酌美國規定，無論是公開發行公司或未公開發行公司，高階主管之薪酬均應改採個別揭露，並增加揭露之獎酬項目，文末並提供揭露之項目表格以供參考，期台灣能再加強資訊揭露之透明度，創造更有保障之投資環境。 / After the outbreak of the financial crisis, it highlights the problem that many poorly performing company still pay high compensation to their managements, and the public began to focus on the phenomenon of corporate fat cats. For this anomaly, the investing public expect to monitor the company through the information disclosed by them, and see whether a reasonable correlation between its operating performance and executive compensation. Taiwan's current regulation for disclosure of executive compensation the only require to disclose the total amount, thus giving the company room for a gray area. Compare to the law before amending, Taiwan’s regulation has changed from individually disclosure to comprehensive disclosure. This change, in fact, makes the information become more nontransparent. Therefore the investor can-not analyze the state of operation through compensation information of the company. Also, this change contrary to intention of the Securities Exchange Act to protect in-vestors. Thus this thesis suggests that the executive compensation disclosure regula-tion of Taiwan shall deliberate US regulations. To disclosure executive compensation individually no matter publicly company or private company, and increase the rewards to expose project. At the end of the text provide a table about executive compensation disclosure for reference, hopes Taiwan to strengthen the transparency of information disclosure and create a more safeguarding investment environment.

This Dissertation consists of two essays. The first essay studies the causal impacts of compensation disclosure on executive compensation, turnover, and executives’ job responsibilities. We find that, after the SEC mandates the disclosure of Chief Financial Officers (CFOs)’ compensation in 2006, CFO pay increases significantly relative to CEO pay, particularly in firms most affected by the mandate. CFOs are more likely to leave their firms following poor performance. The results are absent for the CEO or other executives, suggesting they are unique outcomes of enhanced CFO compensation disclosures. The evidence is consistent with more intense monitoring following the disclosure mandate. CFOs require additional compensation for the loss of private benefits due to greater monitoring and are subject to greater internal discipline. There is also some evidence that the CFOs hide bad news and lower corporate reporting quality after the mandate, suggesting that CFOs engage in more short-term behavior to boost their performance and avoid termination. The second essay of my dissertation focuses on the idiosyncratic volatility puzzle - the negative relation between estimated idiosyncratic volatility and the subsequent month returns documented by Ang et al (2006). We document a systematic pattern of temporary increases in the estimated idiosyncratic volatility for the quintile of stocks with the highest estimated idiosyncratic volatility in a given month. A large portion of this temporary increase in the estimated idiosyncratic volatility is reversed in the subsequent month. This temporary increase in the idiosyncratic volatility for the quintile of stocks with the highest estimated idiosyncratic volatility is associated with relatively large positive returns (positive abnormal returns) in the estimation month and relatively low returns (negative abnormal returns) in the subsequent month. Our evidence shows that these temporary increases in the estimated idiosyncratic volatility and the related positive and negative abnormal returns in the estimation and subsequent months, respectively, create a negative relation between the estimated idiosyncratic volatility and subsequent month returns documented in the prior literature (Ang et al. 2006). We find no significant relation between idiosyncratic volatility and subsequent returns for eighty percent of the stocks that do not exhibit large changes in idiosyncratic volatility despite large differences in the levels of their idiosyncratic volatility. Finally, there is no relation between the estimated idiosyncratic volatility and subsequent returns after a lag of 3 months when the abnormal returns associated with temporary changes are no longer present. Overall, our results are consistent with the notion that there is no relation between the true underlying idiosyncratic volatility and expected returns, and that the previously documented negative relation between estimated idiosyncratic volatility and subsequent month’s returns is being driven by temporary one-month increases in the estimated idiosyncratic volatility and the associated abnormal returns for a subset of stocks. / Ph. D.