Thesis (M.S.)--Boston University / PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you. / This paper examines four televised Congressional hearings: Kefauver, Army McCarthy, Watergate and Iran-Contra. These hearings were studied in order to determine the effects that television coverage of hearings have on: the public, the hearings and the political process. Each hearing was examined in its historical context. Specific sessions of the hearings were looked at in terms of their televised impact. Finally, an analysis of the effects of the coverage was made. The public was emotionally aroused by the television coverage of the hearings. Despite many critics opinions, there was no evidence from any of the hearings that significant shifts in public opinion came about as a result of watching the hearings on television. Emotions were aroused because television is an emotional medium. Given the environment in which the hearings were presented, it was not surprising that the emotional reaction of the public did not translate into shifting of opinions because the public did not view the "show" as real. The presence of the cameras affected the functioning of the hearings. The focus of the hearings shifts from determining legislative alternatives to informing (influencing) the public. Finally, the coverage affected the political process. Legislators taking part in the hearings gained national exposure and often moved on to higher elective offices. In the most negative view the hearings were perceived as no different than any other drama show. In a positive light, television coverage increased the exposure of a greater percentage of the public to the democratic process in action. / 2031-01-01

Given that Congressional hearings are established legislative and political information generating tools for committee members engaging in oversight, fact finding, and agenda setting, I examine whether or not hearings provide information to actors outside of government. More specifically, does testimony by corporate representatives provide new information to the stock market about the future profitability of certain firms? In this paper, I utilize a new dataset collected by Workman and Shafran (2009) that includes 3,300 witnesses (and their affiliations) who testified in business regulation hearings between 2000 and 2005. I identify 99 publicly traded firms with representatives testifying in 117 hearings, and utilize event study methodology to estimate the effects of testimony events on the daily stock returns of corresponding firms. I find that, even with the ‘expectedness’ of Congressional hearings, such events negatively impact stock returns both generally as well as with greater magnitude under certain conditions. This event effect is largest for politically sensitive firms and for hearings held in the Senate. When selecting a portfolio of firms that combines all significant conditions, I determine that the ‘upper bound’ of the effect is one-half a standard deviation in daily returns (or a change of -1.6% in prices). Congressional hearings with corporate testimony do, in fact, generate information for external actors. / text

No description available.

No description available.

This thesis examines two organizational strategies employed for influencing American environmental policy with considerations to the "power elite" and "pluralist" models of policy control. Using a data set comprised of 379 organizations derived from US congressional hearings on climate change policy between 1976 and 2006, I find that industrial corporations conceal the public footprint of their involvement by financially encouraging "independent" research centers to provide favorable testimony. Meanwhile, nonprofit organizations are more likely to be co-represented by shared experts, a resource that is strategically shared for political gain. These findings provide some circumscribed support for both the power elite and pluralist models of organizational influence: the organization of power elites has a disproportionate amount of resources in a system that provides an arena for competing values and goals. Implications for understanding the organizational strategies towards congressional testimony as well as directions for future research are discussed based on these findings.