Corporate governance, and the role of executive pay in particular, has received increased attention from the media, government, and the business arena in recent years. The study reported in this thesis adds to our understanding of both the components and determinants of Australian remuneration packages for the top management team. It does so in four main ways: 1. The study examines the determinants of compensation of a range of senior executives within the organisation, in addition to the CEO. No Australian research, to date, explores the structure and determinants of remuneration beyond the CEO; 2. The research is conducted in a contemporary setting and timeframe, where corporations are subject to expanded disclosure requirements, when compared to the subjects of prior Australian research; 3. It examines an expanded range of factors documented in overseas research as likely to relate to remuneration, some of which have not been previously examined in Australian work; 4. Finally, in developing hypotheses concerning factors expected to relate to remuneration, the study reconciles the perspectives provided by both agency and managerial power theories in terms of how they present similar and differing propositions. The research examines both cash and incentive components of executive compensation disclosed by a sample of top 300 Australian companies in 2005. The model incorporates measures of firm performance, economic characteristics, board monitoring and governance characteristics, and ownership characteristics in an attempt to explain the level of executive compensation. The study extends analysis beyond the CEO to incorporate an investigation of both the structure and determinants of compensation of the top five executives, in addition to the CEO. Results indicate that the structure of CEO compensation has changed since prior Australian research was conducted, to include a more heavy reliance on incentive pay. In contrast to the US, the structure of CEO remuneration differs from that of non-CEO executives. As managers move progressively up the senior executive hierarchy, short-term cash bonus and share-based incentive pay both become more important as components of remuneration. There is also a greater reliance on performance hurdles than has been documented in prior Australian and international research. The expectation that remuneration is now more strongly tied to firm performance is supported. The size and complexity of the firm are also considered to be important in determining the level of various components of both CEO and non-CEO executive compensation. This supports the view that larger, more complex entities attract higher quality executives, and pay for such quality and expertise. Growth firms are more likely to pay higher levels of incentive pay and total compensation to CEOs than non-growth firms. Executive remuneration also relates to the strength of various monitoring and governance mechanisms, although to a greater extent for CEOs than for other senior executives. Managers are able to influence the remuneration-setting process where governance structures are weak, or where they have greater influence. In some cases factors relating to CEO compensation differ from those associated with compensation of lower-level executives.

"September 2003" / Bibliography: leaves 230-257. / ix, 257 leaves ; 30 cm. / Title page, contents and abstract only. The complete thesis in print form is available from the University Library. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Adelaide, Dept. of Social Inquiry, 2003

<p>A model is developed for the Quanser torsion system available at Control Systems Research Laboratory at Chulalongkorn University. The torsion system is a laboratory equipment that is designed for the study of position control. It consists of a DC motor that drives three inertial loads that are coupled in series with the motor, and where all components are coupled to each other through torsional springs.</p><p>Several nonlinearities are observed and the most significant one is an offset in the input signal, which is compensated for. Experiments are carried out under feedback as the system is marginally stable. Different input signals are tested and used for system identification. Linear black-box state-space models are then identified using PEM, N4SID and a subspace method made for closed-loop identification, where the last two are the most successful ones. PEM is used in a second step and successfully enhances the parameter estimates from the other algorithms.</p>

Firms obtain new technology either through internal R&D or through acquisitions. These two approaches are usually labeled as "make" and "buy" strategies. In this paper, I examine the relation between a firm's choice of "make" or "buy" and the performance measures used in the firm's CEO compensation contract. I focus on the two major differences between "make" and "buy" strategies: the risk levels and accounting treatments. I then examine the differential implications of accounting-based and stock-based performance measures on managers' incentive in choosing between the two strategies. Using data from US high tech industries, I find that, firms relying on "buy" approach to obtain technology tend to depend more on the accounting-based performance measures, while those firms who innovate through R&D activities skew toward stock-based pay especially stock options

The ability to distribute signals everywhere in a circuit with controlled and known delays is essential in large, high-speed digital systems. We present a technique by which a signal driver can adjust the arrival time of the signal at the end of the wire using a pair of matched variable delay lines. We show an implemention of this idea requiring no extra wiring, and how it can be extended to distribute signals skew-free to receivers along the signal run. We demonstrate how this scheme fits into the boundary scan logic of a VLSI chip.

This study is about the relationships among compensation satisfaction, job satisfaction, organizational commitment and turnover intention. The major purpose of this research is to use two mental factors of job satisfaction and organizational commitment for examining the existence of mediation effects in between compensation satisfaction and turnover intention. Therefore, using compensation satisfaction as independent variables, job satisfaction and organizational commitment as mediator variable, and turnover intention as dependent variable to probe into the relation among the compensation satisfaction, job satisfaction, organizational commitment and turnover intention. This research was using the method of questionnaire survey together with various kind of statistic analysis. Analysis on 928 workers shows: 1. Compensation satisfaction, job satisfaction and organizational commitment reveals outstanding positive relation. 2. Compensation satisfaction, job satisfaction, organizational commitment and turnover intention reveals outstanding negative relation. 3. Two mental factors of job satisfaction and organizational commitment, have mediating effects between compensation satisfaction and turnover intention. According to the results of research, provides business managers when they try to manage and prevent employees¡¦ turnover, the can increase employees¡¦ compensation satisfaction, job satisfaction and organization commitment to decrease employees¡¦ turnover intention, and turnover behavior will reduce.

Sexual differentiation is a fundamental characteristic of all eukaryotes, dictating sex-specific morphology, physiology and behavior. Diploid organisms with heteromorphic sex chromosomes (XX or XY) require regulatory compensation of the X chromosome to maintain correct levels of genetic expression between the sexes, a process termed sex-specific dosage compensation (SSDC). The fruit fly, <i>Drosophila melanogaster</i> dosage compensates by upregulating transcription of most X-linked genes two-fold. Associated with this two-fold up regulation is the male-specific lethal (MSL) complex, a RNA-protein complex comprised of at least five known proteins; MSL1, MSL2, MSL3, males absent on the first (MOF), and maleless (MLE) and two non-translated RNA molecules; roX1 (RNA on the X chromosome) and roX2. The complex modulates the chromatin structure of the male X chromosome via acetylation of H4K16. MOF and MSL3 both exhibit an N-terminal chromodomain, whose function is unclear. The MSL3 chromodomain has been suggested to bind H3K36Me3. Chromodomains are a paradigm of how a single structural fold has evolved in diverse proteins to bind distinct targets. Chromodomains are common to nuclear regulators, and bind diverse targets including histones, DNA, and RNA. They function as recognition motifs of histone post-translational modifications and facilitate the translation of the histone code into a distinct local chromatin structure via recruiting the appropriate chromatin modulating machinery.<p> The goal of this research is to determine the structure of the <i>D. melanogaster</i> MOF and MSL3 chromodomains by X-ray crystallographic and/or nuclear magnetic resonance techniques, to advance our understanding of the structural characteristics of these diverse domains. Here we report the cloning and reproducible expression and purification of the <i>D. melanogaster</i> MOF and MSL3 chromodomains and their Homo sapiens orthologues. The <i>D. melanogaster</i> MOF chromodomain, whose NMR structure was published during this research, has been crystallized. Attempts to solve the crystal structure by molecular replacement, multiple-wavelength anomalous dispersion, and single-wavelength isomorphous replacement are reported.

This study investigates the relationships among corporate governance mechanism, firm performance, and executive compensation within Chinese publicly listed firms. The corporate governance structure in China is a unique combination of the Anglo-American model and the German system by including a board of director and a supervisory board simultaneously, and has two monitoring organs, independent directors and supervisory board, co-existing. One of the special features of the Chinese publicly listed firms is their close relationship with the government because most of them were converted from state-owned enterprises at the beginning of the market-oriented economic reform in China. Therefore, we attempt to explore the effects of political connections of their ultimate controllers on corporate governance mechanism, on firm performance, and on executive compensation in China. Our findings indicate a dysfunctional corporate governance system in China, which cannot bring improved firm performance but grant executives high compensations. While we take into consideration the political connections, our results show that they deteriorate corporate governance mechanism, but do not result in inferior firm performance. Robustness tests demonstrate a non-linear effect of corporate governance on executive compensation, jointly depending on the status of a firms political connection and its ownership structure.

Agency theory, proposed by previous studies such as Guidry, Leone, and Rock (1999) and Arya and Huey-Lian (2004), suggests that bonus and other accounting-metric-based compensation can motivate managers to perform well in the short horizon while equity-based compensation, such as restricted shares and stock options, can serve the purpose of aligning the long run interests of shareholders and managers. The empirical evidence, for example Jensen and Murphy (1990), Kaplan (1994), Hall and Liebman (1998), Murphy (1999), Zhou (2000), and Chowdhury and Wang (2009), confirms that incentive compensation is popular in many countries. However, recent studies suggest that the relation between performance and incentive compensation is weak. Shaw and Zhang (2010) find that CEO bonus compensation is less sensitive to poor earnings performance than it is to good earnings performance. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) study the relation between bank performance during the 2008 bank crisis and the bonus and equity-based compensation of bank CEOs. They find that banks with CEOs whose incentives were better aligned with the interests of shareholders performed worse than other banks. This study examines whether ownership structure can explain the differences among compensation structures of chief executive officers (CEOs). In particular, we examine the compensation structure of three distinct groups: family-controlled, institution-controlled, and widely-held firms. We distinguish these three kinds of firms to represent different levels of market imperfection. Compared with family-controlled and institution-controlled firms, widely held firms have dispersed ownership. The most significant weakness of a widely-held ownership structure is the lack of shareholder monitoring due to the unmatched benefit and cost of monitoring for small shareholders. In contrast, a holder of a large block of shares will have the same monitoring costs but the benefits to this shareholder from monitoring management and reducing agency costs would be substantial and larger than the costs of monitoring. Thus the presence of a large shareholder will reduce the agency costs. In addition, large shareholders may be willing to spend time and effort continuously to collect more information on management performance or to estimate the firms investment projects. This behaviour will reduce the problems that arise from information asymmetry and will decrease the waste of free cash flows by managers. Both family-controlled firms and institution-controlled firms have large shareholders. However, whether or not the control shareholders are playing an active monitoring role is still an important issue. From the viewpoint of aligning the interests of managers and shareholders, the family-controlled group is superior to the institution-controlled group. First, institutions are more flexible in moving their ownership from one firm to another depending on performance. If the costs of monitoring are high in comparison to the costs of rebalancing portfolios, institutions will choose to rebalance instead of monitoring. In contrast, a family that controls a firm does not have this flexibility. Second, family-controlled firms generally assign influential positions to family members whose focus is in line with that of the family group. Even though a non family member may be appointed as the manager, the level of monitoring is significant given the high ownership concentration by the family. However, the level of monitoring by a family may not necessarily translate into a reduction of agency costs for minority shareholders. Indeed, previous studies suggest that significant family ownership may lead to agency costs of its own. The family may divert company resources for its own benefit despite the presence of a manager who may or may not be a family member. Essentially, the family and the manager can collude to spend on perks and personal benefits at the expense of minority shareholders. Chourou (2010) suggests that excessive compensation of chief executive officers at some family owned Canadian corporations may be viewed as expropriation of minority rights. Overall, the main objective of this study is to examine whether block-holder monitoring is a substitute to the incentive components of compensation. We propose that as we move from widely-held to institution-controlled the level of monitoring may or may not increase. However, as we move further into higher control, as may be suggested by family ownership, the level of monitoring will increase but this monitoring may not necessarily reduce agency costs. The results show that the institution-controlled firms pay significantly less bonus compensation per dollar of assets than widely-held firms but the differences in equity based compensation are not significant. In addition, the family-controlled corporations offer the lowest performance-based compensation, bonus per dollar of assets, in comparison to the institution-controlled and the widely-held groups. These results indicate that the family-controlled Canadian corporations rely more on monitoring managers than paying them incentive payments in the form of bonus payments. In addition, our results indicate that the institutions which control corporations may be monitoring the managers of these corporations but this monitoring does not significantly reduce the need for the long-term incentive components of compensation. This result suggests that institutions may monitor the short-term performance effectively but they may prefer rebalancing their portfolio rather than monitoring long term performance.

In the first chapter, I study a recent and important innovation, the shift towards independent compensation consultants that provide advice only to boards. I construct a theoretical model to conceptualize the potential impact of independent consultants and then develop an empirical strategy to quantify the impact. One contribution of the paper is to provide strong identification of the impact of independent advice, something that has been challenged by the lack of appropriate data. I use a unique sample of Canadian firms which allows me to directly measure the impact of non-compensation related consulting fees on compensation advice. I conduct a number of empirical experiments but the main tests exploit a "quasi-natural experiment" provided by the creation of an independent consultant, Hugessen Consulting, as a spin-off from Mercer. I show that switching from an a ffiliated consultant to an independent consultant is associated with an increase in managerial incentives. Despite the benefits of independent advice, independent consultants may not be hired due to higher fees, the influence of powerful CEOs, or because boards already possess adequate expertise. In the second chapter, using a simple model of incentive contracting as a guide, I examine empirically whether some aspects of executive stock option backdating may be an optimal response of firms to distortions in the institutional environment, in particular tax law and accounting rules. Some of the findings suggest that firms may attempt to effi ciently lower the exercise price of the executive options in order to enhance managerial incentives for risk averse and poorly diversified executives. In the presence of restrictive accounting and tax rules, backdating may be a mechanism by which to achieve this objective of better incentives. Consistent with this explanation I find that backdating is associated with lower CEO pay levels but higher CEO incentives. In the final chapter, I use a dynamic structural model to show that on average firms excessively smooth their payout while maintaining larger than optimal levels of cash (excess cash) on their balance sheets. I provide an agency explanation for the positive correlation between dividend smoothing and cash savings. I show that the dynamic effect of managerial perceived cost to cutting payout results in accumulation of excess cash and distortion of shareholder value.