There is a problem within contractarian ethics that I wish to resolve. It concerns individualpreferences. Contractarianism holds that morality, properly conceived, can satisfy individualpreferences and interests better than amorality or immorality. W hat is unclear, however, iswhether these preferences are those individuals actually hold or those that they should hold. The goal of my thesis is to investigate this question. I introduce a version of contractarian ethicsthat relies on ind ividual preferences in a manner more stringent than has been in the literatureto date.

There is a problem within contractarian ethics that I wish to resolve. It concerns individualpreferences. Contractarianism holds that morality, properly conceived, can satisfy individualpreferences and interests better than amorality or immorality. W hat is unclear, however, iswhether these preferences are those individuals actually hold or those that they should hold. The goal of my thesis is to investigate this question. I introduce a version of contractarian ethicsthat relies on ind ividual preferences in a manner more stringent than has been in the literatureto date.

We share our world with many people who ignore the principles of justice and who regularly take advantage of others by breaching trust or breaking agreements. This dissertation is about the irrationality of the actions of these covenant-breakers. A covenant-breaker typically believes that unjust behavior is to his advantage and that only a fool would act in any other way. Would it not be disturbing if this were true? My central claim will be that adherence to the precepts of justice is a rational strategy for a self-interested actor. I intend to demonstrate that con men and covenant-breakers do not act rationally when violating an agreement. I will trace the concept of justice as it evolves through philosophical history and show that, while the concept of justice changes as the underlying concept of human nature and psychology changes, the argument in favor of the rationality of just behavior remains coherent throughout. Each historical interpretation will advance some form of the claim that the consistent observance of cooperative agreements is a rational strategy, and at each point an interlocutor will object. I will show that these interlocutors are mistaken. My motivating goal is to show that justice, understood as the consistent observance of cooperative agreements, is rational. I want to respond to the clandestine cheaters and other skeptics who believe that just behavior is for suckers, because, if the skeptics are right, and justice is indeed irrational, then those among us who are acting in a just manner are paying an unnecessary cost.

Avec les orientations prises en 2002 par la Commission Bancaire de l’Afrique Centrale (COBAC) en vue de développer les activités microfinancières, le métier de la microfinance s’est transformé dans sa forme organisationnelle (en passant de l’informel au formel) mais aussi dans sa relation avec son environnement. L’observation du terrain met en lumière que cette perspective est largement déterminée par la coopération entre les très petites entreprises (TPE) et les établissements de microfinance (EMF) dont les pratiques managériales sont soumises à l’épreuve de la réglementation. A ce titre, la réglementation conditionne les pratiques des acteurs, et donc devrait contribuer au développement du marché et assurer la pérennité des EMF et TPE à travers leur coopération. Par rapport à ce qui précède, quels enseignements peut-on tirer de l’expérience gabonaise afin de générer une meilleure compréhension du problème de l’impact de la réglementation sur les acteurs du marché de la microfinance? Ce travail révèle qu’en environnement institutionnalisé, les EMF sont partagés entre deux attitudes : financière ou sociale. Il fait apparaître que plusieurs TPE, porteuses de projets, n’arrivent pas à bénéficier de l’offre du marché microfinancier. Ce paradoxe nous amène alors à interroger les différents comportements que la réglementation du marché de la microfinance traduit et induit. Nous avançons que ces comportements, de même que leur interaction, agissent sur la coordination des acteurs, c'est-à-dire sur la manière dont les EMF et les TPE sont gérés, ainsi que sur la coopération EMF/TPE. Ce travail participe ainsi à une meilleure compréhension du marché de la microfinance au Gabon. / With the direction taken in 2002 by the Banking Commission of Central Africa (COBAC) to develop microfinance activities, the business of microfinance has turned in its organizational form (moving from informal to formal), but also its relationship to its environment. Our field observation shows that this perspective is largely determined by the cooperation between the very small enterprises (VSE) and microfinance institutions (MFIs) whose management practices are put to the test of regulations. As such, the regulation affects the behavior of actors and thus should contribute to market development and the sustainability of MFIs and VSE through their cooperation. Compared to the above, what lessons can be learned from the Gabonese experience to generate a better understanding of the problem of the impact of regulation on the market of microfinance? We show that in an institutionalized environment, EMF have two options: a financial attitude and a social attitude. We show that many small businesses, with projects, are unable to benefit from the offer of the microfinance market. This paradox then leads us to question the different behaviors that the regulation of the microfinance market translated and induced. We induce that these behaviors as well as their interaction affect the internal organization of tasks (coordination) of the actors, that is to say on how EMF and VSE are managed, as well as the cooperation between EMF and VSE. This work opens up new areas of understanding of the microfinance market in Gabon.