This dissertation studies the competitive dynamics between two non-identical providers competing for customers seeking low-cost and quick service. Providers have generic delay functions where, asdemand received by each provider grows, so does delay in processing customers' requests. Given a pricing or capacity decision by each provider, customers determine the proportion of demand to send to each provider by minimizing generalized cost (monetary cost plus delaycost). This problem is formulated as a bilevel optimization, with providers competing at the upper level subject to the customers' decisions at the lower level. Occurrence of Nash equilibria between the providers is studied.First studied is the providers' problem of making decisions on capacities, while competing for a single customer. Conditions are derived for one provider to claim the entire market share, and for the occurrence of an equilibrium where both providers receive positivedemand. A numerical example in which no equilibrium exists is presented. Both the inelastic and elastic demand cases are studied for this scenario. In a second model, providers make pricing decisions with capacity fixed. Under some assumptions, it is shownthat a Nash equilibrium between providers always exists and a numerical example is presented. These models are then combined, in which providers make capacity decisions where prices equilibrate based on the results from the second model.Two competing customers with demand for a homogeneous product are then introduced, where providers choose prices as they compete for customers. This model is extended to an application along a highway corridor with a high-occupancy/toll (HOT) lane in parallel with a free road and transit line. A government agency chooses the transit service frequency while a private toll operator competes by choosing a toll to charge single-occupancy vehicles who wish to use the HOT lane.This scenario is also modeled as a bilevel program. For the lower level, a new dynamic equilibration process where homogeneous users make mode choice decisions based on previous generalized costs ofusing a particular mode is developed. Two numerical examples are presented showing a unique Nash equilibrium between the providers and an example in which multiple equilibria exist.

During the last decades, it has been brought to light that well organized logistics processes have contributed to competitive advantages for companies. Mio AB, a chain store warehouse and the second largest furniture company in Sweden, is operating in the middle of an expansion phase with growing revenue. As a consequence, larger volumes of goods are handled, space utilization become more scarce and the everyday operations within the internal logistics are affected. Therefore, the processes within the warehouse department were measured by performing a frequency study, registering how time was distributed between the different work tasks. In order to fully understand the processes, interviews were held with management and personnel. After analyzing previous research that could help guide to ease the impositions and analyzing the result of the frequency study, wastes were identified and new ways of working were suggested. The result firstly presents how to organize internal logistics operations in chain store warehouses to gain competitive advantage. Secondly, keeping in mind that firefighting stressed situations usually is not sustainable and only eases loads temporarily, long-term sustainability and ethics were addressed. Concluding that in order to optimize internal logistics operations in chain store warehouses and gain a long-term competitive advantage in a sustainable way, are achieved through standardizing work tasks, ensuring commitment of management and personnel and applying systems to serve the people and processes. Lastly it is advised to keep in mind the impact a company have on its surroundings and the importance of engaging in sustainable and ethically friendly operations, in order to achieve long-term competitive logistics.