Graduation date: 1992

In this thesis we study the problem of how to effectively manage and operate a market that attracts trading agents to compete for resources in it. In order to attract more agents to the market, the market needs to have incentive policies. We are particularly interested in the research of the incentive matching policy. We propose a new matching policy with loyalty incentive features. In order to cooperate and improve its performance, we also propose a new accepting policy to work with the matching policy. We use the CAT platform as our test-bed. We describe all the policies and techniques used in the CAT competition in detail. In addition we carry out experiments which further support our proposal.

Two firms with innovative technology are potential licensors in the industry. In addition, there is a potential licensee which only possesses aged technology. When the two potential licensors have exactly the same technology, they will cut the license fee to zero due to severe competition no matter whether the fee is in the format of fixed payments or royalties. When one potential licensor possesses the technology far advanced than the technology the other potential licensor has, those two firms with less advanced technology will ask for technology licensing and pay the license fee in the format of fixed payment.

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Resource similarity and market commonality are receiving increased attention in the strategic management literature. In this thesis, I attempt to explore how the firm¡¦s characteristics and the resource similarity between two firms affect the tendency of firm¡¦s action. And follow this with a discussion of the necessity to put the resource similarity into consideration when we analyze the firm¡¦s action tendency from the aspect of market commonality. The thesis focuses on the competitive interaction in Taiwan domestic automobile industry between 1991 and 1996. In the concluding section, I explore the implication of each hypothesis under the empirical evidences.

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­^¤åºK­n I/O, resource-based theory ,or strategic group are usually used for analyzing the competition in industries in the past., but they seldom show the tiny reciprocal interaction between companies. So this research use case study to demonstrate the rivalry between companies in an industry. This research take TV-game machine companies as research targets. The scope starts from Nintendo entering this industry in 1983 to SEGA leaving this industry in 2001. Because the relative researches for TV-game machine were quite few, therefore this research starts from the information gathering about this industry, that trying to mention the outline and nature of TV-game machine industry. Then analyze this industry by rivalry theory. At last, according to the theories and the real competition between companies, this research infers the propositions and findings. The findings are: The TV-game machine industry is greatly influenced by three components; they are the TV-game machine companies, software companies, and consumers. Thanks to that the software companies have to give money to the TV-game machine companies, so TV-game machine companies profit from not only the consumers, but also the software companies. And the willing for consumers to buy a TV-game machine is affected by the function of the machine itself and the amount of games issued by the software companies. From the history of the TV-game machine, this research finds the issue of TV-game machines has the phenomenon of discontinuous invention. From 8 digital, 16 digital, 32 digital, 64 digital, to 128 digital, companies penetrate market by issuing more powerful TV-game machines. Though this discontinuous invention has the effect to raise the rank of companies, but due to the difference of specification between the new type and the old one, the new generation is not able to play the software for the old one. The environmental factors faced by the TV-game machine companies are: 1.The difference of machines between each company is not specific; 2.The entry barrier for TV-game machine industry is high; 3.The amount of sells is affected by time and software; 4.The market uncertainty often rises for the sake of low supply; 5.The market commonality is high. This research has the following findings: 1.To compare with common condition, when the life of products goes into the decline period, the monopolizing companies may take price competition as the means to increase the selling of products. 2.In monopolizing industry, companies seldom attack. But if some company takes tactic attack action, other companies will response quickly. 3.The companies will think over the reputation of other competitors in the industry before attacking, if the competitors had the records of responding strongly after being attacked, the companies may not attack; 4.In fast-cycled industry, if the companies issue new products in a hurry, the advantage of first mover is not obvious; 5.When companies don¡¦t have enough resource to take strategic action, they may take tactic action as substitute; 6.In fast-cycled industry, when companies involved in have immense scale, they can ask their suppliers to produce specific products just for them via their strong negotiation power; 7.To the contrast of initial period of industry, the entry barrier is higher in the mature period. When industry gets mature gradually, the firms have to issue specific products which have not only good quality to satisfy spoiled consumers. When industry gets into mature period, firms will take action to raise their market share.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2000. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 86-88). Available also in a digital version from Dissertation Abstracts.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Rutgers University, 2009. / "Graduate Program in Economics." Includes bibliographical references (p. 96-99).

This dissertation presents research on issues of competition and market structure in economics, and in particular considers the role of asymmetric information in firm competition. This includes asymmetric information among firms, between firms and regulators and between consumers and firms. In the course of this I adapt and expand on recently developed methods for solving, estimating and simulating dynamic models of firm behavior. Finally, this dissertation focuses attention on firms' motivations for and the consequences of horizontal expansion, both in the form of horizontal mergers in a differentiated goods market and in the form of horizontal chain affiliation. This research proceeds in three steps. In Chapter 2 I explore and document consumers growing ability to use new online reputation mechanisms to both share their experiences with a wide variety of firms and gain information from other consumers' shared experiences. In Chapter 3 I present a theoretical model of horizontal mergers in a dynamic industry setting. I use this model to answer a question that increasingly interests antitrust policymakers concerned with innovation: In a concentrated industry, does allowing rival firms to merge increase or decrease total investment? This model has two important features. First, the environment is fully dynamic, and second, I allow mergers to occur endogenously. In Chapter 4, I combine many of the concepts from Chapters 2 and 3 into on piece of research to address the question: why do firms organize into chains? I use of combination of reduced form and structural dynamic methods to examine possible answers to this question in the context of the hotel industry. In particular, I take advantage of recent advances in estimating dynamic industry models to show that there is no evidence in favor of the traditional explanation for horizontal expansion, economies of scale or cost efficiencies. Instead, using a detailed examination of hotel revenue along with firm and market data, I show that chain firms have a substantial demand side advantage resulting from the fact that consumers frequently have little information on firm quality. In this industry, then, asymmetric information seems to not only matter for chain affiliation, it is the only factor that matters. / text