Past research has revealed that both people’s beliefs and situational factors affected people’s goal orientation. This study investigated the interactive effects of competition and theories of intelligence on people’s goal orientation. A 2x2 between-subject factorial design was adopted. Seventh graders (N = 132) were primed with either incremental or entity theory of memory. The students were randomly assigned to either competitive or non-competitive condition. Motivational outcomes were measured after all the four groups received failure feedback. Findings showed that the effect of competition marginally overrode the effect of theories of intelligence in the entity condition. There were no statistical significant changes in self-efficacy and interest on the task before and after the setback in the groups. / published_or_final_version / Educational Psychology / Master / Master of Social Sciences

This thesis consists of two essays on the impacts product market competition has on the real investment efficiency of firms. While the first essay looks at this question through the corporate governance angle and finds product market competition complements institutional investors in disciplining firms, the latter one studies the impacts from an information production point of view and concludes competition reduces the incentive of firms to acquire information thereby reduces investment efficiency. Using product market competition as a proxy for external corporate governance, the first essay documents a sizeable difference between the governance impact of institutional investors on firms with strong and weak external corporate governance. Higher institutional ownership is associated with real efficiency of firms, but only when external corporate governance is strong. The real efficiency is reflected in higher investment sensitivity to investment opportunities and higher firm value. Utilizing the passing of business combination laws as a negative shock to external corporate governance, the essay identifies that firms with higher institutional ownership suffer a larger decrease in real efficiency, suggesting external corporate governance such as product market competition is critical for institutional investors in disciplining firms. The second essay attempts to figure out the impact of product market competition from an ex ante point of view. Specifically, how does product market competition change the incentive of firms to acquire information about investment opportunities ex ante? The essay provides both a model and a series of extensive empirical tests. The model features a two-stage Bayesian game in differentiated products market competition. This essay finds that competition causes firms to acquire less information and that investment becomes more inefficient in competitive industries. Empirically investment efficiency is measured by a latent variable technique and related to competition using a Herfindahl-Hirschman index as well as more exogenous measure such as trade costs. The panel regression analysis provides strong support for the theory and shows that investment is more efficient in concentrated industries. / published_or_final_version / Economics and Finance / Doctoral / Doctor of Philosophy

M.Tech. Business Administration. Business School. / The purpose of the study is to investigate the needs, awareness and implementation of competitive intelligence and the role competitive intelligence plays in the formulation of marketing strategy by South African companies. There is a need for competitive intelligence programmes, with high awareness at senior management level but needs to be filtered down to all employees. The study does offer some insight into current competitive intelligence practices by South African companies in terms of competitive intelligence with particular reference to the sources of competitive intelligence, the types of information gathered and analysis tools used by South African companies.

An overcrowding problem of nyala, and lately also of impala in the Ndumo Game Reserve, South Africa, has been detrimental to other species and vegetation structures over a period of two decades. In the present study a deterministic model for three competing species (where two species tend to be overpopulated while the third faces probable localized extinction) is constructed, while future trends coupled with their coexistence are projected. On a mathematical basis, we seek reasons for the failure of the cropping strategies implemented by management over the last two decades, and suggest alternative, scientifical-based approaches to the calculation of cropping quotas to ensure the future coexistence of all three species. A system of three first-order nonlinear differential equations is used, with parameter values based on field data and opinions of specialist ecologists. The effect of various cropping strategies, and the introduction of a fourth species (man as a predator) to the system, is investigated mathematically. This model was implemented as a harvesting strategy in 2002, and is being continuously tested. Final assessment can only be done over a 10–15-year period, but so far indications are promising.

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The relationships between competition, innovation, and regulation have long been studied in an attempt to understand and evaluate the effect of regulation on the wealth and growth of nations. Recent empirical work has emerged taking advantage of the still ongoing proliferation of ever more disaggregated data to shed more light on these relationships and at the same time uncover new puzzles in need of explanations. This thesis is an attempt to address the discrepancies between some of these newly discovered phenomena and current theory. In Chapter 1 I introduce an insight of Friedrich Hayek - that competition allows a thousand flowers to bloom, and discovers the best among them - into a conventional model of Schumpeterian innovation. I show how the model can account for two seemingly contradictory empirical phenomena, a positive relationship between competition and industry-level productivity growth, and an inverted-U relationship between competition and firm-level innovation. In Chapter 2 I extend the model to investigate the effects of patent protection on competition and innovation, and to understand the interaction between patent policy and product-market regulation. I calibrate the model to show that patent protection in the U.S. is depressing competition, innovation, growth, and welfare. Using patent and citation data, I further provide empirical evidence supporting the implications of the model. In Chapter 3 I investigate the impact of regulatory entry barriers to new firms on aggregate output and total factor productivity. Following recent work by Thomas J. Holmes and John J. Stevens, I extend a standard model of monopolistic competition to account for the existence of both niche markets and mass markets within industries. Calibrating the model using U.S. manufacturing data, I show this extension goes a long way towards explaining the large gap between empirical estimates of the impact of barriers to entry and the quantitative predictions of current models.

The relationships between competition, innovation, and regulation have long been studied in an attempt to understand and evaluate the effect of regulation on the wealth and growth of nations. Recent empirical work has emerged taking advantage of the still ongoing proliferation of ever more disaggregated data to shed more light on these relationships and at the same time uncover new puzzles in need of explanations. This thesis is an attempt to address the discrepancies between some of these newly discovered phenomena and current theory. In Chapter 1 I introduce an insight of Friedrich Hayek - that competition allows a thousand flowers to bloom, and discovers the best among them - into a conventional model of Schumpeterian innovation. I show how the model can account for two seemingly contradictory empirical phenomena, a positive relationship between competition and industry-level productivity growth, and an inverted-U relationship between competition and firm-level innovation. In Chapter 2 I extend the model to investigate the effects of patent protection on competition and innovation, and to understand the interaction between patent policy and product-market regulation. I calibrate the model to show that patent protection in the U.S. is depressing competition, innovation, growth, and welfare. Using patent and citation data, I further provide empirical evidence supporting the implications of the model. In Chapter 3 I investigate the impact of regulatory entry barriers to new firms on aggregate output and total factor productivity. Following recent work by Thomas J. Holmes and John J. Stevens, I extend a standard model of monopolistic competition to account for the existence of both niche markets and mass markets within industries. Calibrating the model using U.S. manufacturing data, I show this extension goes a long way towards explaining the large gap between empirical estimates of the impact of barriers to entry and the quantitative predictions of current models.

In this thesis we investigate important issues in the area of dynamic pricing for revenue management. Studying the effect of competition and strategic consumer behavior, we characterize the dynamic pricing policies for retailers who sell homogeneous goods in multi-period, discrete time, finite horizon settings. In the first essay an impatient consumer visits only one of two competing retailers in each period. If he does not purchase the good, he visits the competing retailer in the ensuing period. Compared to the corresponding single store monopoly, when the consumer’s valuation is uniformly distributed, prices decline exponentially rather than linearly, with a dramatically lower initial price, and a substantially lower system profit. The model is extended to accommodate many consumers, who may be either identical or similar, a more general valuation distribution, and situations wherein capacities are limited. The base case of a centralized two-store monopoly is also examined. In the second essay the consumer may return to the same retailer with some certain probability. This probability is either affected by market structure characteristics, or it may depend on the consumer’s experience at the last store visited. The robustness of the exponential decline of prices is reinforced. It occurs even when a strong retailer faces competition from a relatively much weaker retailer. We investigate the impact of the return probabilities on prices, profits, and consumer surplus. The model is extended to an oligopoly, and to situations with many similar consumers. The effect of strategic consumer behavior on prices and profits is revealed in the third essay. Characterizing the pricing policies arising in a two-period monopoly and duopoly settings, we find that strategic consumer behavior inflicts larger losses to a duopoly than to a monopoly. A lower strategic consumers’ discounting factor, which is beneficial to a monopoly, may be harmful to a duopoly. Ignoring strategic consumer behaviour is costly to a monopoly, but may, on the other hand, be beneficial to a duopoly. An extension to three periods is studied, and with longer horizons the model is analyzed for the case when all the consumers are strategic.

Transition dairy cows are vulnerable to negative consequences of depressed feed intake due to a transient state of negative energy balance that predisposes them to disease after calving. Competition has been identified as one factor that can decrease feeding activity in mid-lactation cows, but the effects of competition on the transition cow are less well understood. The objective of this study was to test the effect of a competition on the behaviour and feed intake of transition cows. Standing behaviour, feeding behaviour and dry matter intake (DMI) was monitored from 1 wk before to 2 wk after calving for 110 Holstein dairy cows. Social behaviour was recorded in the week before calving. Cows were assigned to a competitive (2:1 cows:bin) or non-competitive (1:1 cow:bin) treatment at the start of the study. Treatment groups were balanced for parity and baseline feeding data, resulting in 8 primiparous and 10 multiparous cows per treatment. Competition dramatically increased the number of agonistic behaviours between cows at the feeder. Primiparous cows showed no change in either feeding or standing behaviour when fed in a competitive environment; however, they increased their total meal duration and within-meal intervals in the wk -1 before and wk +1 after calving. In wk -1 before calving, competitively fed multiparous cows increased the frequency of visits to the feeder but consumed less feed at each visit, resulting in decreased daily DMI. Throughout the experiment, multiparous cows fed competitively spent less time eating at each visit and ate at a faster rate, particularly during the 2 wk after calving. Multiparous cows on the competitive treatment also increased the time they spent standing (without eating) compared to cows on the non-competitive treatment. Feeding rate was negatively correlated with social status in multiparous cows. In summary, the results of this study indicate that restricting access to the feeder increases agonistic behaviours regardless of parity, and cows of different parity and social status respond differently in terms of feeding and standing behaviour.