Les réseaux ad hoc sans fil véhiculaires (VANET) permettent les communications entre véhicules afin d'augmenter la sécurité routière et d'agrémenter l'expérience de conduite. Une catégorie d'applications ayant suscité un fort intérêt est celle liée à la sécurité du trafic routier. Un exemple prometteur est l'alerte de danger local qui permet d'accroitre la " ligne de vue " du conducteur en lui proposant un ensemble d'alertes afin d'anticiper des situations potentiellement dangereuses. En raison de leurs contraintes temporelles fortes et les conséquences critiques d'une mauvaise utilisation, il est primordial d'assurer des communications sécurisées. Mais l'ajout de services de sécurité entraîne un surcoût de calcul et réseau. C'est pourquoi l'objectif de notre travail est d'établir un cadre général (de manière analytique) du surcoût de la sécurité sur le délai de transfert d'une alerte. Parmi les mécanismes de sécurité conventionnels, le service d'authentification apparaît comme la pierre angulaire de la sécurité des VANETs. De plus, l'authentification est utilisée pour chaque message émis ou reçu. Il est donc potentiellement le service le plus consommateur. C'est pourquoi, nous nous focalisons sur ce service. Nous nous posons ainsi les questions suivantes : quel est le coût de l'authentification ? Quel est son impact sur l'application d'alerte de danger local ? La première contribution de cette thèse est l'élaboration d'une formule permettant le calcul du surcoût de la signature numérique. Mais l'authentification ne sera pas le seul mécanisme de sécurité déployé. Le consensus est notamment un des mécanismes fréquemment employés afin d'instaurer une confiance entre les véhicules. En effet, grâce à une méthode de décision et à partir d'un ensemble de messages, le consensus vise à obtenir un commun accord sur une valeur ou une action entre les véhicules. Ainsi, nous devons comprendre comment définir les paramètres de consensus afin de réduire l'impact de ce mécanisme sur le délai et la distance de freinage ? Comment s'intègre le consensus dans la formule globale de surcoût de l'authentification ? C'est notamment à ces questions que cette thèse répond. Notre deuxième contribution est une méthode de décision dynamique qui analyse l'environnement réseau courant (nombre de voisins à portée de communication), et explore le contenu des alertes. Il en résulte une réduction du nombre de paquets à examiner et donc une réaction plus rapide et plus adaptée à l'alerte.

<p> In his book <em>Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language </em>(1982)<em> </em>Saul Kripke claims that Wittgenstein argues for a certain form of scepticism in his book <em>Philosophical Investigations </em>(1953), namely a new form of philosophical scepticism, a result of Wittgenstein´s idea of language as language games. Nihilism, scepticism of meaning or of concept, constitutive scepticism are other commentators´<em> </em>different names of the same phenomenon. The philosophy of Wittgenstein accounts for how our words, including the words of mathematics, have no meaning and there are no a priori justified objective facts as to what I mean about a word. We follow the rules blindly and without justification. We are unable to find any facts against this proposal. Like a ´sceptic´ Wittgenstein denies the ´superlative fact,´ a fact supposed to give an a priori justification to our words. The consensus of a language community is enough to give meaning and assertions to what we in ordinary language call facts, but objective facts in logical meaning a priori, do not exist, a sceptical view in Kripke´s interpretation. Wittgenstein rejects explicit scepticism, but Kripke thinks Wittgenstein did not want to repudiate common belief as a common sense philosopher.</p><p>This paper ´Wittgenstein and Scepticism´ says that Wittgenstein certainly denies ´superlative fact´, but his reason was founded on conclusions from his investigation of grammar and language, which we use and misuse according to what we want, not to how it <em>is</em>. We demand that logic ought to be absolute, general and consistent, but there is no such logic a priori. Wittgenstein thinks we have to stick to reality and facts of experience. Facts a priori are very convincing facts, but they are not ´sublime´ in a logical metaphysic way. Logic is not rejected and the philosophy of logic uses the same words as common language. Logic has a normative function in our language. We learn words and rules in a certain context and use them in certain situations. How we use the word tells us the meaning of the word and the correct understanding. Our following the rules depends on how they work in real life.</p> / <p>I <em>Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Languages</em> (1982) hävdar Saul Kripke att Wittgensteins resonemang i <em>Filosofiska undersökningar </em>(1953) leder till en speciell  form av skepticism, en filosofisk skepticism, en konsekvens av Wittgensteins uppfattning om språket som språkspel. Nihilism, meningsskepticism, begreppsskepticism, konstitutiv skepticism är andra kommentatorers beteckningar. Wittgensteins filosofi visar att språkets ord, inklusive matematikens ord, saknar mening och inga rättfärdigade objektiva a priori fakta finns om vad jag menar med ett ord. Vi följer språkets regler blint och som det passar oss Argument saknas för att vederlägga  detta påstående. Som en skeptiker förnekar Wittgenstein filosofins "superlative fact", som förmodas ge en a priori grund för vad jag menar med ett ord. En språkgemenskaps konsensus ger dock orden mening och bekräftar vad som i vanligt språk kallas fakta, men objektiva fakta i logisk mening, fakta a priori saknas, d.v.s. en skeptisk uppfattning, enligt Kripkes tolkning Att Wittgenstein själv tar avstånd från skepticismen beror på att han inte vill bryta med den allmänna uppfattningen om fakta och  mening.</p><p>Uppsatsen "Wittgenstein och skepticismen" visar att visserligen överger Wittgenstein "superlative fact", men detta är ett resultat av hans grammatiska undersökning av språket, vilket vi brukar och missbrukar för våra syften, inte som det <em>är</em>. Vi önskar och fordrar att logiken ger oss ett absolut, generellt och beständigt svar, men ett  sådant svar kan inte logikens a priori ge. Wittgenstein menar att verkligheten och erfarenhetsfakta är vad vi har att hålla oss till. A priori fakta är enligt Wittgenstein mycket övertygande fakta, men inte i den "sublima" logikens metafysiska mening. Logiken förkastas inte, ty logikens filosofi talar inte om ord i någon annan mening än vi gör i det vanliga livet. Logiken har en styrfunktion i språket. Orden lärs in i ett sammanhang och används i ett sammanhang. Användningen av ordet visar om ordets mening är korrekt uppfattad. Vi följer regler efter hur de fungerar i en verklighet</p>

<p>Human rights as codified in international documents are claims every human being have by virtue of being a human. Meaning that every state must ensure, through its laws, that each individual is guaranteed these claims or rights equally. Islamic principles like other religions are obligations that its members (Muslims) must perform rather than claims. Therefore, it is possible that individual rights may not be respected within Islamic principles because, of the differences in their origin and emphasis, one is a claim and the other a duty of believers.</p><p>The concern of violating rights of other people within Islamic law calls into attention how Islamic principles can be applied in a state while guaranteeing human rights as universal principles.</p><p>This study discusses various approaches proposed by Muslim authors on how human rights can be justified in Islam. Since human rights are political concepts, in the sense that each state must ensure that human beings go about their life freely, they should be the focus of consensus among different doctrines in a modern state. That is a principle to justify human rights in Islam must consider the fact of pluralism of religious doctrines and how all are included in the political process of the state.</p>

The overarching purpose of this study is to examine the communication implications of a self-proclaimed consensual organization (IT) within a classical organizational environment. The literature review of relevant theory and research covers both hierarchical and consensual organizations viewed via the classical, human relations, and system perspectives. The researcher compares organizational theory to practice by using communication to describe a consensual organization. The analyses of the research questions show that the IT organization, although a self-proclaimed consensual organization, does not obtain as many consensual qualities as the organization perceives. Organizational theorists have positioned bureaucracies and consensual organizations at opposite ends of the task-relational continuum. However, the findings from this thesis study suggest that consensual organizations should be positioned much closer to the task-oriented bureaucracies. / Graduation date: 1997

The present dissertation studies specific issues related to the coordination of a set of "agents" evolving on a nonlinear manifold, more particularly a homogeneous manifold or a Lie group. The viewpoint is somewhere between control algorithm design and system analysis, as algorithms are derived from simple principles --- often retrieving existing models --- to highlight specific behaviors. With a fair amount of approximation, the objective of the dissertation can be summarized by the following question: Given a swarm of identical agents evolving on a nonlinear, nonconvex configuration space with high symmetry, how can you define specific collective behavior, and how can you design individual agent control laws to get a collective behavior, without introducing hierarchy nor external reference points that would break the symmetry of the configuration space? Maintaining the basic symmetries of the coordination problem lies at the heart of the contributions. The main focus is on the global geometric invariance of the configuration space. This contrasts with most existing work on coordination, where either the agents evolve on vector spaces --- which, to some extent, can cover local behavior on manifolds --- or coordination is coupled to external reference tracking such that the reference can serve as a beacon around which the geometry is distorted towards vector space-like properties. A second, more standard symmetry is to treat all agents identically. Another basic ingredient of the coordination problem that has important implications in this dissertation is the reduced agent interconnectivity: each agent only gets information from a limited set of other agents, which can be varying. In order to focus on issues related to geometry / symmetry and reduced interconnectivity, individual agent dynamics are drastically simplified to simple integrators. This is justified at a "planning" level. Making the step towards realistic dynamics is illustrated for the specific case of rigid body attitude synchronization. The main contributions of this dissertation are * I. an extensive study of synchronization on the circle, (a) highlighting difficulties encountered for coordination and (b) proposing simple strategies to overcome these difficulties; * II. (a) a geometric definition and related control law for "consensus" configurations on compact homogeneous manifolds, of which synchronization --- all agents at the same point --- is a special case, and (b) control laws to (almost) globally reach synchronization and "balancing", its opposite, under general interconnectivity conditions; * III. several propositions for rigid body attitude synchronization under mechanical dynamics; * IV. a geometric framework for "coordinated motion" on Lie groups, (a) giving a geometric definition of coordinated motion and investigating its implications, and (b) providing systematic methods to design control laws for coordinated motion. Examples treated for illustration of the theoretical concepts are the circle S^1 (sometimes the sphere S^n), the rotation group SO(n), the rigid-body motion groups SE(2) and SE(3) and the Grassmann manifolds Grass(p,n). The developments in this dissertation remain at a rather theoretical level; potential applications are briefly discussed.

Cette thèse concerne le contrôle coopératif de systèmes multi-agents. Ce sujet a été largement étudié dans la littérature récente en raison de son grand nombre d'applications. Cette thèse propose des nouvelles conceptions de stratégies de contrôle collaboratif afin de réaliser une mission d'exploration sous-marine. En particulier, l'objectif final est de diriger une flotte de véhicules autonomes sous-marins, équipés de capteurs appropriés, jusqu'à l'emplacement d'une source de température, de polluants ou d'eau douce. Dans cette situation, il est pertinent de considérer les contraintes de communication entre véhicules qui sont décrites au moyen d'un graphe de communication. Les premières contributions traitent du développement des lois de commande d'une formation qui stabilisent la flotte vers des formations variant dans le temps, et qui, de plus, distribuent uniformément les véhicules le long de la formation. Enfin, le problème de recherche d'une source est abordé par l'interprétation de la flottille de véhicules comme un réseau de capteurs mobiles. En particulier, il est démontré que les mesures recueillies par la flotte de véhicules permettent d'estimer le gradient de concentration de la quantité d'intérêt. En suivant cette idée, un algorithme distribué basé sur des algorithmes de consensus est proposé pour estimer la direction du gradient d'une distribution de signal.

<p>This research examines the effectiveness of these dispute resolution mechanisms in environmental disputes and what improvements should be made in order to make those mechanisms suitable for these types of disputes.</p>

Human rights as codified in international documents are claims every human being have by virtue of being a human. Meaning that every state must ensure, through its laws, that each individual is guaranteed these claims or rights equally. Islamic principles like other religions are obligations that its members (Muslims) must perform rather than claims. Therefore, it is possible that individual rights may not be respected within Islamic principles because, of the differences in their origin and emphasis, one is a claim and the other a duty of believers. The concern of violating rights of other people within Islamic law calls into attention how Islamic principles can be applied in a state while guaranteeing human rights as universal principles. This study discusses various approaches proposed by Muslim authors on how human rights can be justified in Islam. Since human rights are political concepts, in the sense that each state must ensure that human beings go about their life freely, they should be the focus of consensus among different doctrines in a modern state. That is a principle to justify human rights in Islam must consider the fact of pluralism of religious doctrines and how all are included in the political process of the state.

In his book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982) Saul Kripke claims that Wittgenstein argues for a certain form of scepticism in his book Philosophical Investigations (1953), namely a new form of philosophical scepticism, a result of Wittgenstein´s idea of language as language games. Nihilism, scepticism of meaning or of concept, constitutive scepticism are other commentators´ different names of the same phenomenon. The philosophy of Wittgenstein accounts for how our words, including the words of mathematics, have no meaning and there are no a priori justified objective facts as to what I mean about a word. We follow the rules blindly and without justification. We are unable to find any facts against this proposal. Like a ´sceptic´ Wittgenstein denies the ´superlative fact,´ a fact supposed to give an a priori justification to our words. The consensus of a language community is enough to give meaning and assertions to what we in ordinary language call facts, but objective facts in logical meaning a priori, do not exist, a sceptical view in Kripke´s interpretation. Wittgenstein rejects explicit scepticism, but Kripke thinks Wittgenstein did not want to repudiate common belief as a common sense philosopher. This paper ´Wittgenstein and Scepticism´ says that Wittgenstein certainly denies ´superlative fact´, but his reason was founded on conclusions from his investigation of grammar and language, which we use and misuse according to what we want, not to how it is. We demand that logic ought to be absolute, general and consistent, but there is no such logic a priori. Wittgenstein thinks we have to stick to reality and facts of experience. Facts a priori are very convincing facts, but they are not ´sublime´ in a logical metaphysic way. Logic is not rejected and the philosophy of logic uses the same words as common language. Logic has a normative function in our language. We learn words and rules in a certain context and use them in certain situations. How we use the word tells us the meaning of the word and the correct understanding. Our following the rules depends on how they work in real life. / I Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Languages (1982) hävdar Saul Kripke att Wittgensteins resonemang i Filosofiska undersökningar (1953) leder till en speciell  form av skepticism, en filosofisk skepticism, en konsekvens av Wittgensteins uppfattning om språket som språkspel. Nihilism, meningsskepticism, begreppsskepticism, konstitutiv skepticism är andra kommentatorers beteckningar. Wittgensteins filosofi visar att språkets ord, inklusive matematikens ord, saknar mening och inga rättfärdigade objektiva a priori fakta finns om vad jag menar med ett ord. Vi följer språkets regler blint och som det passar oss Argument saknas för att vederlägga  detta påstående. Som en skeptiker förnekar Wittgenstein filosofins "superlative fact", som förmodas ge en a priori grund för vad jag menar med ett ord. En språkgemenskaps konsensus ger dock orden mening och bekräftar vad som i vanligt språk kallas fakta, men objektiva fakta i logisk mening, fakta a priori saknas, d.v.s. en skeptisk uppfattning, enligt Kripkes tolkning Att Wittgenstein själv tar avstånd från skepticismen beror på att han inte vill bryta med den allmänna uppfattningen om fakta och  mening. Uppsatsen "Wittgenstein och skepticismen" visar att visserligen överger Wittgenstein "superlative fact", men detta är ett resultat av hans grammatiska undersökning av språket, vilket vi brukar och missbrukar för våra syften, inte som det är. Vi önskar och fordrar att logiken ger oss ett absolut, generellt och beständigt svar, men ett  sådant svar kan inte logikens a priori ge. Wittgenstein menar att verkligheten och erfarenhetsfakta är vad vi har att hålla oss till. A priori fakta är enligt Wittgenstein mycket övertygande fakta, men inte i den "sublima" logikens metafysiska mening. Logiken förkastas inte, ty logikens filosofi talar inte om ord i någon annan mening än vi gör i det vanliga livet. Logiken har en styrfunktion i språket. Orden lärs in i ett sammanhang och används i ett sammanhang. Användningen av ordet visar om ordets mening är korrekt uppfattad. Vi följer regler efter hur de fungerar i en verklighet

With the aid of modern sensors it is possible to create models of buildings. These sensorstypically generate 3D point clouds and in order to increase interpretability and usability,these point clouds are often translated into 3D models.In this thesis a way of translating a 3D point cloud into a 3D model is presented. The basicfunctionality is implemented using Matlab. The geometric model consists of floors, wallsand ceilings. In addition, doors and windows are automatically identified and integrated intothe model. The resulting model also has an explicit representation of the topology betweenentities of the model. The topology is represented as a graph, and to do this GraphML isused. The graph is opened in a graph editing program called yEd.The result is a 3D model that can be plotted in Matlab and a graph describing the connectivitybetween entities. The GraphML file is automatically generated in Matlab. An interfacebetween Matlab and yEd allows the user to choose which rooms should be plotted.