Thesis (D.Phil (Social Work))--University of Pretoria, 2005. / Includes abstract in English and Afrikaans. Includes bibliographical references.

The rule excluding evidence of opinion is traditionally stated in broad and general terms, subject to a more or less closed list of exemptions. Stephen says that a witness’s opinion is “deemed to be irrelevant”. A witness may depose to the facts which he has observed, but he may not ordinarily state any inferences which he has drawn from those facts, or opinions founded upon facts of which he has no personal knowledge. The general rule is that the evidence of opinion or belief of a witness is irrelevant because it is the function of a court to draw inferences and form its opinion from the facts; the witnesses give evidence as to the facts and the court forms its opinion from those facts. The opinion of an expert is admissible if it is relevant. It will be relevant if the witness’s skill, training or experience enables him materially to assist the court on matters in which the court itself does not usually have the necessary knowledge to decide. Where the topic is such that an ordinary judicial officer could be expected to be able, unassisted, to draw an inference, expert evidence is superfluous. In principle, there is no rule that a witness cannot give his opinion on an issue that the court has to decide ultimately. It is not experts alone who may give their opinions on ultimate issues but, in practice, there is a strong tendency to regard the evidence of lay persons on ultimate issues as constituting prima facie evidence only. If such lay testimony remains unchallenged, it may be of greater significance. It is generally true that relevant evidence is admissible and irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. At this stage the following question may be posed: is the opinion of any witness – whether from an expert or lay person – admissible evidence? Should an opinion be admitted for purposes of persuading the court to rely on it in deciding the issue at hand? The basic answer is that relevance remains the fundamental test for admissibility. Certain issues simply cannot be decided without expert guidance. Expert opinion evidence is therefore readily received on issues relating to ballistics, engineering, chemistry, medicine, accounting and psychiatry, to mention only a few examples. The problem which arises is this: what is the best way of cross-examining the expert witness? Although the concept of skilful cross-examination conjures up the image of the crossexaminer destroying the expert witness in the witness box, total annihilation of expert evidence in court occurs only rarely. In reality, lawyers who are expected to cross-examine experts are often at a disadvantage in that they do not possess sufficient in-depth knowledge of the specific field of expertise to enable them to cross-examine the witness. Despite the expert nature of the evidence, it is suggested that the true basis of crossexamination should not be abandoned when dealing with experts. The effectiveness of crossexamination is enhanced by keeping the number of questions to a minimum as well as opening and concluding with good strong points. At the outset it should be mentioned that there is a distinction between matters of scientific fact and matters of mere opinion. On matters of scientific fact experts seldom differ but within the province of opinion one encounters difficulties. Lengthy cross-examination concerning expert’s theoretical knowledge is usually inefficient and should rarely be attempted. Cross-examination should be directed at pure logic or scientific analysis. The cross-examiner should always have relevant authority with him in court so as to confront the expert with these. The whole effect of the testimony of an expert witness can also be destroyed by putting the witness to test at the trial as to his qualifications, his experience and his ability and discriminations as an expert. A failure to meet this test renders his evidence nugatory.

Thesis (M.S.)--Florida State University, 2004. / Advisor: Dr. Michael K. Kauner, Florida State University, College of Social Sciences, Program in Russian and Eastern European Studies. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed Jan, 27, 2005). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Florida, 1981. / Description based on print version record. Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 137-142).

Thesis (D.Phil (Social Work))--University of Pretoria, 2005. / Includes abstract in English and Afrikaans. Includes bibliographical references.

The Crimes Act 1961 and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 provide that a person accused of a criminal offence in New Zealand has the right to be represented at trial by counsel. The purpose of representation by counsel is to protect the accused�s interests; ensure that the accused is able to present their defence to the Court; ensure that the accused receives a fair trial; and ensure that the accused is not the subject of a miscarriage of justice. It is implicit that criminal defence counsel must be competent if they are to be effective advocates on behalf of their clients. If counsel is not competent, there is a risk that counsel�s acts or omissions may cause or contribute to a miscarriage of justice. The Crimes Act 1961 allows an accused to appeal against their conviction on the basis that they have been the subject of a miscarriage of justice through the conduct of their counsel. The thesis analyses the Supreme Court decision of R v Sungsuwan that sets out the test that an appellate court must consider when deciding to allow an appeal based on the conduct of counsel. The thesis examines 239 Court of Appeal decisions between 1996 and 2007 that have considered appeals from jury trials where at least one of the grounds of appeal was that defence counsel caused or contributed to a miscarriage of justice. The thesis notes the increasing trend to use "conduct of counsel" as a ground of appeal. In 1996 there were 4 appeals; in 2006 there were 43 such appeals and in 2007 there were 29 appeals. During the period under review the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and specifically held that counsel�s conduct, either alone or in combination with other grounds, caused or contributed to a miscarriage of justice in 41 cases. The thesis analyses the common complaints made by an accused against trial counsel and the common areas where the Court of Appeal upheld complaints against counsel. The thesis takes into account the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 and the Lawyers and Conveyancers (Lawyer: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008 that came into existence on 1 August 2008. The new legislation places particular emphasis on the obligations of counsel to uphold the rule of law and to facilitate the administration of justice in New Zealand. Counsel also has an obligation to protect the interests of their clients. The thesis concludes that the plethora of cases coming before the Court of Appeal, and the number of appeals allowed by the Court, demonstrate defence counsel do not always protect the interests of their clients and can cause or contribute to a miscarriage of justice. The thesis makes a number of recommendations that may reduce the risk of both an accused appealing on the basis on the conduct of counsel and an appeal being allowed on the basis of the conduct of counsel. In particular, it is suggested that there should be greater degree of co-operation between the New Zealand Law Society and the Legal Services Agency to ensure the maintenance of high standards among criminal defence lawyers.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of California, San Diego, 2009. / Title from first page of PDF file (viewed October 13, 2009). Available via ProQuest Digital Dissertations. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (p. 375-400).

The Crimes Act 1961 and the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 provide that a person accused of a criminal offence in New Zealand has the right to be represented at trial by counsel. The purpose of representation by counsel is to protect the accused�s interests; ensure that the accused is able to present their defence to the Court; ensure that the accused receives a fair trial; and ensure that the accused is not the subject of a miscarriage of justice. It is implicit that criminal defence counsel must be competent if they are to be effective advocates on behalf of their clients. If counsel is not competent, there is a risk that counsel�s acts or omissions may cause or contribute to a miscarriage of justice. The Crimes Act 1961 allows an accused to appeal against their conviction on the basis that they have been the subject of a miscarriage of justice through the conduct of their counsel. The thesis analyses the Supreme Court decision of R v Sungsuwan that sets out the test that an appellate court must consider when deciding to allow an appeal based on the conduct of counsel. The thesis examines 239 Court of Appeal decisions between 1996 and 2007 that have considered appeals from jury trials where at least one of the grounds of appeal was that defence counsel caused or contributed to a miscarriage of justice. The thesis notes the increasing trend to use "conduct of counsel" as a ground of appeal. In 1996 there were 4 appeals; in 2006 there were 43 such appeals and in 2007 there were 29 appeals. During the period under review the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and specifically held that counsel�s conduct, either alone or in combination with other grounds, caused or contributed to a miscarriage of justice in 41 cases. The thesis analyses the common complaints made by an accused against trial counsel and the common areas where the Court of Appeal upheld complaints against counsel. The thesis takes into account the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 and the Lawyers and Conveyancers (Lawyer: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008 that came into existence on 1 August 2008. The new legislation places particular emphasis on the obligations of counsel to uphold the rule of law and to facilitate the administration of justice in New Zealand. Counsel also has an obligation to protect the interests of their clients. The thesis concludes that the plethora of cases coming before the Court of Appeal, and the number of appeals allowed by the Court, demonstrate defence counsel do not always protect the interests of their clients and can cause or contribute to a miscarriage of justice. The thesis makes a number of recommendations that may reduce the risk of both an accused appealing on the basis on the conduct of counsel and an appeal being allowed on the basis of the conduct of counsel. In particular, it is suggested that there should be greater degree of co-operation between the New Zealand Law Society and the Legal Services Agency to ensure the maintenance of high standards among criminal defence lawyers.

Thesis (MA (Counselling Psychology))--University of Pretoria, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references. Available on the Internet via the World Wide Web.

No description available.