The aim of this research was to find out whether or not the use of the veto by one or more of the permanent members in the UNSC had an impact on the behaviors of the warring parties by looking at the interventions that would be imposed by the Council. Much of the research on this topic looks at what it takes for a conflict to get to the UNSC and what happens after sanctions are put into place, but what about if the resolution does not receive support and is not adopted? Two cases are looked at using the structured focused comparison method in relation to two conflict periods in the Kosovo conflict, before the veto (during-UNSC) and after the veto (post-UNSC) asking the question how can the use of the veto in the UNSC by one, or more, of the permanent members of the Security Council impact a conflict? The evidence collected shows that the hypothesis was not supported due to there not being a large change in the behavior of the warring parties from one conflict period to the next. The conclusion shows that the impact by the UNSC on the conflict was not severe.