This work seeks to recover the critical spirit of conservatism and re-emphasize its goal of stability and resilience in society. I will argue that we should strive to view ourselves as deeply dependent and persistently vulnerable beings rather than free, equal, and rational individuals. An understanding of ourselves as embodied and interconnected patternings-in-the-world – res ecologia – will allow us to better recognize a diffuse violence at work in the modern world. I consider the nature of causation and suggest that the internal stability of res ecologia, when disrupted, should be a primary concern when considering the nature of violence and domination. I then invite us to understand the violence and domination arising in modern liberal societies – protocolic modulations – as abstract standardization that ensures efficient synchronization between individuated or atomized actors. Further, I suggest that the rapid modulations of this kind of protocolic domination disrupt the structural causation within and between res ecologia. In chapter five, I begin to show how this kind of violence and domination is manifest in and through the tradition of liberalism by tracing out a shared, underlying dualistic logic that simultaneously individuates and totalizes. In chapter six, I turn to the role of reason in creating freedom and legitimizing violence. Reason is seen to be contributing to both freedom and domination depending upon whether or not it creates resilience within society that resists standardizations. In chapter seven, I argue that the only way to effectively counter the excessive violence within the dualistic logic of liberalism is to cultivate an ethic of mutual support and restraint that invests society with stability and resilience. Finally, I conclude by contending that a resilient society requires intermediate structures and civil enterprises to instill tradition and reciprocal responsibilities in interdependent familial, socio-economic, and religious life. / Graduate / 0615 / jared.giesbrecht@gmail.com

This thesis will trace the development of Conservative ideology in Great Britain between 1906 and 1914. During these years the Conservative party was defeated by the Liberal party on three separate occasions. Many historians believe that this string of electoral contretemps offers convincing evidence that Conservatism, as an evolving pattern of beliefs, was fundamentally unsuited to the political climate of Great Britain at the turn of the century. According to this interpretation of Edwardian Conservatism, it was only the timely onset of war which saved the party from having to come to terms with the democratic impulse of an unfamiliar era. This is a gross exaggeration of the plight of Conservatism before the war, for the party's unwavering commitment to the economic status quo was not in itself a recipe for electoral catastrophe. What may well have turned out to be fatal to the party's well-being was Joseph Chamberlain's Tariff Reform campaign. In 1903 Chamberlain offered the party an all-encompassing creed, a total solution to Britain's problems, both domestic and foreign, and a positive platform to sustain the party in office. Balfour sensed the dangers of a comprehensive ideology that was inherently of its own time. He, and Bonar Law after him, helped to rehabilitate Conservative ideology by limiting its scope and suggesting that Tariff Reform was merely one weapon among many in a large Conservative arsenal.

Errata sheet pasted inside front cover. / Bibliography: leaves 372-400. / ix, 400 leaves ; 30 cm. / Title page, contents and abstract only. The complete thesis in print form is available from the University Library. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Adelaide, Dept. of Politics, 1996?

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Wollongong, 2004. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references: leaf 323-367.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-03T11:52:52Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2014-04-14Bitstream added on 2015-03-03T12:06:56Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 000806318.pdf: 2399386 bytes, checksum: 809bc54e78e2b426bffccedd94e2d37d (MD5) / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / A ideia da existência de uma Guerra Cultural, que seria responsável pela disputa na sociedade estadunidense por duas metades antagônicas (entre conservadores e liberais), aparece de maneira recorrente na vida intelectual, política e midiática da contemporaneidade do país. O destaque dado a ela originou-se após o resgate do termo pelo sociólogo James Davison Hunter, em 1991, com intuito de explicar, através dela, as crescentes radicalizações nas disputas em torno de questões culturais nos EUA a partir dos anos 1970. O que se seguiu a publicação de sua tese de Hunter foi uma visibilidade cada vez maior do termo Guerra Cultural e, consequentemente, um grande debate intelectual entre autores defensores e contrários a sua existência. O fato é que a ideia perdurou no debate sociopolítico estadunidense até o final do governo George W. Bush e início da administração Barack Hussein Obama, quando a Guerra Cultural perdeu relevância, a ponto de um grande número de comentadores apontarem que a Guerra Cultural havia terminado. Em uma direção paralela, percebemos que a partir da década de 1970 ocorreu um constante crescimento dos movimentos conservadores nos EUA, principalmente, por parte da direita religiosa que atingiu seu auge durante o governo George W. Bush para, logo em seguida, passar por um processo de desorganização durante o término do governo do presidente republicano. Essa crescente conservadora foi analisada por uma leva significativa de intelectuais que descreveram como os Estados Unidos passaram durante as últimas décadas por um processo de guinada à direita. Nossa pesquisa propõe ir além do debate intelectual sobre a existência ou não de uma Guerra Cultural, assim como, busca ir além da releitura sobre o conservadorismo. Nosso intuito é, compreender os motivos que levaram a ascensão e crise nessa ideia, apontando como a polarização entre os partidos construída em torno de temas culturais ... / The idea of the existence of a Culture War, which would be responsible for a struggle in American society into two antagonist halves (between conservatives and liberals), appears on a recurring basis in, political, media and intellectual life in the country’s contemporary . The prominence of it originated after the concept’s revitalization by sociologist James Davison Hunter in the year of 1991 and aiming to explain, through it, the radicalization of the disputes over cultural issues in America from the 1970s. What followed the publication of Hunter’s thesis was an increase of the visibility of the Culture War and, therefore a great intellectual debate between supporters and critics of its. The fact is that the idea persisted in American’s socio-politics debate until the end of George W. Bush government and the beginning of the Obama administration, when the Cultural War has lost relevance and a large number of commentators suggest that the Cultural War had ended. In a parallel path, occurred from the 1970s a spread of the conservative movement in the U.S., above all by the religious right that reached its height during the George W. Bush government, soon, they go through a disorganization process during the end of President Republican Government. The intellectuals who described how the United States began, during the last decades, a process to yaw to the political right, analyzed this increased conservative. Our research proposes to go beyond intellectual debate about the existence or not of a Cultural War, as well as seeks to go beyond retelling of conservatism. Our aim is to understand the reasons that led the rise and crisis of that idea, pointing out how the polarization between the parties built around cultural themes, not sustained after election periods and how it was losing its functionality over the years

This thesis seeks to explain the reasons behind Johann Wolfgang von Goethe's critical response to the French Revolution, and to identify his broader political views. It casts Goethe as a reform-minded conservative, who strove to advance civilisation and law-abiding liberty, and deplored tyranny, whether of the few or of the many. He deemed the Revolution politically and socially destructive, as it countered Enlightenment values of reason, tolerance, independent thought, and self-cultivation. While acknowledging the faults of the traditional ruling elite of the monarchy and aristocracy, Goethe also recognised the inherently flawed nature of human beings. This led him to support modest changes to redress specific grievances, rather than to overturn an entire political system in the utopian hope of realising a vice-ridden 'brotherhood of Man'. The fictional works indicate an author who favoured clearly definable freedoms over an abstract 'universal' freedom, who believed that BÃ1⁄4rger should develop their intellect and find an occupation best suited to their personal attributes, and that the most temperate and politically astute among them should influence government by co-operating with aristocrats. Goethe also portrays the fall of the ancien régime as largely self-inflicted, presenting many selfish and gullible courtiers, and incompetent kings. He appears to lament its demise, however, and not wish for a repeat in Germany, as the insurgent Bürger-dominated and/or republican regimes seem even more reckless. The advocates of 'liberté, égalité, fraternité' generally come across as perilously naïve or fraudulent, often using altruistic rhetoric to conceal egocentric and vindictive aims. The best cure for a flagging regime is (sometimes considerable) reform, not revolution. Political power should be treated with humility and self-restraint, and the relationship between rulers and subjects should be as intimate as possible. Above all, no part of the social hierarchy should suffer oppression from another, and people should be free to express various opinions, and criticise their government. For Goethe, the Revolution thwarted such principles.

Orientador: Andréas Hofbauer / Banca: Heloisa Pait / Banca: Terezinha Ferrari / Resumo: A presente dissertação apresenta as determinações sociais relacionadas à objetivação do movimento eugenista no Brasil a partir da trajetória de Renato Kehl (1889-1974), principal expoente da ideologia eugenista no Brasil. Médico e farmacêutico, de forma aguerrida, defendeu a difusão e implantação do projeto eugênico, realizando conferências em todo o Brasil e em vários países da América Latina. Para Renato Kehl, a elite intelectual brasileira teria como responsabilidade instituir parâmetros da eugenia, isto é, o sucesso dependeria da sua implantação como política pública. Para essa finalidade, funda, em 1918, a Sociedade Eugênica de São Paulo, com a missão de difundir as ideias eugênicas no Brasil e implantar propostas de cariz eugênico. Renato Kehl foi também um dos principais articuladores do movimento de criação e fomento de instituições em nível nacional; em 1929, cria o Boletim de Eugenia, a fim de publicar textos sobre a temática nos âmbitos nacional e internacional, assim como divulgar as propostas de leis baseadas na eugenia e implantadas em países como os Estados Unidos da América e Alemanha. Foi o precursor do movimento no Brasil e defendeu que o povo brasileiro estaria perfeitamente efetivado caso fossem extintos os débeis mentais, loucos, psicopatas, criminosos, delinquentes e "desviados"; epiléticos, alcoólatras e dependentes de drogas ilícitas; doentes (tuberculosos, leprosos, dentre outros); cegos e surdos; disformes, pessoas dependentes da assistência social, moradores de rua, "vagabundos" e indigentes. / Abstract: This work aims to present the social determinations regarding the objectification of the eugenics movement in Brazil from the path of Renato Kehl (1889-1974), leading exponent of eugenic ideology in Brazil. Medical and pharmaceutical, stiffer way, defended the dissemination and implementation of the eugenics project, holding conferences in Brazil and in several Latin American countries. Renato Kehl Brazilian intellectual elite would establish responsibility eugenics parameters, the success of eugenics depended on its implementation as public policy. For this purpose Renato Kehl founded in 1918, the Eugenics Society of São Paulo, with the mission to spread the eugenic idea in Brazil and implement eugenics - oriented proposals. Renato Kehl was still one of the main organizers of the movement in the creation and development institutions at the national level; in 1929, founded the Eugenics Bulletin in order to publish texts on eugenic theme in the national and international levels, as well as disclose the proposed laws based on eugenics and implemented in countries like the United States and Germany. Renato Kehl was the forerunner of the eugenics movement in Brazil and claimed that the Brazilian people would be perfectly effected if there were the extinction of feebleminded, insane, psychopaths, criminals, delinquents and "diverted"; epileptics, alcoholics and addicted to illicit drugs; patients (tuberculosis, leprosy and others); blind and deaf; shapeless, people dependent on welfare, the homeless, " bums" and destitute. / Mestre

This dissertation challenges the theories of new political historians, who argue that nineteenth-century American politics was little influenced by ideology. Instead, by treating the public careers of self-identified conservatives in Abraham Lincoln's cabinet--Edward Bates, Montgomery Blair, Salmon P. Chase, and Gideon Welles--as exemplars of nineteenth-century political thought, this study examines the formation of American conservatism in the Civil War era from an anthropological perspective, treating it as a tribal identification shared by American lawmakers. Nineteenth-century conservatives identified themselves according to their subscription to certain common principles of governance, the ideals of which were first expressed in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Applying these principles to the nineteenth century, American conservatives thus greatly influenced public policy initiatives from civil service reform to anti-slavery reform and from public finance to presidential war powers. Although the conservative ideals espoused by these politicians--exemplified in their management of issues during the Civil War--had receded to a minority opinion among lawmakers by 1865, they were ultimately resurrected during the later years of Reconstruction, and helped to shape future political discourses surrounding public policy in the Gilded Age.

Orientador: Leila de Menezes Stein / Banca: Flávio Limoncic / Banca: Ruy Braga / Banca: Luís Fernado Ayerbe / Banca: Marcia Teixeira / Resumo: A ideia da existência de uma Guerra Cultural, que seria responsável pela disputa na sociedade estadunidense por duas metades antagônicas (entre conservadores e liberais), aparece de maneira recorrente na vida intelectual, política e midiática da contemporaneidade do país. O destaque dado a ela originou-se após o resgate do termo pelo sociólogo James Davison Hunter, em 1991, com intuito de explicar, através dela, as crescentes radicalizações nas disputas em torno de questões culturais nos EUA a partir dos anos 1970. O que se seguiu a publicação de sua tese de Hunter foi uma visibilidade cada vez maior do termo Guerra Cultural e, consequentemente, um grande debate intelectual entre autores defensores e contrários a sua existência. O fato é que a ideia perdurou no debate sociopolítico estadunidense até o final do governo George W. Bush e início da administração Barack Hussein Obama, quando a Guerra Cultural perdeu relevância, a ponto de um grande número de comentadores apontarem que a Guerra Cultural havia terminado. Em uma direção paralela, percebemos que a partir da década de 1970 ocorreu um constante crescimento dos movimentos conservadores nos EUA, principalmente, por parte da direita religiosa que atingiu seu auge durante o governo George W. Bush para, logo em seguida, passar por um processo de desorganização durante o término do governo do presidente republicano. Essa crescente conservadora foi analisada por uma leva significativa de intelectuais que descreveram como os Estados Unidos passaram durante as últimas décadas por um processo de guinada à direita. Nossa pesquisa propõe ir além do debate intelectual sobre a existência ou não de uma Guerra Cultural, assim como, busca ir além da releitura sobre o conservadorismo. Nosso intuito é, compreender os motivos que levaram a ascensão e crise nessa ideia, apontando como a polarização entre os partidos construída em torno de temas culturais ... / Abstract: The idea of the existence of a Culture War, which would be responsible for a struggle in American society into two antagonist halves (between conservatives and liberals), appears on a recurring basis in, political, media and intellectual life in the country's contemporary . The prominence of it originated after the concept's revitalization by sociologist James Davison Hunter in the year of 1991 and aiming to explain, through it, the radicalization of the disputes over cultural issues in America from the 1970s. What followed the publication of Hunter's thesis was an increase of the visibility of the Culture War and, therefore a great intellectual debate between supporters and critics of its. The fact is that the idea persisted in American's socio-politics debate until the end of George W. Bush government and the beginning of the Obama administration, when the Cultural War has lost relevance and a large number of commentators suggest that the Cultural War had ended. In a parallel path, occurred from the 1970s a spread of the conservative movement in the U.S., above all by the religious right that reached its height during the George W. Bush government, soon, they go through a disorganization process during the end of President Republican Government. The intellectuals who described how the United States began, during the last decades, a process to yaw to the political right, analyzed this increased conservative. Our research proposes to go beyond intellectual debate about the existence or not of a Cultural War, as well as seeks to go beyond retelling of conservatism. Our aim is to understand the reasons that led the rise and crisis of that idea, pointing out how the polarization between the parties built around cultural themes, not sustained after election periods and how it was losing its functionality over the years / Doutor

Abstract One of the major features of financial reporting is conservatism. Accounting conservatism is traditionally defined by the adage “anticipate no profit, but anticipate all losses.” Accounting conservatism is manifested in two general but distinct ways. First, conservatism can be unconditional, meaning that the book value of net assets is understated due to predetermined accounting practices (e.g. immediate expensing of research and development expenditures as incurred). Second, conservatism can be conditional, meaning that the book value of assets is written down under sufficiently adverse circumstances, but not up under favorable circumstances (e.g. goodwill impairment rules). This dissertation focuses only on conditional conservatism. The purpose of this dissertation is to increase our understanding of conditional conservatism through three inter-related essays. These essays seek to answer the following research questions: (1) Are standard measures of conditional conservatism affected by the asymmetry in cash flows? (2) How does “bad news” contribute to the persistence of accruals and cash flows? (3) Do firms manage fair value based goodwill write-offs under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 142 (SFAS 142)? (4) What are the economic consequences of SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs? Collectively, the empirical results of this dissertation further our understanding of the determinants and implications of conditional conservatism. The first essay demonstrates that the asymmetry in cash flows biases standard measures of conditional conservatism. The second and third essays are one of the first to assess conservatism using an individual accrual account, namely, SFAS 142 goodwill write-offs. The second essay examines the reliability of goodwill write-offs, while the third essay provides evidence on the economic consequences of goodwill write-offs. The findings of these two essays are important for the debate on whether fair value measurements in financial statements are appropriate.