Syfte: Syftet med denna uppsats är att utifrån Finansinspektionens nya regelverk om belöningssystem som infördes 2010 se om det har bidragit till en förändring i motivationen hos medarbetarna på Skandinaviska Enskilda Bankens distrikt Stockholm Norr. Metod: Datainsamlingen görs i form av en kvantitativ enkätundersökning med ett utskick till samtliga medarbetare på de utvalda bankkontoren inom distrikt Stockholm Norr på Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken. Teori: De teorier som används i studien är Abraham Maslows behovspyramid, David L Stums performance pyramid och Vrooms förväntningsteori. Slutsats: Motivationen hos medarbetarna på bankkontoren inom distrikt Stockholm Norr har inte förändrats trots en minskning i förmåner genom den nya ersättningspolicyn.

Submitted by William Justo Figueiro (williamjf) on 2015-08-20T17:50:42Z No. of bitstreams: 1 17e.pdf: 4833899 bytes, checksum: bf223781f226b67de43eb30160a4b491 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-08-20T17:50:42Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 17e.pdf: 4833899 bytes, checksum: bf223781f226b67de43eb30160a4b491 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 / Nenhuma / A aplicação de incentivos monetários e não monetários a executivos, com objetivo de obter uma performance empresarial, de curto ou longo prazo, constitui um dos mecanismos de governança corporativa para alinhamento entre os interesses do acionista majoritário e proprietário (principal) e executivos (agentes). Como ajustador deste alinhamento o papel do Conselho de Administração, bem como dos comitês de apoio como de riscos e de remuneração, são fundamentais. Dependendo do ajuste do sistema, poderá haver uma exposição ao risco estratégico em maior ou menor grau. No Brasil, conforme percepção de conselheiros de administração, este mecanismo não é regulado com objetivo de regular a exposição ao risco estratégico e as políticas de incentivo são alinhadas, em geral, no curto prazo, conforme a performance desejada, levando a custos de controle e monitoramento. Além disto, algumas peculiaridades brasileiras leva a necessidade de modelos de incentivo adequados ao Brasil, sendo, os componentes de incentivo usuais na Europa e Estados Unidos, em alguns casos, conflitantes com a legislação trabalhista e fiscal brasileira. / The application of monetary and non monetary incentives to executives in order to obtain a performance business, short or long term, are corporate governance mechanisms for aligning the interests of shareholders, and majority owner (principal) and managers (agents). As this alignment adjusting the role of Board of Directors and committees of support as risk and return are key. Depending on the setting of the system, there may be a strategic risk exposure to greater or lesser degree. In Brazil, as perceptions of board members, this mechanism is not regulated for the purpose of regular exposure to strategic risk and incentive policies are aligned generally in the short term, as the desired performance, leading to control costs and monitoring. Moreover, some peculiarities Brazilian models leads to the need for adequate incentive to Brazil, being the components of incentive usual in Europe and the United States, in some cases, conflicting with the Brazilian labor legislation and tax.

One of the ways how to solve the agency problem is to align the managers and shareholders interests. Such concord can be achieved through an appropriate selection and set-up of remuneration policy for the top managers of companies. This thesis studies the compensation methods of five biggest corporations in each of the G7 countries and then further analyses the outcomes of the research using statistical and descriptive methods. The analysis is done through a comparison of performance of the company and the industry in order to identify if there is a link between the used compensation method and the company s under or over performance. The findings are described and eventual implications are presented at the end of the paper.