Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Alberta, 2009. / Title from pdf file main screen (viewed on Nov. 16, 2009). "A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, [Department of] Philosophy, University of Alberta." Includes bibliographical references.

稿本 / 論文(碩士)--香港中文大學硏究院哲學學部,1992. / 參考文獻: leaves i-vii / 盧傑雄. / Chapter （I) --- 導論 / Chapter (II) --- 道德危機與契約論 / Chapter (II.1) --- 道德危機之形成 / Chapter (II.2) --- 工具理性與道德証成 / Chapter (II.3) --- 經濟人(Homo economicus)與契約論 / Chapter (II.4) --- 市場與道德功能 / Chapter (III) --- 高契爾的契約式道德理論 / Chapter （III.1) --- 理性的個人與合理的選擇 / Chapter (III.2) --- 零和對局(Zero-sum Gsme)與非零和對局 (Non-zero-sum Game) / Chapter (III.2.1) --- 二人零和對局中的合理選擇原 則 / Chapter （III.2.2) --- 二 人非零和對局與囚徒的兩難 / Chapter (III.3) --- 合理的選擇理論與契約式的道德理 論 / Chapter (III.3.1) --- 初始的討價還價境況（initial bargaining position 與洛克式條件 (Lockean Proviso)) / Chapter （III.3.2) --- 大中取小地相對的退譲原則 (The minimax relative concession principle)與分配的公正原則 / Chapter (IV) --- 遵從間題(The Compliance problem) 與合理的道德 (Rational morality) / Chapter (V) --- 遵從道德原則：理性還是不理性? / Chapter (V.1) --- 循瓌問題 / Chapter （V.2) --- 性向的間題 / Chapter (V.3) --- 合理的性向與自由的選擇

Thesis--Munich. / Includes bibliographical references (p. vii-xxxv).

Thesis--Munich. / Bibliography: p. vii-xxxv.

Moral contractarianism, as demonstrated in the work of David Gauthier, is an attempt to derive moral principles from the non-moral premises of rational choice. However, this contractarian enterprise runs aground because it is unable to show that agents would commit to norms in a fairly realistic world where knowledge is limited in space and time, where random shocks are likely, and where agents can be arbitrarily differentiated from one another. In a world like this, agents will find that the most "rational" strategy is to behave "non-rationally," imitating the behavior of others in their vicinity and preserving a limited sort of ignorance.

We share our world with many people who ignore the principles of justice and who regularly take advantage of others by breaching trust or breaking agreements. This dissertation is about the irrationality of the actions of these covenant-breakers. A covenant-breaker typically believes that unjust behavior is to his advantage and that only a fool would act in any other way. Would it not be disturbing if this were true? My central claim will be that adherence to the precepts of justice is a rational strategy for a self-interested actor. I intend to demonstrate that con men and covenant-breakers do not act rationally when violating an agreement. I will trace the concept of justice as it evolves through philosophical history and show that, while the concept of justice changes as the underlying concept of human nature and psychology changes, the argument in favor of the rationality of just behavior remains coherent throughout. Each historical interpretation will advance some form of the claim that the consistent observance of cooperative agreements is a rational strategy, and at each point an interlocutor will object. I will show that these interlocutors are mistaken. My motivating goal is to show that justice, understood as the consistent observance of cooperative agreements, is rational. I want to respond to the clandestine cheaters and other skeptics who believe that just behavior is for suckers, because, if the skeptics are right, and justice is indeed irrational, then those among us who are acting in a just manner are paying an unnecessary cost.

Moral contractarianism, as demonstrated in the work of David Gauthier, is an attempt to derive moral principles from the non-moral premises of rational choice. However, this contractarian enterprise runs aground because it is unable to show that agents would commit to norms in a fairly realistic world where knowledge is limited in space and time, where random shocks are likely, and where agents can be arbitrarily differentiated from one another. In a world like this, agents will find that the most "rational" strategy is to behave "non-rationally," imitating the behavior of others in their vicinity and preserving a limited sort of ignorance.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, 1911. / "Reprinted from the University of Nevada studies, vol. II, no. 3 (1910), and vol. III, no. 2 (1911)." Also available in digital form on the Internet Archive Web site.

I use a brand of social contract theory derived from David Gauthier to delimit precisely what might be permissible in the methods of conception and gestation of a child. More specifically, Gauthier posits a rule that is supposed to govern behavior among individuals prior to but in anticipation of the rise of social interaction. I argue that this rule can be appropriately applied to the interactions between a parent and her unborn child. I review other social contract models in an effort to show that Gauthier's is preferable to these. I also address other accounts concerned with parental obligations to the unborn, to see how these fare against Gauthier's. I conclude that, because of its breadth of applicability, as well as its plausibility, Gauthier's model is a powerful force for guiding us through these issues.

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