Thesis (M.S.)--Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1991. / Vita. Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 56-59). Also available via the Internet.

Thesis (M.S.)--Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1991. / Vita. Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 86-90). Also available via the Internet.

Thesis (Ed. D.)--Illinois State University, 1974. / Title from title page screen, viewed Nov. 2, 2004. Dissertation Committee: J.H. McGrath (chair), Gene A. Budig, Clinton R. Bunke, Clifford H. Edwards, Eugene D. Fitzpatrick. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 121-128) and abstract. Also available in print.

Thesis (M. Sc.)--University of Hong Kong, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 147-156).

Thesis (M.Sc.)--University of Hong Kong, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 147-156) Also available in print.

Texte remanié de: Habilitationschrift--Frankfurt-am-Main--Philosophie, 1974-1975. / Bibliogr. p. 641-657. Index.

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This thesis addresses the problem of combining the prior density functions, f[sub=1],…,f[subn], of n individuals. In the first of two parts, various systems of axioms are developed which characterize successively the linear opinion pool, A(f[sub=1],...,f[sub=n]) = Σ[sup=n; sub= i=1] w[sub=i] f[sub=i] , and the logarithmic opinion pool, G(f[sub=1],…,f[sub=n]) = π[sup=n; sub= i=1] f[sup=α(i); sub=i] / ʃ π[sup=n; sub= i=1] dμ. It is first shown that A is the only pooling operator, T(f[sub=1],…,f[sub=n]), which is expressible as T(f[sub=1],…,f[sub=n]) (θ) = H(f[sub=1](θ),...,f[sub=n](θ), θ) for some function H which is continuous in its first n variables and satisfies H(0,...,0,θ) = 0 for μ- almost all θ. The regularity condition on H may be dispensed with if H does not depend on θ. This result leads to an impossibility theorem involving Madansky's axiom of External Bayesianity. Other consequences of this axiom of group rationality are also examined in some detail and yield a characterization of G as the only Externally Bayesian pooling operator of the form T(f[sub=1],…,f[sub=n])(θ) = H(f[sub=1],(θ),...,f[sub=n](θ))/ ʃH(f[sub=1],…,f[sub=n])dμ for some H:(0, ∞) —>(0, ∞). To prove this n result, it is necessary to introduce a "richness" condition on the underlying space of events, (θ,μ). Next, each opinion f[sub=i] is regarded as containing some "information" about θ and we look for a pooling operator whose expected information content is a maximum. The operator so obtained depends on the definition which is chosen; for example, Kullback-Leibler's definition entails the linear opinion pool, A. In the second part of the dissertation, it is argued that the domain of pooling operators should extend beyond densities. The notion of propensity function is introduced and examples are given which motivate this generalization; these include the well-known problem of combining P-values. A theorem of Aczel is adapted to derive a large class of pooling formulas which encompasses both A and G. A final characterization of G is given via the interpretation of betting odds, and the parallel between our approach and Nash's solution to the "bargaining problem" is discussed. / Science, Faculty of / Mathematics, Department of / Graduate

The objective of this experiment was to compare three group decision-making strategies and their effects on the group decision-making process. Two of the strategies, Dialectical Inquiry and Devil's Advocacy, were structured while the control condition, Unstructured Consensus Seeking, was non-directed, thus unstructured. The following dependent variables were measured: (a) decision quality, (b) cognitive conflict, (c) affective conflict, and (d) decision commitment. Seventy-two undergraduate participants were randomly assigned across 3 conditions into groups of 6 to solve an interactive group decision task. Thirty-six trained observers were randomly assigned across the same conditions to observe intra-group cognitive and affective conflict and to assess how well the undergraduate participants implemented the structured approaches. The unit of comparison was groups (n = 12). The results of this study were analyzed using analysis of variance and no statistical difference was found between the treatment groups on any of the four dependent variables measured. Cognitive conflict levels and commitment to the decision, while not statistically significant, were higher in the two structured conditions compared to the unstructured control condition. A discussion of these results along with directions for future research is provided. / Ph. D.

At the start of the twenty-first century, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) officials can look back on nearly thirty years of meaningful accomplishments. Toxic releases are down, the air and water are cleaner, and waste disposal methods are greatly improved. Although this is a record of which EPA officials should be proud, is it sufficient to carry them into the next century? Conventional wisdom among scholars, environmental policy advocates, and even EPA officials indicates that it is not. The new century is bringing complex challenges and, in some cases, the changing conditions are threatening the progress EPA has struggled to achieve. Some of the tools and approaches this agency has relied upon historically, such as notice and comment rulemaking, single stakeholder consultations, and positional leadership, are no longer adequate to address existing environmental challenges and new emerging environmental problems. The Common Sense Initiative (CSI) was launched by EPA in mid-1994 as a fundamentally different approach to environmental protection. Its sector-based, multistakeholder, consensus decision-making process was counter to EPA's traditional command-and-control approach. CSI was created with the intent to heal the growing dysfunctional relationships that exist among government co-regulators (i.e., EPA and state and local agencies), the regulated industry, and non-governmental organizations (i.e., environmentalists and environmental justice organizations). Even though EPA officials realized the limitations of the existing regulatory approach, they had trouble "giving up control." Nonetheless, during the four-year history of the CSI process, EPA personnel had an opportunity to see themselves in a different light and to operate in a new organizational regime. Rather than being just regulators, they were able to become solvers of environmental problems. Rather than being position-oriented, they were able to become person-oriented. Instead of seeking ownership and control, they were able to obtain leverage through partnerships and collaboration. In short, EPA officials were building social capital and a new style of management"facilitative leadership. A facilitative leader leads without controlling, communicates without being condescending, and uses synergism to help groups achieve "win-win" results. This new paradigm has the potential to help EPA better adapt in the next generation system of environmental protection. / Ph. D.